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MY PCP PERSONAL
STORY
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Franz Epting
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University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA |
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In the Summer of 1967, I finished my
dissertation on cognitive complexity and persuasibility at The Ohio
State
University in Columbus, and started out for the University of Florida for my
first and as it turned out my only job, retiring after a 36 year
tenure. I
talked to Dr. Kelly about my dissertation topic and had him sign my
copy of the
first volume of his book just before he left Ohio State
for
Brandeis in the Summer of 1965 but did not try to contact him again nor
did I
hear from him. My next contact was as one of the student pallbearers
lifting
his coffin from the hearse to the open grave at the Walnut Grove Cemetery in Worthington, a
small town just north of Columbus on a cold March 10th in 1967. I later
learned, to my
great surprise, that he had called, shortly before his death to make
sure I had
found a job and was pleased about my Florida
appointment. One did not really know what to expect from Dr. Kelly; he
was the
kind of person who did nice things behind your back. (I think often he
was more
comfortable doing it that way.) For students at Ohio State
it was
always, of course Dr. Kelly. However when he moved to Brandeis,
with
Maslow being referred to as Abe by the students, Dr. Kelly in
fact
became George!
As excited as I was to arrive in
Gainesville, Florida surrounded by a great group of humanistic scholars
– Arthur
Combs, Ted Landsman, David Suchman and Sidney Jourard in psychology and
Charles
Morris and Tom Hanna in philosophy – to name but a few, I felt very
isolated
from my personal construct theory colleagues but was very excited about
what a
career in personal construct psychology might hold. It also gave me a
unique position
even among my humanistic colleagues. By the way, for those who might be
interested, my life partner Mark Paris and I have spelled out some of
the
similarities and differences between humanistic psychology and
construct theory
in a paper that appeared in the Humanistic Psychologist earlier this
year
(Epting & Paris, 2006).
Even though there were various people in
personal construct psychology scattered around the United States, in my mind the most visible group was the British group
headed by
Don Bannister and I reasoned that the British Journals would be the
most
receptive to my work. What did I know? I found something called the
British
Journal of Psychology in the University of Florida library and submitted my first paper there. I was very
surprised,
when I met Don in 1971 on a trip to Bexley Hospital, that he had never
published in that journal and was very impressed that I had just had my
article, on an evaluation of elicitation procedures, published there
(Epting,
Suchman & Nickeson, 1971). After tea that afternoon, Don did
something that
delighted and surprised me. He took me out back of the buildings to see
the
hospital’s pigs. He seemed most comfortable there; more so than he had
been in
the meetings in the hospital just a few minutes before. There we got to
know
each other much better. It may have been that meeting which later led
him and Fay Fransella to recommend
me to John Wiley & Sons Ltd. to write a book on Personal Construct
Counseling and Psychotherapy; in this way my first book was in fact a
British publication
(Epting, 1984).
It was not really until the 24th
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation in October of 1975 in Lincoln, Nebraska
that I
got to meet more of the British group that included Fay as well as the
other
international participants. During this meeting Fay had the brilliant
insight
that we, in fact, were having the First International Congress on
Personal
Construct Psychology instead of just another Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation
and took it upon herself to begin organizing the Second International
Congress
on Personal Construct Psychology which was held in July, 1977 at Christ Church College in Oxford. It was
there I got to know the larger British group much better and it was
there that
my thoughts and feelings about what Personal Construct Psychology means
to me
began to fuse with what Fay
Fransella means to me. The
rest, as they say, is history. In 1986 Phil Salmon
arranged for me to become a visiting fellow in her college at the University of London, and
Fay invited me to become a guest lecturer in the new Centre for
Personal
Construct Psychology. What a treat it was to get to know the students,
faculty
and staff at the Centre. All the way along I have sort of followed my
nose into
lots of interesting areas: fixed role therapy, alternative elicitation
procedures, construction of death and dying, mentoring, what it means
to be gay
and who knows what else. I have come, now as an Emeritus Professor at University of Florida, to my
largest project yet; writing a biography of George Kelly. This has
turned into
a grand detective story and a good excuse to re-read Kelly. I would
like to use
my remaining time to mention a few things I have come across that might
be of
interest.
Some time ago Fay gave me a recording of
a
1966 meeting she had with Kelly when she visited him in his new Massachusetts
home. In the tape Kelly again disavows any attempt to categorize
construct
theory as a cognitive, behavioral, existential, or even a humanistic
theory. [The following is given as an example of Kelly distancing
himself from
what
many have seen as a kindred spirit. At Ohio State Kelly commented, in a
graduate seminar where he had students reading literature and
philosophy (anything but psychology) on what he thought of Sartre’s
Being and
Nothingness.
Kelly said that he started reading it or read a portion of it and that
he found
a lot of nothingness but not much being (Carpenter, 2006).]
This past Summer, as a part of the first
symposium on George Kelly and Personal Construct Psychology presented
during a
history of psychology conference which occurred at this year’s meeting
of
Cheiron: International Society for the Social Sciences, Mark and I
decided to
take Kelly seriously and not see him as just being difficult,
misguided, or
simply obstreperous in his refusal to be categorized and subsumed by
the extant
psychological labels; but see him instead as putting forth the only
thorough-going pragmatic theory of psychology. We entitled the paper
Dewey
Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition (Epting
& Paris,
2006b). (I expect Trevor Butt will be particularly pleased with this paper since he
has been
trying, for some time, to promote a pragmatic view of Kelly.) We see
this
pragmatic base, anchored in the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey
as the
foundation of the entirety of Personal Construct Psychology and as the
basis of
Kelly’s set of exclusions: no concept of self or ego; no conception of
psychological dynamics; no notion of developmental stages; no typology
of
psychological traits; no notion of efficient causation; no conception
of
psychopathology, as such; no separation of thoughts, feeling and
actions; no
set of basic needs; and no notion of an ‘unconscious’ (Epting &
Paris,
2006a). In fact Kelly (1963, p. xi, in the introduction to the
paperback three
chapter version of his two volume work) states that, “ It is not only
that
these terms [the set of exclusions listed above] are abandoned; what is
more
important, the concepts themselves evaporate. If the reader starts
murmuring
such words to himself, he can be sure he has lost the scent”.
What Kelly did put in place was both a
rich
description of how constructs are engineered and mathematically
configured and,
more importantly, the central premise that “constructions are tools we
use to
move around in or ‘use’ reality, rather than a means for ascertaining
an
unmoving ‘truth’ about reality” (Paris & Epting, 2006a). What I am
suggesting
here is that we resist ‘reading’ the theory in traditional terms but
instead go
on with the business of elaborating this marvelous pragmatic theory
either
along engineering-technical lines or along content-conceptual lines or
both
without re-importing more traditional notions. It is so easy for us all
to be
lured back into psychodynamic, cognitive behavioral or some other
theoretical
notions as we attempt to expand and further explicate the theory.
This resisting a slide back into
traditional terms would also mean following the pragmatist’s protest of
leaving
behind commonly accepted philosophical concerns with respect to the
existence
of reality; whether it be a concern about whether construct theory is
best
described as naïve realism, critical realism, radical realism or
yet something
else. For Kelly, “the open question for man is not whether reality
exists or
not, but what he can make of it. If he does make something of it he can
stop
worrying about whether it exists or not” (Kelly, 1969b, p. 25) In my
way of
thinking, Kelly was well equipped to join the pragmatist’s protest
coming from
a protestant religious background which supported such free thinking
that many
proponents claimed to be more protestant than Christian. This is to say
they
were more invested in the spirit of the protest, as such, rather than
in any
literal interpretation of scripture.
What may be even more challenging than
putting aside those traditional theoretical concepts so near and dear
to hearts
of traditional psychologists, is the challenge to resist importing
efficient
causation into the theory because of a mistaken notion that the natural
science
IV-DV (Independent Variable-Dependent Variable) paradigm requires it. I
am
afraid many of us have made this mistake in the past; making grid
measures
appear and behave like trait measures and discovering, in the
discussion
sections of our research articles, language which describes personal
construct
terms in mechanistic cause and effect ways. It is as if we have never
even read
Joseph Rychlak’s (1968/1981) excellent critique of this predicament. I
urge us
all to remember that the only requirement for our using the natural
science
IV-DV paradigm is to translate our terms into extraspective operations
for the
method section only. When we come to the discussion section of our
papers, we
are quite free to translate them back to our original introspective
formulations.
Being a part of the language of method the IV-DV paradigm is devoid of
any
notion of causality and only portrays either the presence or absence of
a
mathematical functional relationship. This leaves us quite free to use
our
formal and final causation language in discussing our results. The
results
sections of our papers reside in the language of theory; the same
humanistically oriented theory that we used in the introduction of our
papers
(Epting, 2005).
These are a few of the thoughts I have
been
having lately about what PCP means to me. I hope you have found some of
it
interesting and I hope that some it may be of use to you in one way or
the
other.
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REFERENCES |
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Carpenter, J. C. (2006). Unpublished
interview with Franz Epting
Epting, F. R. (1984). Personal
construct
counseling and psychotherapy. London
and New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Epting, F. (2005). A brief comment on
competing for reality. Journal of Constructivist
Psychology, 18, 365-366.
Epting, F. R. & Paris, M. E.
(2006a). A
constructive understanding of the person: George Kelly and humanistic
psychology. The Humanistic Psychologist, 34, 21-37.
Epting F. R. & Paris, M. E. (2006b
August). Dewey between the lines: George Kelly and the pragmatist
tradition.
Paper presented at the 38th annual meeting of Cheiron:
International
Society for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Bronxville, New York.
Epting, F.R., Suchman, D.
& Nickeson, C. (1971). An evaluation of
elicitation
procedures for personal constructs. British Journal of Psychology,
62,
513-517.
Kelly, G. A. (1969). Ontological
acceleration. In B. Maher (Ed.), Clinical psychology and
personality: The
selected papers of George Kelly (pp. 7-45). New York:
John
Wiley & Sons.
Kelly, G. A. (1963). A theory of
personality: The psychology of personal constructs. New York:
W. W.
Norton. (originally published in 1955)
Rychlak, J. R. (1968/1981). A
philosophy
of science for personality theory. Boston:
Houghton
Mifflin. |
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The article
is based
on a talk given at the conference on 'PCP: a personal story' organised
by
the Centre for Personal Construct at the University of Hertfordshire, UK,
on September 29, 2006. |
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ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Franz
Epting, Ph. D., is Emeritus Professor in the Department of
Psychology at the University
of Florida in Gainesville,
Florida. He received his
Ph.D. from
The Ohio State University in Columbus,
Ohio where, as a
graduate student,
he had the opportunity to study with George Kelly. His career has
focused on
the development of Personal Construct Psychology in his teaching,
research and
professional practice. In 2000 he received a lifetime achievement award
from
the North American Personal Construct Network (now known as the
Constructivist
Psychology Network). He is a past president of the division of
humanistic
psychology of the American Psychological Association and is a past
chairperson
of the Council of Counseling Psychology Training Programs in the United
States. Email: frepting@hotmail.com
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REFERENCE
Epting,
F.
(2007). My personal PCP story. Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 4, 53-56
(Retrieved
from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp07/epting07.html)
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Received: 30 December 2006 – Accepted: 5 January 2007 –
Published: 31 January 2007
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