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BOOK REVIEW
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STUDIES IN MEANING 4: CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY, PRACTICE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
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Jonathan D. Raskin, Sara K. Bridges, and Robert A. Neimeyer (Eds.)
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New York: Pace University Press, 2010, Paperback, 407 pages,
$ 40
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reviewed by Bill Warren
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University
of Newcastle, Australia
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This volume, like its predecessors (Raskin
and Bridges, 2002, 2004, 2008) offers a rich lode of ideas that can be mined by
explorers in search of many different types of bounty. Structurally, a brief
Preface introduces fourteen (14) contributions organized under four Parts
going, in order, to Theory, Practice, Social Justice, and Theory Revisited. The
contributions range from quite brief (six pages) to substantial length (forty-two
pages), with authors both well-known in the field and less well known. As to
content, the different papers discuss a wide variety of ideas and issues that
in one way or another are likely to be of interest to constructivist thinking. A
brief survey of this content with comment by way of my reaction constitutes
this Review, as follows.
| | | Jonathan Raskin | Sara Bridges | Robert Neimeyer |
Von Glasersfeld (p. 3-8) opens the Volume by
briefly outlining the radical constructivist view of meaning and the consequent
problem of understanding how communication is possible at all from that
perspective. He raises three questions in the face of the radical
constructivist view of the individual (or, in his paper, the “individual
language user”) as only ever able to work with subjective constructs that are
“ideas of the imagination”. That is, ‘ideas’ or ‘conceptions’ as captured in what
he explains is a more correct rendering, as per Wittgenstein, of the German
word Vorstellung. This is in contrast to a view that these constructs refer to ‘things’
having, ostensibly, independent objective existence ‘in the world’, and where
communication between people is relatively unproblematic. His three questions
are: where do these ‘items of the imagination’ come from?; if they are (merely)
subjective constructs, how, then, could communication be possible at all?; and,
who are the “others” from whom or through whom we learn those constructs?. There
are some traditional issues here in terms, for example, of the philosophy of
mind and the problems of Solipsism (which, arguably in my view, is impossible
to refute, logically, anyway, and takes us nowhere – whoever ‘us’ is!), and in
terms of discussions within Existentialist philosophy of the previous century. Von
Glasersfeld is obviously aware of these issues, but the reader interested in
the deeper discussion they invite is redirected to fuller treatments in other
of his writings or the writing of others. Gergen’s paper (p. 9-25) reiterates
the view that meaning can only occur in relationship, a view that has its well
known origins in the “dialogues on the social construction of knowledge”, to
which Gergen himself has been a most significant contributor. These two papers
are useful ‘scene setters’ and provide a ‘platform’ for the volume and it is
true as the Editors say, that the themes they raise resonate, overtly or
covertly, in the rest of the volume. That said, perhaps a ‘direct addressing’
by other papers might have been interesting rather than a mere ‘resonance’. That
is, a brief comment in each other paper on the relationship of the ideas of that
paper, to these first two papers; and, perhaps, Von Glasersfeld and Gergen’s
comments on the other dozen papers. Still, there is perhaps no shortage of
critical discussion of those themes in the more general literature both within
and outside constructivist thinking, and my suggestion, thus, superfluous. Equally,
it would make for a much more complex production and impose significant work.
In the context of Gergen’s paper, in
particular, but equally, if less pointedly, in relation to Von Glasersfeld’s, two
papers which immediately follow their contributions are both interesting and
problematic in terms of the very matters raised in their opening contributions,
and in terms of my suggestion about ‘direct addressing’. One commences with a discussion
of the centrality of ‘unique outcomes’ in therapy (Goncalves et al; p.29-64); yet,
with Part I in one’s head, what is ‘unique’ if all is caused or conditioned or
determined by social factors or forces (whatever these might turn out to be)? The
other (Neimeyer, p. 65-91) takes us through the ‘private story’ of those who
grieve; yet, again, what is ‘private’ in terms of the same constructionist
argument, and how can we really know it or share it if it is merely and,
importantly, always, only and ever ‘private’ and ‘subjective’?. These points
aside, Goncalves et al outline their research programme grounded in narrative
therapy, which attempts to access these outcomes, defined as “all the details that
fall outside the domain of the dominant narrative, namely episodes in which the
person did, thought, imagined or felt something different, or elated to others
in a new way, from what the problematic narrative ‘prescribes’ for his or her
life” (p. 29, my italics). Their research programme develops a coding system
for systematically studying change processes in therapy (essentially, but also
outside of therapy), using a notion of “innovative moments” (i-moments) as a
theoretical advance on that of ‘unique outcomes’ in therapy. Five different
types of i-moments are identified as emerging in therapy (action, reflection,
protest, reconceptualisation, and performing change) and the coding takes
account of the temporal salience of each (where it occurred in a session) and
its origin (e.g. the therapist or client). This is a most interesting paper
with the fuller implications for practice to be worked out, but of significant
interest and import for those interested in the micro-processes of therapy, and
the micro-skills of it. Robert Neimeyer’s discussion of grief illuminates the
‘private story’ his client was sharing with him in therapy. He argues that it
is the “movement from symptoms to significance that a constructivist
orientation to bereavement takes its central concern” and he goes on to discuss
the theoretical, empirical and therapeutic implications of this with his
customary precision. His conclusion concerning therapy introduces a metaphor
related to a jazz improvisation, where “each ‘performance’ of therapy is unique
as ... participants ‘riff’ off the offerings of the other(s)” (p. 87). This
metaphor, for me, highlights the gaps and spaces for a bridge or a rapprochement
between the ‘socially constructed’, the personally constructed, and the
‘radically individually constructed’ of life. Here, in relation to such a rapprochement,
I was reminded of the notion of Praxis, highlighted in modern times by Marx but
developed more specifically by Paulo Freire. This appears a useful way to
engage the apparent tensions between Existentialist and Marxist traditions
which provide important elements in the genealogy of personal constructivism
and social constructionism, respectively? (This has been discussed elsewhere: Warren,
2002). To harp on my earlier point, would it not be interesting for Goncalves et
al and Neimeyer to conclude with a comment on their own thinking after having
read Von Glasersfeld’s and Gergen’s papers, or vice versa?
Papers on love and on deconstruction within
counseling conclude Part II. Hermans-Konopka and Hermans (p. p. 93-123) discuss
the transformative features of love and their work on developing a more dynamic
conceptualization of feelings that will allow love’s transformative features to
be better understood; thereby, in turn, for the concept of love itself to be
better understood in its wider complexity. While from this last observation it
might be thought that this is a theoretical paper, in fact it is an empirical
one describing an interesting study of the capacity of love to provoke change
in self-experience. Of a number of feeling words (loneliness, anxiety, guilt,
love etc.) taken from the Self Confrontation Method (Hermans, 1986 – reference
not in Reference list), applied to situations which evoked particular emotional
experiences that went to a sense of self and to a tendency to act (to do
something), it was love that provoked the broadest and most positive change in
self-experience and in motivation to do something. My observations here unlikely
do justice to the study but it is a most interesting one, self-styled as a
“first step’ in a dialogical conceptualization of love”; as such, and in terms
of its general discussion of love as well, it has good claim to being also a
substantive theoretical contribution that can also be usefully read in the
context of Gergen’s contribution. Finally, Strong and Schultz (p. 125-153) discuss
“‘deconstructivist’ counseling”, canvassing some theoretical and historical
matters before describing a research study in which video-taped , one-hour consultations
were closely analyzed using discourse analysis to detect where “deconstruction
questions” were asked or attempted between counselors [with graduate training
and supervision in social constructionist approaches to counseling] and
‘clients’” (p. 133). This is a good, practical demonstration of, again, some
micro-aspects of counseling and similar relationships, and it well shows the
understanding the author’s have of deconstructive conversations as being “about
locating one’s understandings in others’ words and discourses that can never
ultimately capture experience” (p. 146). Again, the platform established by the
first two papers in Part I emerges as a good and provocative one.
Part III, the largest section with five (5)
papers, is somewhat different. It takes the reader into a topic that ought to
be warmly welcomed into the constructivist oeuvre; at least I welcome it. The
controversy surrounding whether psychologists should work in such areas as the
interrogation of terrorist suspects and/or such places as Guantanamo Bay raised
wider questions for Psychology and Psychologists that have touched
constructivist psychology but slightly. It was Koocher (2007) who exposed for
me most dramatically the ethical questions that challenged Professional Societies
and sped up considerations of the idea that social justice and related notions
inescapably impacted our practice. North American Psychologists will be aware
of the agonising that went on in the profession concerning psychology and
interrogation conducted at Guantanamo Bay. In this Part III are discussions
concerning: therapeutic work “alongside” (an interesting and important
expression) survivors of torture and political violence (Reynolds, 157-184);
mentoring as a rich concept with ethical dimensions and how the richness and
ethical aspects are well met in constructivist mentoring (Bridges, 185-204);
the ‘objectification’ of women and its individual-psychological consequences, but,
equally importantly – and equally objectionably – as preserving power
differentials and inequalities (Hill, 205-226); George Kelly’s assumption that
the universe is integral and interconnected and the significance of this view
for how we understand psychopathology and how we might respond to it in a way
that accepts and has an important place for notions of transpersonal
responsibility, reverence for humanity and for other living things and the
‘living system’, as well as for the cultures of others (Leitner, 227-246); and
a courageous discussion challenging social justice counseling in terms of five
(5) criticisms: its espousal of naïve realism, its lack of theoretical
elaboration, its (righteous) imposition of values, it ‘brimming with hubris’,
and the fact that it goes beyond its range of convenience (Raskin, p. 247-276).
The papers in Part III are quite varied and
illustrate the wide range of issues that discussion in this field can throw-up.
They are all quite good papers in both content and writing, and while not
wishing to single any one out for special attention I was most struck by Vikki Reynolds
paper which opens this Part, and Leitner’s broadening of our reflections. Her identification
of her therapeutic engagement with survivors of torture as witnessing struck a
strong chord. I think that that chord concerned her identification of witnessing
as speaking to a “particular ethical stance, rather than a prescribed set of
tools or techniques” (p. 161), but also because her idea here generates
reflection on therapeutic work more generally. Different, yet related, is
Leitner’s sensitive discussion of our interconnectedness with a wider reality
than the merely ‘social’ – the cosmos, no less – and the ethical as well as
psychological dimensions of this. Thus, given Reynolds and Leitner did I find
Jon Raskin’s paper a little puzzling generally; particularly his fifth
criticism, that is, that the ‘range of convenience’ of social justice
counseling is exceeded. This is an interesting paper with obviously more in it
than the fifth criticism, but I wondered how it sat with another discussion,
published, indeed, in a Psychology Journal, that might itself fall to this
‘range of convenience’ critique (Raskin, 2002)?
Part IV returns to some theoretical
discussions, two somewhat related, the other a key topic in the context of the
real or imagined debate between (social) constructionism and (personal)
constructivism. Holmes (p.281-315) offers a critique of ‘personal
epistemologies’ and some ideas which go also to issues raised in other papers
elsewhere in the volume. For example, she cites research on indigenous views of
cognition and intelligence as part of her challenges to consider knowing in an
eco-cultural context, which she discusses in relation to such other contexts as
socio-historical and ecological ones and to highlight a claimed epistemological
elitism and to expose “blinders and biases”. This is ‘true’ – an interesting
notion in terms of Part I – and useful, but releases again my ‘demon’ of
relativism! (and I had tried some ‘heal thyself’ therapy to slay that demon;
Warren, 1992). Related to the matter of epistemologies, more or less, is Stojnov’s
discussion of the psychotherapist as ‘philosopher of science’, taking his
starting point from George Kelly’s model of the ‘person as scientist’ and the
significance to this of different understandings of just what we might take
science ‘to be’; which is a question in the philosophy of science itself. Stojnov
argues well that the model proposed by Kelly is not significantly weakened by
developments in and debates about our understanding of what science ‘is’. Finally,
Butt (p. 361-379) surveys the “status” – an interesting concept, ‘status’, in
the context of the very first two papers of Part I – of ‘the individual’ as
this has played itself out in the debates between constructionism and
constructivism, as well as in other perspectives, ‘rescuing’ the individual in
terms of the perspective that is Pragmatism. He also makes the important and
valid point that the notion of the individual in Pragmatism was always a
‘social one’, as personal constructivists would argue it was in George Kelly;
hence, one might ask, ‘what’s all the fuss about social constructionism and
personal constructivism?’ Maybe, as in dancing, and acknowledging Neimeyer’s
‘riffs’, it is, as in dancing, a dispute about ‘who leads’!? Yet, in terms of
the analogy with jazz one might conjure with now the riff of the social
construction of personal reality, later that of the personal construction of
social reality, later still something else? Just like an evening of creative
construing, perhaps?
This is a good collection of papers, with
something for everyone in the by now ‘broad Church’ or ‘family’ in terms of
which we seem to be construing ourselves nowadays. There is useful, interesting
and practical information, accounts of creative research, reflective writing,
rich theory, and challenging and provocative ideas. Whether there are some ‘odd
bedfellows’ in the contributions, overt or covert, and whether ‘resonances’ are
sometimes ‘dissonances’, are open questions in terms of how the coherence of ‘constructivist
psychology’ is enhanced. That, though, is a question of ‘identity’ that may
already be value-laden, as well as more a ‘philosophical’ than a ‘psychological’
question. Thus, if one reads the whole volume then perhaps the broadness of the
Church rather than its common or core tenets is more illuminated; and that is
both a good and a less-good thing.
REFERENCES
Frank, M. (1989). What is neostructuralism?
Translated by Sabine Wilke and Richard Gray, with a Foreword by Martin Schwab. Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis Press. Original work published 1984, in German. Published
as Volume 45 of Theory and History of Literature, Edited by Wlad Godzich and
Jochen Schulte-Sasse.
Koocher, G. P. (2007). Novel naughtiness:
Negotiating negative nuances in behavioural science and mental health practice.
Keynote address, Forty Second Annual Conference, Australian Psychological
Society, Brisbane, 25-29 September.
Raskin, J. D. (2002). Defending constructivist
ethics after September 11. The Humanist Psychologist, 30, 281-292.
Raskin, J. D. & Bridges, S. K. (Eds.). (2002).
Studies in meaning: Exploring constructivist psychology. New York: Pace
University Press.
Raskin, J. D. & Bridges, S. K. (Eds.). (2004).
Studies in meaning 2: Bridging the personal and social in constructivist
psychology. New York: Pace University Press.
Raskin, J. D., & Bridges, S. K. (Eds.).
(2008). Studies in meaning 3: Constructivist psychotherapy in the real world.
New York: Pace University Press.
Warren, W.G. (Bill). (1992). Subjecting and
objecting in personal construct psychology. In A. Thomson and P. Cummins (Eds) European
Perspectives in Personal Construct Psychology: Selected Papers from the
Inaugural Conference of the EPCA. York, UK. (pp. 57-66).
Warren, W.G. (Bill). (2002). The notion of
‘applied psychology’ from a personal construct psychology perspective. In, J.
Raskin and S. Bridges (Eds.). Studies in Meaning: Exploring Constructivist
Psychology. New York: Pace University Press. (pp. 265-287).
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ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Bill Warren
holds an appointment as a Conjoint Associate Professor in the
University of Newcastle, Australia having retired from full-time
academic work teaching Philosophy, in 2006. A member of the Colleges of
Clinial and Forensic Psychology of the Australian Psychological Society
he continues the private clinical practice in which he has been engaged
for some twenty-five years. Email: William.Warren@newcastle.edu.au
Home Page: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/research-centre/sorti/people/bill-warren.html
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REFERENCE
Warren, B. (2010). Review of Raskin, J. D., Bridges, S. K., Neimeyer, R. A. (Eds.).: Studies in Meaning 4. (2010). Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 7, 27-31, 2010 (Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp10/warren-raskin10.html)
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Received: 25 July 2010 - Accepted: 25 July 2010 -
Published: 7 August 2010 |
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