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| BOOK REVIEW | |
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BEING HUMAN: HUMAN BEING MANIFESTO FOR A NEW PSYCHOLOGY |
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Rue L. Cromwell |
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| New York: iUniverse, 2010, Paperback, 463 pages,
$ 30.95 | | | | | | reviewed by Spencer McWilliams | | | California State University
San Marcos, USA | | | | | | BETTER CONSTRUCTS CAN ALWAYS EMERGE | | | | | |
Suppose we publicly declared the intention
and motivation to develop a comprehensive constructivist approach to
psychology. Perhaps it might end up looking something like this:
Within the continuous streaming universe of
events, a constant cycle of human activity that we arbitrarily separate into
segments occurs. Perception launches when a 100 msec. scan separates this unbroken
(analog) input into discrete (digital) elements. A construct, the basic unit of
human psychological functioning, emerges when the person identifies the perceived
element by making a discrimination of it as ‘the same as or similar to’ or ‘different
from’ other elements, or else irrelevant to the task at hand. This process
serves survival; recognition of rhythm and repetition among events provides the
ability to anticipate future events. To facilitate this function, constructs
include ‘anticipation tags,’ elements that match with features of an
anticipated event. If a construct proves useful in such anticipation it
survives; if not the person abandons it. If the element matches with something
similar or familiar it links to long term memory and initiates an action or
thought sequence.
To facilitate survival, the scanning
process biases people toward prioritizing the identification of novelty, harm,
and threat. Thus, constructs develop an emotional ‘valence tag,’ positive or
negative, based on the person’s history of the consequences of relevant events.
Anticipation and valence do not require conscious awareness, but some, but by no
means all, constructs acquire a ‘verbal tag’ when an element comes to serve as
a stand-in for the construct itself. This enables the person to name a
construct by matching the verbal tag with its elements. When a construct within
long term memory matches the input, it links to a single thought or act,
generating a sequence that moves the cycle into taking action, and a process of
regulating whether the sequence is on track, or making necessary corrections. A
match of the anticipation tag and evidence that the anticipated event has occurred
closes the loop and returns the person to scanning continuous input.
An admittedly exceedingly oversimplified
summation, this description depicts some of the core psychological processes
that Rue Cromwell articulates as a basis for his new theory of psychology that identifies
the same/difference discrimination as the fundamental explanation for all human
functions. This formulation likely will seem recognizable to constructively-oriented
psychologists, and we might yearn for a unified, comprehensive theoretical
formulation that provides a constructivist theory that can subsume all relevant
psychological phenomena. However, as Cromwell effectively argues, such an aspiration
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of human cognitive and
linguistic functioning.
The process of developing constructs,
including scientific theories, revolves around the same/difference distinction,
and occurs within a particular context of circumstances or elements. We invent
constructs and construct systems for their convenience in anticipating a
particular range of events, and no construct or system can effectively
anticipate all events. Cromwell astutely reminds us that constructive
alternativism means that there is always more than one way to structure or
organize sensory input. Thus he values diversity among knowledge domains rather
than unity, and argues for avoiding overgeneralization and committing the reductionist
error of believing that one description of an event causes another description
of the event. Unrestricted diversity in describing events is necessary, he
suggests, for evolution of knowledge; ways of describing events will survive
pragmatically, to the extent that “they predict more things, more precisely,
more often” (p.30)
In keeping with his acknowledged influence
by George Kelly, Cromwell fully embodies a reflexive stance toward psychology. He
effectively elaborates the understanding that a theory about human functioning
must account for itself as an example of that functioning. Accordingly, his
description of science follows the same guidelines as applied to human beings
in general: knowledge begins by discriminating sensory input as
same/difference, called constructs; dividing them into likeness, contrast, and
irrelevance; using constructs for anticipation, with survival of the construct
related to its effectiveness; and meaning arises as the observer communicates
verbal tags to others and their responses lead to shared consensus.
A full elucidation of all of Cromwell’s thorough
elaboration of a human science based on the construing process falls well
beyond the scope of this review, let alone the reviewer’s comprehension or
competence. However, I will attempt to describe some additional components of
the presentation that I found particularly compelling. He describes how the
construct system structure evolves—how they are generated, combined, and
organized—by suggesting that people break up the stream of events in which
elements are embedded. They choose their own ‘cut points’ and invent how they
assemble or package the stream based on prior experience and current needs. They
organize these constructs into constellations and hierarchies that enable new
predictions. In assessing hierarchical structure with the Repertory Grid
Technique he discusses the relative merits of principle components analysis
versus hierarchical classification cluster analysis. He suggests, for example,
that extracting system hierarchy from a numerical matrix yields a more reliable
indication of the hierarchical system structure than laddering methods, which
require verbal tags for superordinate constructs. He proposes a system of
modeling hierarchy that reflects how the brain stores information at a
neurological level, using “decomposition of binary matrixes with the
identification of overlapping sets” (p. 132).
His proposition that constructs and their
organization can account for everything important about human functioning gains
immensely from his discussion of the two ways that constructs relate to other
constructs: symmetrically and asymmetrically. Symmetrical constructs have a
bilateral relationship to each other, so that the order of pairing makes no
difference. For example, ‘the rose is red’ and ‘red rose’ are clearly
equivalent. Asymmetrical constructs have a unilateral relationship that implies
directionality, in the sense that one construct precedes the other, providing
an opportunity for planning and anticipation. For example, ‘the boy hit the
ball’ is not equivalent to ‘the ball hit the boy.’ The importance of this
distinction lies in the significance of asymmetric links between constructs as
the basis for thought and action. Many ordinary human activities primarily use
symmetric linkages, but abstract thinking and planning require asymmetric
linkages among constructs. Cromwell describes the implications of these two
types of linkages for many complex human functions, such as language,
reasoning, and human action, as well as their possible linkages to brain
hemispheres and neurotransmitters.
Similarly to Kelly, he describes ‘self’ as
a construct that discriminates between same and different, with self as the ‘same’
pole and not-self as the ‘different” pole, observing that self constructs refer
to those in which the “anticipated outcome depends on our presence or action”
(p. 43). He further describes the challenge in changing self constructs in
terms of their implications for the entire organization of self-related
constructs. We can understand many social and affiliation processes in terms of
our tendency to view ourselves positively and similar to most other people and
he cites Adams-Webber’s grid work on the golden ratio to analyze the extent to
which we view others in same/difference and positive/negative terms.
Throughout this thorough and ambitious
book, Cromwell draws effectively on many decades of experience as a
psychological scientist and clinician, and he effectively relates his
construct-oriented psychology to his extensive knowledge of brain function,
hemispheric localization, and neurotransmitters. He includes examples from his
wide-ranging expertise and research in topics such as schizophrenia,
depression, mental retardation, and PTSD, along with fascinating anecdotes from
his wide-ranging professional experience. Conceptually, he connects his
perspective to the work of historical figures such as Plato, Spinoza, Abelard, Kant,
Mach, Helmholtz, Wundt, Bleuler, James, Planck, Einstein, and Bohr. He
effectively and compelling discusses important events in the recent history of
organized psychology, the implications of the history of science, physics, and
religion, and topics such as freedom and determinism, time and space, and
emotion. The book represents an amazing feat of conceptual understanding and
integration, within the context of absolute respect for diverse ways of making
sense of sensory input and unwavering support for the value of differing
knowledge domains.
This recurrent thematic emphasis on
diversity of knowledge domains, and the ethos it implies, struck me as one of
the most compellingly meta-theoretical constructivist contributions of the
book. This perspective has significant implications for the integral view of
science in particular and human functioning in general. Because different knowledge
systems, with different ranges of convenience, may use the same or similar
verbal tags we mistakenly tend to assume that the constructs with the same
verbal tag mean the same thing. Furthermore, if constructs in our preferred
knowledge domain effectively anticipate events in that domain we tend to
generalize them to other domains, failing to acknowledge that our constructs
evolved as same/difference distinctions in a particular context of elements and
have no necessary validity beyond that context. We attempt to force our desire
for a unified understanding by overgeneralizing from one domain to others, but
a superordinate domain cannot exist because we cannot identify any single
correct explanatory language for events.
Throughout the book, and in a variety of
ways, Cromwell describes the problems that arise as a result of reifying
constructs. We build constructs and develop consensus with others about shared
constructs. We commit ourselves to these constructs as a way of making life
meaningful and predictable. We then tend to believe that what we have
constructed exists absolutely, as the truth. This makes it difficult to change
constructs, since we have linked them with other constructs that give us our
sense of reality. To change one construct may require that we reconsider
everything that the construct relates to in our hierarchical system.
Other problems in human functioning occur
when we attend more to verbal concepts and ‘ideas' regarding events rather than
to the actual elements and our actual experience, endowing the verbal with
excessive power. In other words, once we allocate verbal tags to constructs we
pay more attention to the verbal tags than to the events that we created them
to anticipate. This failure to attend to the on-going anticipatory utility of
our verbalized concepts leads us to continue to use obsolete ideas and beliefs
that no longer effectively anticipate events.
Scientific thinking, Cromwell suggests, has
proceeded on the flawed idea that we can build a model of the universe without
regard to a science of how people construct models and concepts. He regards the
premise of an external world that exists with absolute truth as a metaphysical
assumption, not a scientific proposition, and he argues that the notion of a
pre-existing reality in science, as well as concepts like ‘mind’ have no
utility. Hypothetical concepts like space, time, and self may prove useful to
us in facilitating hypothesis, but otherwise have no useful purpose.
Cromwell further elucidates the idea that
constructs exist solely for their purpose in anticipating events, to be
discarded or abandoned when that process fails, by emphasizing
disconfirmability as a key element in science and human functioning. The
benefit of science in comparison to other knowledge domains derives from its assumption
that we can best ask an empirical question and test a hypothesis by asking what
event would disconfirm this particular formulation. Thus, doubt and
disconfirmability are central to the scientific process, and we should actively
seek disconfirmation of our hypotheses and constructs and take pleasure when
they are invalidated. New thinking and the growth of knowledge only come about
due to disconfirmation of existing ideas; scientific propositions do not remain
into perpetuity.
The rich array of material in this book
ranges from metatheoretical discussion regarding science and knowledge, through
its elaboration of many aspects of the construing process, to methodological
and clinical examples. It will, I believe, provide a fertile source for research
and development of a constructivist approach to psychology. I look forward to
the further elaboration of the new psychology that Cromwell has proposed and
the application of the book’s many insights to the development of constructivist
psychology. To help maintain proper perspective, I would like to close this
review with an important reminder:
“A
cardinal rule in human construct building is that there is no single correct
solution. All human constructions unfortunately are arbitrary. One cannot
declare one construct as the right one. Some better construct can always emerge
later.” (p. 158).
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| ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
Spencer A. McWilliams, Ph.D. has held faculty and administrative appointments at six
American universities and colleges from 1971 to the present. He has sustained
an active interest and participation in PCP for more than thirty years. He
currently serves as Professor of Psychology at California State University San
Marcos, San Marcos, CA 92096, USA. E-mail: smcwilli@csusm.edu. Home Page: http://www.csusm.edu/mcwilliams/
Correspondence: Dept. of Psychology California State University San Marcos 333 S. Twin Oaks Valley Rd. San Marcos, CA 92096-0001 USA | | | | |
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REFERENCE
McWilliams, S. (2011). Better constructs can always emerge. Review
of Being Human: Human Being. Manifesto
for a New Psychology
by
Rue L. Cromwell
Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 8, 7-10.
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp11/mcwilliams-cromwell11.html)
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Received: 21 March 2011 – Accepted: 22 March 2011 –
Published: 25 March 2011 |
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