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PCP and ontology
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Placing constructs at the centre of its focus of
attention, PCP lies
outside the Cartesian dualist perspective. Ontologically, PCP is a form
of
substantival monism, meaning
that the whole world is assumed to be made of one
substance. Very much like Spinoza’s monism, this one substance is
neither made
from matter nor ideas, but something neutral. It is not entirely clear
what it
exactly is, but we can apply attributive pluralism to this substance,
i.e. it
can be construed in many different ways according to the philosophy of
constructive alternativism.
It is important that this substance really exist,
and that it is not a figment of our imagination. However, it exists in
a very
neutral, unspecified way. Our ways of knowing specify this substance in
one of
potentially endless ways. Therefore, it could be said that, in PCP,
epistemology (investigating the nature and origin of knowledge) is
placed in
front of ontology (investigating the nature of being and existence),
and that a
distinct boundary between these two realms is blurred. Although this
approach
in realistic philosophy is often labeled the "epistemic fallacy",
stating that
existence of being should not be defined by what we know about it –
thus
reducing existence to human knowledge, in constructivist and other
non-realist
philosophies it is construed as a proper illustration of their
approach.
Existence and knowledge themselves are not immanent properties of the
world;
instead, they are constructions of the human mind, and are just two out
of the
myriad constructions that can be constituted in order to make our being
more
meaningful. Even before ontology was constituted as a discipline of
philosophy,
people had to understand their world and each other. Therefore, they
had to
develop specific categories and notions in order to make their living
understandable to themselves. Only then could some aspects of their
life could
be subjected to philosophical, and even more lately to psychological,
analysis.
Being, existence, reality and truth are only a few of the
categories formed in
the history of human discursive practice. Therefore, realist remark
exactly
summarizes the PCP approach: there is no doubt that reality is out
there, but
in order to be able to talk about it, we have to construe it first –
potentially with an endless repertory of alternatives.
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References
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- Chiari, G. & Nuzzo, M.
(1996): Psychological Constructivism: a
metatheoreticla differentiation. Journal
of Constructivist Psychology, 9, 163-184.
- Stojnov, D & Butt, T.
(2002): The Relational Basis of Personal
Construct Psychology. In: R. Neimeyer & G. Neimeyer (Eds.), Advances of personal construct theory: New
Directions and Perspectives, 81-113. Westport, Connecticut and
London:
Praeger.
- Warren, W. (1998): Philosophical
Dimensions of Personal Construct Psychology. London: Routledge.
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Dušan Stojnov
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