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MUSING ABOUT CONSTRUCTS
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Bob Green |
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Queensland Forensic Mental Health
Service, Brisbane Australia
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Abstract
Construing
has not received the attention in the literature that has been directed toward
identifying and describing constructs. It is proposed that Personal Construct
Theory (PCT) could benefit from elaborating the notion of construing through
consideration of established concepts from other fields. Using substance use as
an example, the concepts of outcome expectancies, implicit cognition and habit
are examined, as a means to elaborate the notion of construing. A link between
these concepts is the pervasiveness of non-conscious cognition. As PCT is often
described as a cognitive theory it is instructive to also consider the
contribution of non-deliberative processes to construing.
Keywords: Construing, expectancies,
implicit cognition, habit
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I’d like to ‘muse’ about
constructs, muse in the sense to think or ponder. The central proposal
underlying this paper is that Personal Construct Theory (PCT) might benefit
from further elaboration of the notions of constructs and construing. While
substance use was not a topic Kelly addressed to any great extent,
consideration of concepts from the contemporary literature in this field offers
opportunities to enhance understanding of what Kelly has referred to as
construing. Three concepts (e.g. outcome expectancies, implicit cognition and
habit) were selected for this purpose, which while employed in the substance
use literature, have a wider application and history in the psychological
literature generally. These concepts and substance use examples are discussed
to highlight an important consideration for PCT, namely, that construing is not
necessarily a fully conscious, deliberative process.
The fundamental postulate of Kelly’s
Personal Construct Theory is that “A person’s processes are psychologically
channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1955, p.46).
Kelly describes this as occurring through a “network of pathways”, more
commonly referred to as constructs. Constructs are variously described by Kelly
as a discrimination of likeness from difference, an abstraction from events, ‘two-way’
streets to reach conclusions, interpretations of facts as well as ordinal axes
in psychological space. Constructs are described as enabling the anticipation
of events, and making events more predictable and controllable (Kelly, 1955). Whereas
constructs are abstractions or attributed similarity, construing is the process
whereby “a person places an interpretation upon what is construed” (Kelly,
1955, p.50).
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to
consider the parallels between muses and musing, and constructs and construing.
Like constructs, the muses of Greek mythology could be considered as either an
element (i.e. what is construed), such as Melpomene, the muse associated with
tragedy or Thalia the muse associated with comedy (Grant & Hazel, 1994) or
as a construct (e.g. tragic vs. comic). However, in addition, both musing and
construing are processes, variously creative, practical and abstract; by which
constructs are invented and applied to anticipate events.
While Kelly provided a rich language
regarding types of constructs, and subsequent research has expended
considerable attention towards individuals’ constructs, less attention has been
given to the process of construing itself. In part, my interest in this topic
was generated by conducting research into cannabis use and being exposed to
concepts that have relevance to construing but which do not feature prominently
in the PCT literature. As a starting point I’d like to consider a section of a
repertory grid analysed by Slater (Slater, 1977).
Referred to as the ‘Addict’s’ grid, two
constructs have been selected because they capture a key feature of cannabis
use, namely, the reported motivation to obtain relaxation (Green et al., 2003).
In this grid excerpt, I have construed warm feeling to reflect a pleasant,
relaxed feeling and tense as the opposite to this effect. In this grid a value
of 1 equals causes this effect very strongly and a 5 equals causes the opposite
effect very strongly. Not surprisingly there is a significant negative
correlation between the constructs (r = – 0.53), however, closer inspection
reveals widely differing relations between these constructs for the respective
drug elements. For the purpose of interpretation the elements have been
reordered so like elements are located together, to illustrate these
relationships. In this grid drynomil and methedrine were construed as not
producing a warm feeling but producing tension. In contrast, cocaine,
marijuana, alcohol and LSD were construed as equally producing both effects,
whereas heroin, mandrax and barbiturates produced a warm feeling but not
tension. I was particularly interested in cannabis (marijuana) and the
seemingly paradoxical effects of both a warm feeling and tension being
experienced.
Table 1: Excerpt from Slater’s ‘Addict’s’
grid
| Dryno mil | Methe drine | Co caine | Mari juana | Alco hol | LSD | He roin | Man drax | Barbit urates | warm feeling | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | tense | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
The ratings made by the person who
completed the grid could be explained by a number of factors. These include
general factors that influence performance such as inconsistency, fatigue or
disinterest. In addition there is the issue of variation in experience in
relation to substance use. For example, variation across occasions (e.g
different effects being experienced in different contexts), variation within
occasions (e.g different effects associated with phase or degree of
intoxication) as well as responses that are based on general versus recent
experience (Green, Kavanagh & Young, 2003). For example, a person may
typically experience relaxation but on the most recent occasion of use tension
is experienced. In rating the grid, the more salient recent experience may be
ignored in favour of usual experience or be taken into account because it was
recent and memorable. In the example of a person experiencing relaxation and
tension, both outcomes may occur but are likely to have different
probabilities. Another explanation is that posed by Yorke (1983, 2001), namely,
that these implicit construct poles are not opposites of the same construct but
implicit poles of different constructs.
Slater was particularly interested in
whether the constructs (effects) distinguished between the elements (drugs).
This is in effect a question of likeness, i.e., “How much is A like B” or “How
alike are A & B compared to C” in relation to certain constructs. The
question of likeness or similarity links to the more sophisticated application
of a construct as a probability. As a probability, the questions of interest
shift to: “How likely is it that A and B produce similar effects, “how likely
is it that an effect will occur” or “under what circumstances is it likely that
this effect will be experienced”. Construing likeness is an anticipation.
OUTCOME EXPECTANCIES
Outcome expectancies are a concept that has
a long history in psychological research generally (Olson, Roese & Zanna,
1996), but has also been widely employed in researching substance use,
particularly alcohol (Jones, Corbin & Fromme, 2001). Derived from past
experience, outcome expectancies refer to beliefs people hold regarding the
physical and social, or self-evaluative effects that will occur after
performing a specific behaviour (Bandura, 1997). Several authors (Bandura,
1997; Maddux, 1999; and Olson et al., 1996) have proposed different ways to
categorise expectancies, which have variously been distinguished from a range
of related concepts such as attributions, schemas, set or beliefs. Common to
the different descriptions of expectancies is the notion that expectancies are
beliefs about the future likelihood of some event. In effect an outcome expectancy
is an anticipation.
Consideration of the notions of likeness
between elements A & B in terms of a construct tense – relaxed is to
examine the likelihood of a person being tense or relaxed. Two persons may both
be construed as tense, however the second person might act this way
infrequently. Context is also important in this regard as construct ratings
could be based on either recent experience or more global impression. While
likelihood is a component of prediction, Kelly highlighted that “statistical
prediction is not the same as psychological significance” (Kelly, 1969). That
Kelly was aware of the complexities associated with prediction is illustrated
by his discussion of ‘if-then’ relationships. Rather than simple cause-effect
relationship he provided an example of conditional probabilities using the
example of a child contemplating whether he would receive a “spanking” if he
broke his mother’s necklace (Kelly, 1955; pages 122-124). Not surprisingly,
Kelly framed this question in terms of whether a spanking and not something
else would occur. Such a judgment would involve construing “a considerable
variety of events” including (a) his mother’s disposition and mood, (b) the
value placed on the necklace, (c) the child’s role in the breakage, (d) the
discovery of the act and (e) the circumstances around previous spankings. In
this example Kelly is describing a process of construing rather than just an
identification of constructs.
Subjective certainty about the likelihood
of an event is one of the four properties of expectancies described by Olson,
Roese and Zanna (1996). The other properties identified by these authors
include: the frequency with which an expectancy is used (e.g. accessibility);
whether the expectancy is explicitly or implicitly generated (e.g. in or out of
awareness) and importance, in terms of functional importance as well as in
terms of implications for other expectancies. Expectancies can also be examined
in terms of dimensions such as valence (positive or negative) and imminence of
the expected effect.
In considering constructs as expectancies
it is timely to note points of convergence, such as the focus on anticipated
future behaviour, while also recognising points of divergence between
social-learning theory and Personal Construct Theory. Notable points of
divergence include Kelly’s dismissal of motivation, his conceptualisation of
learning as experience (as opposed to learning from experience) and the
importance of bipolarity and contrast. Rather than viewing expectancies and
constructs as competitors or combining them cafeteria style as if “alternative
conceptual schemes” (Bandura, 1995) it may be useful to view constructs in some
contexts as outcome expectancies for the purpose of obtaining another vantage
point from which to view construing and human behaviour, especially when the
topic of interest is anticipating self and others. Further, considering
constructs as expectancies offers a link to other literatures and theoretical
approaches, which open alternative areas for exploration.
IMPLICIT COGNITION
One such area of potential exploration
concerns implicit cognition. The differences that exist within or between
individuals in the types of constructs employed have been a central focus of
subsequent PCT research and practice. In contrast implicit cognition research
has focussed on differences that exist within or between individuals in terms
of the accessibility of constructs (Fazio & Olson, 2003). For example, Field, Mogg & Bradley (2004)
examined attentional and evaluative biases in recreational cannabis users and
controls, using a visual probe task and the Implicit Association Test. The
visual probe task involved participants being presented simultaneously with a
series of cannabis-related and environment-related word pairs, with one word
located at the top of the display screen and the other word at the bottom.
Immediately after the display, one of the words was replaced by a small dot
until the participant gave a manual response to the probe’s location. The
participant was required to respond as quickly as possible to the probe and the
task was intended as a measure of attentional bias. In the Implicit Association
Test (IAT) participants categorized stimuli into one of four categories, two
target categories (e.g. cannabis-related or environment-related) and two
attribute categories (e.g. pleasant or unpleasant). The difference in reaction
times between the responses given for the combination of cannabis-related with
pleasant attribute and the reaction time for cannabis-related with unpleasant
attributes was used as a measure of the strength of the evaluative association
between the target (cannabis) and the concept.
Because explicit cognition is characterised
by conscious recall and reasoning, and can be subject to social desirability or
heuristic processes (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; Nisbett
& Ross, 1980)
implicit cognition approaches do not rely on direct verbal report to explore a
topic of interest (Fazio & Olsen, 2003). Other examples of implicit
cognition tasks include word, object or outcome association tasks such as
sentence completion. By asking a person to reflect on similarities and
differences (e.g. when completing a repertory grid) it is typically explicit
cognition that is being tapped into, not infrequently the result being a
tightening of how elements are construed. In contrast, implicit cognition does
not require introspection or awareness. Implicit cognition approaches may have
relevance to approaches which tap into preverbal construing and have to date
limited application in PCT research. There are two exceptions. Millis and
Neimeyer (1990) employed a lexical decision test to determine whether bipolar
constructs or propositions were activated when primed by names of familiar
persons. Support was obtained for the hypothesis that both poles would be
retrieved and that response time did not significantly differ for construct and
contrast poles. Grice et al. (2004) have employed sentence completion stems to
elicit constructs, though sentence completion was not employed to examine
implicit cognition.
However, making a firm distinction between
implicit and explicit approaches is not necessarily clear cut. Neal and Hesketh (1997) in a
review of implicit measures concluded it was problematic to infer a measure was
exclusively implicit (or explicit) or that a measure of implicit (or explicit)
knowledge was exhaustive of a domain. Fazio and Olson (2003) also
raised the question regarding the basis for concluding that an individual’s
attitude is outside of their awareness and cautions against equating implicit
measurement with implicit content. Bearing in mind these caveats the relevance
of implicit approaches to PCT is worth further consideration.
Further, contemporary cognitive science
models emphasise memory as an associative network activated in response to
cues. For example, cannabis related cues activate (without intent or conscious
thought) expected outcomes in accord with their association in memory (Goldman
1999, Goldman & Darkes, 2004). Such a model incorporates both explicit
cognition (e.g expected outcomes) and implicit cognitions (accessibility and
strength of association which influence activation) as influencing behaviour. Such
a memory network is depicted in the figure below (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Memory network
While PCT may appear to have little to
offer approaches that emphasise concepts such as ‘activation’, ‘accessibility’
and ‘automaticity’, the importance of individual differences and the individual
remain. Memory research has been described as typically seeking to examine
processes shared by individuals rather than variation between individuals
(Reich & Goldman, 2005). Researchers are however increasingly examining the
role of individual differences. Reich and Goldman (2005) found that in response
to the word stem, “Alcohol makes me ___________”, the heaviest drinkers made
more positive and arousing responses and that positively toned words increased
as the probability of drinking increased. In an entirely different field,
employing a modified semantic priming approach, support was found for the role
of idiographic but not nomothetic associations between anxiety symptoms and
perceived catastrophe among panic patients (Schneider & Schulte, 2007).
Conversely, consideration of concepts such
as ‘activation’ and ‘accessibility’ have relevance to PCT, particularly in
relation to the process of eliciting constructs as well as the link between
constructs and behaviour. In musing on these issues it is worth considering the
term ‘construct system’ and its constituents, constructs. Kelly (1955) defined
construing in terms of placing “an interpretation upon what is construed”
through use of a structure of constructs. By constructs Kelly was not referring
to word labels but discriminations between events, “similarity and contrast”. Employed
individually, Kelly described constructs as bipolar, with the chosen
alternative being the pole that is thought to best anticipate events, though
limited by a range of convenience.
The Kellian notion of ordinally connected
constructs comprising a ‘construct system’ is not necessarily incompatible with
the concept of associative networks described above. Rather than neat sets of
hierarchies, the relationships between construct hierarchies are more complex
and might perhaps more accurately be represented as overlapping or inter-woven
networks. The use of free-associates (Reich & Goldman, 2005) to examine
implicit cognitions and the associated memory processing model provides
opportunities to explore construing as a process, within the framework of
contemporary cognitive research.
HABIT
Kelly (1955) and subsequent authors
(Bannister & Fransella, 1982, Burr & Butt, 1992) have emphasised
individuals as active participants in life, rather than victims of fate. Like a
musician, Kelly notes that “only when man attunes his ear to recurrent themes
in the monotonous flow does his universe begin to make sense to him” (Kelly,
1955, p.52). Further, Kelly noted that events are anticipated by construing
their replications. In relation to habit and contrary to the notion of the
inquiring man is what could be referred to as the ‘non-inquiring’ man.
Elsewhere, when discussing construing,
Kelly made the distinction between predicting a duplicate of today‘s events and
abstracting themes that are ‘replicative’ aspects of events. Mills (2006)
describes habit as responding to events “as a repeated instance of something
already known”. Rather than hypothesis testing, an action is initiated in the
expectation (conscious or unconscious) that a certain effect will occur. Examples
of individuals seeking the duplication of events were evident in research into
cannabis use (Green, Kavanagh & Young, 2004; Green, 2006). Participants in
this research when asked about effects of cannabis use, not infrequently gave
responses along the lines of: “I don’t give thought to why I smoke”, “I don’t
know what effect I expect” or “The same thing happens every time”.
Relatively little has been written about
the processes underlying the relationship between habit, intention and
behaviour (Aarts, Verplanken & van Knippenberg, 1998) and little has been
written from a PCT perspective. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) assert that the
question of whether individuals actively choose and control their experiences
and behaviours has distinguished the different psychological approaches of the
20th century. Kelly subsumed habit under the section: ‘Preoccupation with old
material’, one of three conditions he identified as unfavourable to the
formation of new constructs. Habits were considered to have a purpose, namely,
to assist with dealing with the “onrush of events”. However, Kelly also refers
to habit as “a convenient kind of stupidity which leaves a person free to act intelligently
elsewhere” (Kelly, 1955). In contrast, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) refer to
automatic processes as “mental butlers”.
Aarts, Verplanken & van Knippenberg
(1998) have distinguished between behaviour performed “efficiently,
effortlessly, and unconsciously” and behaviour that is undertaken regularly.
These authors link habit in the former sense with the processes associated with
implicit cognition: “… we conceive of habits as goal-directed automatic
behaviors that are mentally represented. And because of frequent performance in
similar situations in the past, these mental representations and the resulting
action can be automatically activated by environmental cues” (p.1359). These
authors also state that in addition to habit leading to an increased focus “on
the habitually chosen option”, that when habit is strong, “alternatives are
rejected relatively early in the decision process”. In such circumstances
“cognitive shortcuts” are followed. From a PCT perspective this could
alternatively be conceptualised as a repeated shortening of the experience
cycle.
Burr and Butt in discussing addiction
suggested that the range of behaviours associated with this term, might be
better construed in terms of dependency. Walker (2003) has suggested habit
could be understood in terms of nonvalidation, ie. a disinterest or
disinclination to test hypotheses concerning habitual behaviours, while
Fransella (2003) has suggested that constellatory (fixed or stereotypical)
construing may form the basis of habits.
Attention to habit and the processes that
support habit have importance for a number of reasons. At the most fundamental
level is Kelly’s contention that “our Experience corollary claims that a
person’s construction system varies as he successively construes the replication
of events. If he fails to reconstrue events, even though they keep repeating
themselves, he minimizes his experience” (Kelly, 1955, p.172). Secondly, habit
may result in a response, but not a meaningful response. Whether the context is
life in general, clinical practice or research, simply eliciting a habitual
response may not produce responses that further understanding. Understanding
habit more comprehensively is considered important to understanding its
contrast, namely change and spontaneity. Stephens and Marlatt (1987) suggest
that the process of changing a habit requires self-exploration and awareness to
regain control, a process that can lead to learning about the role of habit in
personal identity, as well as an individual’s perceived needs and desires. In
effect, these authors are referring to the importance of core constructs and
construing of self.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to reflect on
the subject of constructs and construing. Each of the three concepts discussed,
were selected for different reasons, however, in the process of writing this
paper connections between these topics became apparent. In particular, implicit
cognition, i.e., cognition that is ‘automatic’ or ‘outside of awareness’
featured in relation to each concept.
Outcome expectancies have similarities with
constructs in that both are concerned with anticipating the future and can
operate as explicit or implicit cognitions. The notion of implicit cognition
may appear at odds with construing as a conscious deliberative process.
However, Kelly has noted that constructs are not equivalent to the word labels
employed to describe them and constructs are not only thoughts. Fransella and
Neimeyer (2003) have highlighted that Kelly identified levels of awareness and
that much construing operates at lower levels of awareness (e.g preverbal).
According to Fransella and Neimeyer recognition that construing operates at
different levels of awareness is of significance in counselling and therapy,
where a central task is assisting the client to give verbal labels to preverbal
construing. Cognition outside of conscious awareness also relevance to core
constructs, which are central to personal existence and identity. For example,
while an occasional glass of wine may be a minor part of one individual’s life,
for others, substance use will be central to self-construal, perceived
alternatives and the choices the individual makes through life. In the latter
instance, to the extent that construing about substance use is outside of conscious
awareness, essential aspects of identity and self-maintenance, will be out of
awareness.
Implicit cognition has not been a topic of
interest to PCT research, though issues such as construct accessibility has
clear relevance to the process of construing and construct elicitation. An
assumption is frequently made that the constructs that are elicited are the
most important constructs. Consideration of the processes of construct
activation associated with models of associative memory networks (Rather,
Goldman Roehrich & Brannick, 1992) raises interesting possibilities for
modelling construct ‘systems’ and implicative relationships.
Habit, which could be considered the
antithesis of active construing is another topic which to date, has received
limited attention in the field of PCT. As the contrast to active construing and
change it is worthy of further attention. By discussing outcome expectancies,
implicit cognition and habit, this paper has in effect been considering the
submerged construct poles of likeness, construing as a deliberative process and
construing as the replication of events. By considering concepts in established
usage outside of PCT, avenues for elaborating PCT have been afforded with the
potential to add content-specific depth as well as additional methodological
options to practitioners and researchers.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
The comments of the anonymous reviewers
were appreciated.
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ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Bob Green is a social
worker working in the field of forensic mental health. He has conducted
research informed by Personal Construct Theory to examine judgments of mental
health professionals, as well as to study the perceived effects of cannabis by
individuals with and without psychosis.
Email:
bgreen@dyson.brisnet.org.au
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REFERENCE
Green, B. (2008). Musing about constructs. Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 5, 68-75, 2008
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp08/green08.html)
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Received: 23 November 2007 – Accepted: 5 April 2008 –
Published: 23 December 2008
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