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MEASURING SELF-DISCREPANCIES ON
THE BIG-FIVE PERSONALITY TRAITS
WITH THE REPERTORY GRID
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Brenda L. McDaniel, James
W. Grice |
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Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA
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Abstract
The current paper describes a repertory
grid approach for measuring trait-based self-discrepancies. This novel
method
is strictly empirical and more parsimonious than extant methods for
assessing
self-discrepancies on personality dimensions. We demonstrated this
approach by
measuring discrepancies between the actual, ideal, and ought selves on
the Big
Five personality traits and then assessing their relationships with
measures of
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. The results indicated that
self-discrepancies on the Big Five personality traits were generally
not
predictive of psychological well-being. These findings were discussed
in the
context of previous research and contemporary models that relate
self-discrepancies
to different emotional states.
Key words: Big Five traits, personality,
self-discrepancies, repertory grid.
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"In each kind of self,
material, social,
and spiritual, men distinguish between the immediate and actual, and
the remote
and potential, between the narrower and the wider view, to the
detriment of the
former and advantage of the latter." (James, 1890, p. 315)
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William
James is often cited for the unique
distinction he drew between the actual and ideal selves. As described
by James,
the actual self is one’s immediate, conscious sense of self; whereas
the ideal
self (or potential self) is an image of oneself that is constructed in
accord
with personally desirable characteristics. Since the publication of
James’ The
Principles of Psychology in 1890 psychologists have explored how
the actual and
ideal selves are constituted and related within the individual’s
overall
self-concept. Rogers (1961), for instance, regarded the actual and ideal
selves as internal
representations of oneself that are often at odds, and one of the
primary goals
of therapy is to explore and reconcile the differences between these
two
selves. Hart, Field, Garfinkle, and Singer (1997) further posited a
semantic
space model of cognition in which the different selves are situated.
Given this
semantic space, the proximities between the actual and ideal selves can
be
measured and correlated with measures of self-esteem and mood. Higgins
(1987)
also relied on a semantic space model of cognition, and specifically
showed
that the discrepancy between the actual and ideal selves regulates
particular
emotional states such as depression. In the past twenty years,
researchers have
gone beyond the ideal self, introducing the ought (Higgins, 1987),
undesired
(Ogilvie, 1987), feared (Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999), and
future
(Markus & Nurius, 1986) selves. The overarching goal behind much of
this
work has been to study how different self-discrepancies (i.e.,
differences
between different selves) are related to distinct emotional states.
Efforts have also
been made to integrate
self-discrepancy research with modern trait theories of personality.
Hart et
al. (1997), for instance, examined the relationships between various
self-discrepancies and scores on the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae,
1992), a
measure of the Big Five personality traits: Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Openness
to Experience, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. Hafdahl, Panter,
Gramzow,
Sedikides, and Insko (2000) further introduced a novel measurement and
scoring
procedure to obtain scores for different selves (e.g., the actual and
ideal
selves) on the Big Five factors. They then computed discrepancies
between
various pairs of selves and correlated the resulting values with
measures of depression
and self-esteem.
In the current
study we measured
self-discrepancies on the Big Five traits using a modified version of
Kelly’s
(1955) repertory grid technique. It is well known that the repertory
grid is
highly suited for idiographic research in personality psychology. Given
its
flexibility, however, it can also be used to address questions
concerning trait
models such as the Big Five (e.g., see Grice, 2004). Assessing
self-discrepancies on personality traits with the repertory grid is in
fact a
parsimonious process that offers significant advantages over the
complex and
time-consuming procedures employed in previous studies. Using this
straightforward technique, we examined the relationships between
different
trait self-discrepancies and measures of psychological well-being;
specifically
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. We also tested key predictions
from
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory and discussed the importance of
the
current methods and results for future self-discrepancy researchers.
Self-discrepancies and personality
Because of its
popularity, Higgins’ (1987)
self-discrepancy theory has played an important role in studies that
have
sought to integrate self-discrepancies and trait theories of
personality.
Building on James’ (1890) and Rogers’ (1961) original insights
distinguishing
between the actual and ideal selves, Higgins developed self-discrepancy
theory
(Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985) to differentiate between the
actual and
ought selves as well. As stated above, the ideal self (or self-guide)
is an
individual’s representation of his or her hopes and aspirations for him
or
herself; whereas the ought self is an individual’s representation of
someone
else’s beliefs about his or her responsibilities and obligations
(Higgins,
1999). The importance of the distinction between the ideal and ought
self-guides lies in the connections between different
self-discrepancies and
particular emotional states. Stated succinctly, self-discrepancy theory
posits
that discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves will uniquely
predict
dejection-related emotions (e.g., sadness, disappointment, and
depression),
whereas discrepancies between the actual and ought selves will uniquely
predict
agitation-related emotions (e.g., anxiety, nervousness, and guilt).
In an initial
effort to explore the
boundaries between self-discrepancies and trait models of personality,
Hart et
al. (1997) related different self-discrepancies to measures of
emotional
well-being and the Big Five factors of personality. Self-discrepancies
were
measured by first asking participants to freely describe themselves and
important others using adjective terms. The fifty most prevalent
descriptors
for each participant were then selected. Finally, the participants were
asked to
indicate whether or not each adjective described their actual, ideal,
ought,
future, and undesired selves as well as a number of significant others.
In
their analysis of the resulting ratings Hart et al. (1997) found that a
number
of self-proximities (i.e., the opposite of discrepancies) were related
to
scores on the Big Five traits as measured by the NEO-FFI (Costa &
McCrae,
1992). Hart et al. also found that the actual-ideal and actual-ought
proximities were associated with both anxiety and depression; however,
after
statistically controlling for the Neuroticism, Extraversion, and
Agreeableness
traits, proximities continued to be related to anxiety but not
depression.
These results were therefore not entirely consistent with the
predictions of
Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory, but nonetheless demonstrated that
self-discrepancies could be studied in the context of a personality
trait
model.
Hafdahl et al.
(2000) have more recently
devised a method for directly assessing self-discrepancies on the Big
Five
personality factors. They incorporated the Selves Questionnaire (SQ)
into their
study, which is a measure often used in studies of Higgins’
self-discrepancy
theory. To complete the SQ, a participant freely lists descriptive
adjectives
that apply to the actual, ideal, and ought selves. Adjectives are also
listed
for these different selves from the viewpoint of some other significant
person
(e.g., mom, dad, or a romantic partner). Trained judges in Hafdahl et
al.’s
study then used marker items from Golberg (1990) to code the responses
from the
SQ as indicators of the Big Five personality traits. The Big Five
traits from
Golberg’s analysis are typically referred to as Surgency,
Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect. As part of the
coding
scheme, scores for the actual, ideal, and ought selves were generated
for each
of the personality traits. Discrepancy scores were then computed and
correlated
with a measure of self-esteem and two different measures of depression.
The
results revealed that actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies on
the Big
Five traits were not correlated with either measure of depression. The
actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies were found to be correlated
with
self-esteem, however, for Surgency and for the average discrepancies
across all
five traits. The results were therefore inconsistent with Higgins’
(1987)
self-discrepancy theory but showed that some discrepancies are
nonetheless
associated with different emotional states.
Hafdahl et al.’s
(2000) method was
certainly innovative. Using the SQ and a coding system based on marker
items
for the Big Five, they obtained trait data from free responses and were
able to
directly assess the various self-discrepancies on each personality
dimension. A
number of limitations pertaining to their methods, however, can be
noted. Foremost,
their coding scheme was complex and time-consuming. Participants’
responses to
the SQ were judged against nearly two-thousand marker adjectives for
the Big
Five to determine if each particular response was a match (identical to
a Big
Five marker) or a non-match (not among the nearly two-thousand marker
adjectives). More difficult subjective judgments were then made to
classify the
non-matches. The interrater reliabilities for these judgments were
adequate but
unimpressive, ranging from .64 to .73 for the five traits. Once the
free-response descriptions from the SQ were coded, scores for the
actual,
ideal, and ought selves were computed using factor loadings for the
marker
items as weights. Again, this procedure was time-consuming and also
subject to
the inherent problems of using loadings as weights in computing sum
scores. It
has been shown that factor-analysis-derived sum scores (essentially
factor
scores) based on loadings are generally less valid than scores based on
the
factor score coefficients (Harris, 1985, p. 282-287; Grice, 2001).
Finally, by
using the free-response format of the SQ, the procedure did not ensure
that
each of the Big Five traits would be represented sufficiently in the
adjectives, or that the five traits would be equally represented. Given
these
concerns regarding the coding and scoring procedures employed by
Hafdahl et
al., we sought to utilize a more efficient procedure for obtaining
self-discrepancies on personality trait dimensions and subsequently
assessing
their relationships with measures of psychological well-being.
Kelly’s (1955)
original repertory grid
technique has undergone numerous modifications since its inception,
resulting
in a wide variety of measurement procedures that are generically
referred to as
“repertory grids” (see Beail, 1985; Fransella, Bell,
&
Bannister, 2004). In the typical repertory grid, an individual rates or
ranks a
number of people or objects (elements) along a series of bipolar
dimensions
(constructs). Any number of elements and constructs can be elicited
from the
person completing the grid, or they can be provided by the examiner. A
two-dimensional matrix of ratings or rankings is generated which can
subsequently be subjected to a host of statistical analyses and
graphing
procedures. Grice (2004) recently showed that the repertory grid
technique can
easily be modified to obtain ratings for personality traits. In his
study,
participants rated themselves and other individuals on twenty-five
marker items
for the Big Five personality traits. Total scores, or trait scores,
were then
computed for the people in each participant’s grid and used in
subsequent
multivariate statistical analyses.
The data
acquisition method employed in Grice’s
study can also be used to assess self-discrepancies on personality
traits such
as the Big Five. Ratings for the actual, ideal, and ought selves and
other
significant individuals can be obtained on multiple items for each
personality
trait. These ratings can then be summed into trait scores for the
actual,
ideal, and ought selves, as well as for the other rated individuals.
Automated
procedures can moreover be used to obtain the repertory grid ratings.
Likewise,
trait scores for the different selves and significant others can be
computed
directly from the data. Trained judges are therefore not employed in
the
scoring procedures. Compared to the methods outlined by Hafdahl et al.,
this
summation-based approach is parsimonious, efficient, and strictly
empirical. As
will be shown below, the trait scores can be transformed into
discrepancy
scores and correlated with various measures of psychological
well-being,
similar to previous studies. These discrepancy scores can also be used
to
assess the specific predictions of Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred twenty-five undergraduate
students (69 women and 56 men), 18 to 29 years of age (M = 19.6, Mdn = 19, SD =
1.76), participated in this study in exchange for course credit. The
sample
consisted of 81.6 percent Caucasians, 4.8 percent Native Americans, 4.0
percent
African Americans, 3.2 percent Asian-Pacific Islanders, 1.6 percent
Hispanics,
and 4.8 percent of the participants reported their ethnicity as
"other."
Materials
Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory. The
Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory (RSEI;
Rosenberg, 1965, p. 17-18) is a ten-item self-report instrument that
measures
global self-esteem. Participants rate each evaluative item on a 7-point
Likert
scale ranging from "disagree strongly" to "agree strongly." Good
reliability
and construct validity for data generated from the RSEI have been
reported
(Goldsmith, 1986). Cronbach’s alpha for all ten items in the present
study was
.88.
Brief Symptom Inventory. The Brief
Symptom
Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1975) is a self-report questionnaire that
assesses
nine primary symptom dimensions (somatization, obsessive-compulsive,
interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic
anxiety,
paranoid ideation, and psychoticism) as well as global psychological
distress. The
BSI consists of 53-items which participants rate on 5-point scales
(ranging
from "not at all" to "extremely") indicating the number of times during
the
past week they were bothered by a particular symptom. Basic language,
equivalent of an American sixth grade education, is used in the
instructions
and wording of the items. Administration normally takes no more than 10
minutes, and Derogatis and Melisaratos (1983) report strong evidence
for
convergent and construct validity. The BSI has also been shown to yield
data
with good test-retest and internal consistency reliabilities.
Cronbach’s alpha
for all 53 items was .97 for the current data, and alphas for the
anxiety and
depression scales were .86 and .87, respectively. These two primary
scales were
examined in the analyses below.
Procedure
Participants
rated their actual, ideal, and
ought selves, as well as twenty-two other individuals on computers
using
Idiogrid (Grice, 2002). After reading brief instructions on the
computer
monitor, participants entered twenty-two names (e.g., Megan, Allen) or
titles
(e.g., Mom, Uncle Patrick) for individuals who most closely fit
provided roles.
The roles, adapted from Kelly (1955, p. 221-222), are listed in the Appendix.
Disregarding
misspellings, the participants
were not permitted to enter duplicate names or role titles. If the same
name or
title was entered, they were prompted to think of another person or
clarify
that the entered name or title was in fact a different person by using
a last
name initial or other identifying mark. The ideal self was defined as
"yourself
as you would truly like to be" and the ought self was defined as
"yourself as
others would expect or like you to be." Participants then rated their
three selves
("myself", the ideal self, and the ought self) and the twenty-two
entered
people on thirty marker items for the Big Five. The marker items were
randomly
selected for each participant
from the one-hundred items comprising the
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999). The Big Five
traits were
labeled as Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
and
Intellect. Six items were selected for each of the Big Five scales
(e.g., six
from Extroversion, six from Agreeableness, etc.). A 5-point Likert-type
scale
(-2 = Very Inaccurate, -1 = Inaccurate, 0 = Neither Inaccurate nor
Accurate, +1
= Accurate, +2 = Very Accurate) was used for the ratings, and a
standard item
stem, "______ is the type of person who _____", was used. The first
blank in
the stem was replaced with the name or role title of the person being
rated,
and the second blank was replaced with the personality phrase. For
example, "Megan is the type of person who is the life of the party", or
"Mom is the type
of person who gets chores done right away." The twenty-five elements (3
selves
and 22 others) were presented in random order to each participant and,
for each
person, the thirty personality items were presented in random order.
The
seven-hundred and fifty ratings were recorded in a 25 (roles/elements)
x 30
(Big Five markers/constructs) repertory grid. Following completion of
the
rating procedure, participants completed a demographics sheet, the
Brief
Symptom Inventory, and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory.
Participants were
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Participants completed
all tasks
in 30 minutes or less.
RESULTS
Analysis
of trait scores
For each
participant’s grid, the Big Five
marker items were keyed in the same direction such that high scores
indicated
greater levels of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism,
and Intellect. The six marker items for each trait were then summed
separately
for the actual, ideal, and ought selves. These sum scores, or trait scores,
ranged in value from -12 to +12.
Figure 1
Means and
standard errors were then
computed and plotted in Figure 1.
As can be seen, the ideal self was
rated most
extreme on the Big Five dimensions, followed closely by the ought self.
The
actual self was not rated as extreme as the other two selves on the Big
Five
traits and was most similar to the ideal and ought selves on
Agreeableness and
least similar on Neuroticism. Overall the participants viewed
themselves as
slightly extraverted, agreeable, slightly conscientious, slightly
emotionally
stable, and relatively high in intellect. They wished or thought they
ought to
be more extraverted, more agreeable, more conscientious, less neurotic,
and
higher in intellect. These results are typical for the college
population that
was sampled. Lastly, if the Neuroticism trait scores are reflected, it
can be
seen in Figure 1 that the
ideal and ought selves showed less variation
in their
means across the Big Five dimensions compared to the actual self.
Analysis of discrepancy scores
An important
premise of self-discrepancy
research is that trait scores fail to convey an important aspect of
self-concept; namely, the intra-psychic tension between the various
selves. In
order to capture this aspect of self-concept, discrepancy researchers
often compute
disparity scores in which large values indicate greater discrepancies
between
the different selves and small values indicate greater self-congruity.
In the
current study, Actual-Ideal (A-I) and Actual-Ought (A-O) discrepancy
scores
were computed for each of the Big Five traits by taking the absolute
values of
the differences between the respective trait scores. The A-I and A-O
discrepancy scores consequently ranged in value from 0 to 24, with 0
representing no discrepancy and 24 representing the greatest
discrepancy
possible.
Table 1
As can be seen in
Table 1, the
average
self-discrepancies for the Big Five traits were small, ranging from
2.44 to
5.50. Examination of frequency histograms also revealed that all
discrepancies
were positively skewed. Thus, while a wide range of values in both A-I
and A-O
discrepancies were seen across the Big Five traits, the vast majority
of
discrepancies were small in magnitude. The largest average A-I and A-O
discrepancies were noted for Neuroticism, whereas the smallest averages
of the
two discrepancies were noted for Agreeableness. The descriptive
statistics for
the measures of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem reported in Table
1 also
reveal low variability in the participants’ responses. High scores for
the
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem measures indicated higher levels
of
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. On average the students reported
low
levels of depression and anxiety and high levels of self-esteem.
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Table
2
Table 2 displays
the bivariate
correlations
between the Big Five A-I and A-O discrepancies and measures of
depression,
anxiety, and self-esteem. Consistent with previous studies, the
correlations
between self-discrepancies were large (> .75) and highly significant
within
each trait. In other words, participants reporting high A-I
discrepancies for a
given Big Five trait tended to report high A-O discrepancies as well.
Even across
traits the A-I and A-O discrepancies were moderately (> .30) and
significantly correlated. Those participants reporting high A-I
discrepancies
on one trait therefore tended to report large A-O discrepancies on the
other
four traits as well. Lastly, participants reporting high A-I
discrepancies for
a given trait tended to report high A-I discrepancies on the other four
traits,
and participants reporting high A-O discrepancies for a given trait
tended to
report high A-O discrepancies on the other four traits as well.
With regard to
the measures of psychological
well-being (see Table 2),
high A-I discrepancies on Extraversion
predicted
greater levels of depression and anxiety. Greater A-I and A-O
discrepancies on
Conscientiousness also predicted higher levels of anxiety. High A-I and
A-O
discrepancies on Extraversion and Neuroticism predicted lower scores of
self-esteem, and high A-I discrepancies on Conscientiousness predicted
lower
scores of self-esteem. While all of these correlations were
statistically significant
at the .05 level, the absolute magnitudes were low (< .30).
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Semi-partial
correlation analyses
Prior
research has shown that once
variation in ratings of the actual self are controlled, ratings for the
ideal
self fail to predict measures of psychological well-being (Wylie,
1961). In
other words, variation attributable to the actual self ratings alone
may drive
the relationships between the self-discrepancies and measures of
psychological
well-being. We therefore computed semi-partial correlations between the
A-I and
A-O discrepancies and the measures of depression, anxiety, and
self-esteem,
controlling for the effects of the actual self in each measure of
psychological
well-being. These semi-partial correlations are reported in Table 3 and
show
the discrepancies’ unique contribution above and beyond the actual self
ratings
when predicting depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. Only two of the
nine
original self-discrepancy correlations remained significant when actual
self
ratings were controlled (cf., Table
2). Specifically, the two
semi-partial
correlations between anxiety and the A-I and A-O discrepancies on
Conscientiousness (controlling for actual self Conscientiousness
ratings) were
statistically significant. Additionally, the semi-partial correlation
between
anxiety and the A-O Intellect discrepancy (controlling for actual self
Intellect ratings) was significant. Participants with greater
discrepancies
tended to report higher levels of anxiety. The absolute magnitudes of
these
statistically significant semi-partial correlations, however, were
small (<
.23). Similarly, all of the nonsignificant values for depression,
anxiety, and
self-esteem were small in magnitude (max = .16). Overall, these results
indicate that A-I and A-O discrepancies on the Big Five traits were not
effective, unique predictors of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem.
Table 3
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Tests
of self-discrepancy theory
According to Higgins’ self-discrepancy
theory, discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves should
predict
self-reported levels of depression when controlling for variability in
the
Actual-Ought (A-O) discrepancies. In other words, the Actual-Ideal
(A-I)
self-discrepancy should uniquely predict depression. To test this
prediction
separately for each of the Big Five traits, we regressed the BSI
depression
scores onto the A-I and A-O discrepancies. A total of five regression
analyses
were conducted and only the Extraversion model was statistically
significant [F
(2, 121) = 3.63, p = .03, Adjusted R2 = .04]. Specifically, the
Extraversion
A-I discrepancy beta weight was significant and positive (b = .41, p =
.02)
while the Extraversion A-O discrepancy beta weight was nonsignificant
(b =
-.23, p = .19). Hence, when predicting depression from Extraversion
discrepancies, this aspect of Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory was
supported. Analyses
for the other four Big Five personality traits failed to yield support
for
self-discrepancy theory when predicting depression.
Self-discrepancy theory also predicts
that
discrepancies between the actual and ought selves should uniquely
predict
self-reported levels of anxiety when controlling for variability in the
Actual-Ideal discrepancies. To test this prediction separately for each
of the
Big Five traits, we regressed the BSI anxiety scores onto the A-I and
A-O
discrepancies scores. Two of the five models for predicting anxiety
were
statistically significant. The Extraversion model was statistically
significant
[F (2, 121) = 3.74, p = .03, Adjusted R2 = .04], yielding a significant
beta
weight for the A-I discrepancy (b = .38, p = .03) and a nonsignificant
beta
weight for the A-O discrepancy (b = -.19, p = .28). This result
therefore
contradicted self-discrepancy theory because the A-O discrepancy was
expected
to uniquely predict anxiety, not the A-I discrepancy. The regression
analysis
for Conscientiousness was also significant for predicting anxiety [F
(2, 121) =
3.82, p = .03, Adjusted R2 = .04]; however, neither the A-I discrepancy
beta
weight (b = .06, p = .75) nor the A-O discrepancy beta weight (b = .24,
p =
.25) was significant in the model.
Similar to the small effect sizes –
explaining approximately 4% of the variance in the measures of
psychological
well-being – of the three significant regression models above, the
nonsignificant models also yielded small effect sizes (Adjusted R2
ranging from
.00-.01). It should also be noted that scatterplots of the residuals
were
examined and multicollinearity was checked for each analysis. Slight
anomalies
were present in some of the plots and moderate levels of
multicollinearity were
found (tolerance values ranged from .27-.42). These anomalies, however,
did not
affect the conclusions substantively. Therefore, very little supporting
evidence was found for self-discrepancy theory within the Big Five
personality
traits.
DISCUSSION
A modified form of Kelly’s (1955)
original
repertory grid technique was used to measure participants’ views of
their
actual, ideal, and ought selves on the Big Five personality traits:
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and
Intellect.
This approach toward measuring the three different selves on the
personality
traits was automated on a computer, and calculation of the trait scores
did not
require the use of trained judges. The current repertory grid procedure
took
about 20 minutes or less for participants to complete on the computer.
Furthermore, none of the participants demonstrated overt signs of
fatigue or boredom
(e.g., selecting the same scale response for all ratings) with the
procedures
or reported difficulties with completing the ratings. The quickness and
ease
which participants completed the repertory grid is not surprising given
the
personal constructs (Big Five marker items) were provided, and the
participants
were simply required to rate themselves and others. The savings in time
and
effort afforded by the automated grid procedure was realized in
computing the
trait scores and discrepancies. The trait scores were computed as
simple sums
of the ratings, and difference scores were then computed for the
discrepancies.
This process was much simpler and more efficient than the cumbersome
procedures
used by Hafdahl et al. (2000) and had the additional benefit of not
requiring
subjective judgments made by trained research assistants.
Examination of the trait scores for each
of
the three selves indicated very little separation between the ideal and
ought
selves. In other words, the participants showed very little
discrimination
between the ideal and ought selves. Both were rated relatively extreme
on the
Big Five traits compared to the actual self. The participants viewed
themselves
as slightly extraverted, agreeable, slightly conscientious, slightly
emotionally
stable, and relatively high in intellect; whereas they wished or
thought they
ought to be more extraverted, more agreeable, more conscientious, less
neurotic, and higher in intellect. Given the positive valences (e.g.,
the
typical college student values extraversion over introversion) of all
but the
Neuroticism trait, these results are not surprising.
In previous studies the discrepancies
between the actual and ideal selves and the actual and ought selves on
the Big
Five personality traits have been compared to a variety of
psychological
constructs, most notably depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. How do
the
results from the current study, using a repertory grid approach,
compare to the
findings reported in these previous investigations? Analysis of the
self-discrepancies revealed that the participants in this study
generally
viewed their actual selves as similar to their ideal and ought selves
on the
Big Five traits. On a 24-point scale, the average absolute discrepancy
was
approximately 3.5 across all five traits. The discrepancies also
appeared to be
general; in other words, those individuals with large Actual-Ideal
(A-I) or
Actual-Ought (A-O) discrepancies on one of the Big Five traits, tended
to have
large A-I or A-O discrepancies on the other traits. Most of the
bivariate
correlations revealed that the A-I and A-O self-discrepancies were not
significantly associated with the measures of depression and anxiety.
The few
exceptions involved Extraversion and Conscientiousness. Larger A-I
discrepancies
on Extraversion were weakly associated with depression and anxiety, and
larger
A-I and A-O discrepancies on Conscientiousness were weakly associated
with
anxiety. Comparable correlations were reported by Hafdahl et al. (2000)
with
largely nonsignificant results. With regard to self-esteem, however,
Hafdahl et
al. reported that A-I and A-O Surgency (Extraversion) discrepancies, as
well as
the average of self-discrepancies across the five personality traits,
significantly predicted self-esteem. In the current study, the A-I and
A-O
Extraversion discrepancies similarly predicted self-esteem.
Participants with
large self-discrepancies on the Extraversion trait tended to report
lower
self-esteem. In contrast to Hafdahl et al.’s findings high A-I
Consciousness, A-I
Neuroticism, and A-O Neuroticism discrepancies were also found to
significantly
predict low self-esteem; although the magnitudes of these effects were
small.
Semi-partial correlations were also
computed and examined to assess the unique predictive power of the A-I
and A-O
discrepancies. The computation of these correlations was important
because the
use of discrepancy scores to predict different psychological states has
been an
issue of debate. Wylie (1961, p. 105) argued long ago that discrepancy
scores
may provide little information above and beyond what can be found in
ratings of
the actual self alone. On the other hand, Higgins, Bond, Klein, and
Strauman
(1986) have argued that it is not sufficient to measure only the
individuals’
actual self, the discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal
and ought
selves must also be measured. We thus computed the semi-partial
correlations
between the A-I and A-O discrepancies and the measures of depression
and
anxiety, controlling for the shared variance between the actual self
ratings
and the three measures of psychological well-being. In other words, the
effects
of the actual self ratings were removed from the measures of
depression,
anxiety, and self-esteem. In this way, Wylie’s concerns were addressed
and the
unique relationship between the Big Five self-discrepancies and
measures of
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem could be assessed. Most of the
resulting
semi-partial correlations, however, were nonsignificant. Similar
nonsignificant
results for self-esteem were found by Moretti and Higgins (1990) when
using a
nomothetic measure of self-discrepancies. The few significant
exceptions in the
current study involved Conscientiousness and Intellect. Specifically,
larger
A-I and A-O discrepancies on Conscientiousness and larger A-O
discrepancies on
Intellect were weakly associated with anxiety. Given the current sample
of
students, these results likely reflect the parental, peer, and
institutional
pressure placed on the participants to behave responsibly and succeed
in
college.
Finally, the primary predictions of
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory were examined in the current
data using
multiple-regression analyses. Self-discrepancy theory posits that
discrepancies
between the actual and ideal selves will uniquely predict depression,
whereas
discrepancies between the actual and ought selves will uniquely predict
anxiety. The results generally failed to support these predictions.
Only one of
ten regression analyses was in line with Higgins’ theory; namely, A-I
discrepancies on Extraversion uniquely predicted scores on the BSI
depression
scale. This positive result, however, was contradicted by the other
regression
analysis involving Extraversion which showed the A-I discrepancy to
also
uniquely predict anxiety. According to self-discrepancy theory, the A-O
discrepancy should uniquely predicted anxiety. The current results
stand in
contrast to numerous studies published by Higgins and his colleagues
that
support self-discrepancy research (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond,
Klein
& Strauman, 1986; Higgins, Klein & Strauman, 1985; and Strauman
&
Higgins, 1987), but are consistent with the negative results reported
by other
investigators (e.g., Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998;
Key,
Mannella, Thomas, & Gilroy, 2000; and Ozgul, Heubeck, Ward, &
Wilkinson, 2003).
A number of factors may explain the
largely nonsignificant or
contrary findings reported above. First, the college students in this
study
were not very depressed or anxious, and they reported moderately high
self-esteem. The low variability of these measures may have attenuated
their
relationships with the trait self-discrepancy scores. The distributions
for the
discrepancy scores were also positively skewed, with most participants
indicating low A-I and A-O discrepancies. On the other hand, prior
self-discrepancy studies yielding positive results have also employed
primarily
college students, and it is therefore difficult to clearly attribute
the
nonsignificant and contrary findings of this study to differences in
samples or
populations. This issue in fact highlights the need for samples drawn
from more
diverse populations (e.g., different age groups and social economic
backgrounds, clinical populations) in future discrepancy research. More
diverse
samples would likely remedy the restricted ranges, like those observed
in this
study, and increase both statistical power and the generalizability of
results.
Moreover, from the standpoint of Personal Construct Theory (PCT),
variability
across time in how individuals might apply a set of provided constructs
to
themselves and others is to be expected. It is thus reasonable to
hypothesize
that as individuals mature from adolescence to their senior years their
self-discrepancies may change. While the results of the current study
do not
address these dynamic processes inherent in the PCT perspective of
self-concept, the efficient methods presented above for measuring
self-discrepancies could prove very useful in such endeavors.
Second, Goldberg’s (1999) marker items
for
the Big Five personality traits were used in the current study. Other
studies
employed different measures of the Big Five traits; for instance, Hart
et al.
(1997) measured the five traits using the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae,
1992) in
their study of self-discrepancies. Other studies relating psychological
well-being to personality traits have commonly employed some version of
Costa
and McCrae’s measure of the Big Five (e.g., Ebert, Tucker, & Roth,
2002;
Meyer, 2002). It is feasible that using a different set of marker items
in the
repertory grids would yield different results.
Third, the participants in this study
rated
their actual, ideal, and ought selves in the context of 22 other
individuals.
The presentation of the three selves and the 22 other individuals was
randomized for each person, and although each rating was made
independent of
the others it is possible that the context affected the participants’
ratings
of their actual, ideal, and ought selves. In studies of Higgins’
self-discrepancy theory, only the three selves were typically assessed.
Similarly, in Hafdahl et al.’s (2000) study of Big Five
self-discrepancies,
only the actual, ideal and ought selves were assessed. It is impossible
to
argue the superiority of one approach over the other at this juncture,
but
collecting ratings of other individuals does provide several potential
benefits. For instance, although they were not addressed in the
analyses above,
it is possible to compute and evaluate discrepancies between the actual
self
and other individuals (e.g., mom, dad, or significant other). Hart et
al.
(1997) showed that such discrepancies may also predict different
emotional
states.
Finally, the repertory grid technique
was
used in the current study to obtain data on well known personality
traits that
are considered to be common to all people. Moretti and Higgins (1990)
and
Higgins (1999), however, have emphasized the importance of obtaining
person-specific (i.e., idiographic) data in self-discrepancy research.
Higgins
(1999) argued that a central moderating variable in discrepancy
research, and
particularly in his self-discrepancy theory, is the individual
importance each
person ascribes to the trait or quality being considered. In Higgins’
Selves
Questionnaire, participants freely list qualities that they consider to
describe their actual, ideal, and ought selves. Because these
descriptors are
freely elicited, Higgins assumes they are both accessible and important
to the
individual’s self-concept. The items found on a standardized
questionnaire, by
contrast, may largely prove irrelevant to any given individual’s
self-concept,
or the researcher will not be able to separate the important and
unimportant
descriptors. In the methods described above, participants could be
asked to
rate the importance of each Big Five marker item, and then the trait
scores
could be computed for a reduced set of items. However, given the
findings of
Hafdahl et al. (2000), it is not clear that such a strategy would alter
the
current results in regard to self-discrepancy theory. Hafdahl et al.
employed
the Selves Questionnaire in their study and translated the
participant’s
responses into scores on the Big Five traits. It could be argued that
such
scores represent more personally relevant data than the summation
scores
computed above, but the results still failed to support Higgins’
self-discrepancy theory. Nonetheless, Kelly’s (1955) repertory grid
technique
is best suited for collecting idiographic data, and can hence easily be
used to
assess self-discrepancies on individuals’ own personal constructs.
Moreover, as
was recently shown by Grice (2004), both idiographic data and trait
data (like
the data in this study) collected from repertory grids can be compared
and
combined. Using the repertory grid technique, Higgins’ claim regarding
the
importance of assessing self-discrepancies idiographically, rather than
nomothetically, can be empirically tested.
The current methodology can therefore
play
an important role in the future of self-discrepancy research. It can
also
potentially play an important role in building theoretical bridges
between PCT,
self-concept research, and trait theories of personality. PCT has much
in
common with contemporary semantic space models of self-concept (e.g.,
see Cross
& Markus, 1994; Markus & Nurius, 1986), and Grice (2004) has
recently
argued that PCT serves as a propitious framework for addressing the
idiographic
- nomothetic debate in mainstream personality psychology. We are
hopeful that
the techniques and methods described above will lead to new insights
and further
advances in exploring these theoretical boundaries.
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Ebert, S. A., Tucker, D. C., & Roth,
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L. (2002). Psychological resistance factors as predictors of general
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Fransella, F., Bell,
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Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative
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Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A
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Goldsmith, R. E. (1986). Dimensionality
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Grice, J. W. (2004). Bridging the
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Hafdahl, A. R., Panter, A. T., Gramzow,
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H., Sedikides, C., & Insko, C. A. (2000). Free-response
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Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-Discrepancy:
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APPENDIX
Provided roles
1. ‘Your mother (or someone who has been
like a mother to you).’
2. ‘Your father (or someone who has been
like a father to you).’
3. ‘Your brother nearest your age. If
you
have no brother, the person who is most like one to you.’
4. ‘Your sister nearest your age. If you
have no sister, the person who is most like one to you’.
5. ‘Your wife/husband or
girlfriend/boyfriend (or someone you would like to have as a romantic
partner).’
6. ‘Your most recent ex-girlfriend or
ex-boyfriend (or someone you have had romantic feelings for in the
past).’
7. ‘Your closest friend of your same
sex.’
8. ‘A person of your same sex whom you
once
thought was a friend but in whom you were badly disappointed.’
9. ‘A spiritual person with whom you
would
be most willing to talk over your personal feelings about religion.’
10. ‘A person you dislike.’
11. ‘The present neighbor whom you know
best (or a neighbor you knew well in the past).’
12. ‘A person with whom you have been
associated who appeared to dislike you.’
13. ‘A person whom you would most like
to
help or for whom you feel sorry.’
14. ‘A person with whom you usually feel
most uncomfortable (or a person whom you find to be threatening).’
15. ‘A person whom you have recently met
whom you would like to know better.’
16. ‘A teacher who influenced you most
during your education (or the teacher of a subject you liked).’
17. ‘A teacher whose point of view you
have
found most objectionable (or the teacher of a subject you disliked).’
18. ‘An employer, supervisor, or officer
under whom you worked and whom you know fairly well.’
19. ‘A successful person whom you know
personally (other than yourself).’
20. ‘A happy person whom you know
personally
(other than yourself).’
21. ‘The person known to you personally
who
appears to uphold high ethical standards (other than yourself).’
22. ‘A person you know personally who
often
has difficulty telling the truth.’ |
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AUTHORS' NOTE
The authors would like to thank James
Barraclough, Rodney Claborn, Douglas Haynes, Bobby Jackson, Joyce
Jenkins, and
Kathie Wilson for their help collecting and managing data for this
study. |
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ABOUT THE
AUTHORS
Brenda
McDaniel, M.S. is an advanced
doctoral student in the department of psychology at Oklahoma State University. Her
research interests involve George Kelly’s Psychology of Personal
Constructs and
repertory grid techniques. Specifically, she has conducted research in
the
areas of idiographic and nomothetic personality measurement and
mathematical
models of self-concept. She also conducts personality research in the
area of
moral development. E-mail: brenda.mcdaniel@okstate.edu
James
W. Grice, Ph.D., is an associate
professor of psychology in the department of psychology at Oklahoma State University
where he teaches courses on statistical methodology. He is most
interested in
multivariate statistics and their application to problems in
personality
psychology. He has been a student of Personal Construct Theory since
the 1980s
and has authored scientific papers and computer programs relevant to
repertory
grid methods. E-mail: jgrice@okstate.edu
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REFERENCE
McDaniels, B. L.,
Grice, J. W.
(2005). Measuring self-discrepancies on the Big Five Personality traits
with the repertory grid technique. Personal
Construct Theory & Practice,
2, 18-31.
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp05/mcdaniels05.html)
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Received: 23 September 2005 – Accepted: 22 November 2005 -
Published: 23 November 2005
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