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PEIRCE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSTRUCTIVISM AND
PERSONAL CONSTRUCT PSYCHOLOGY: I. PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS
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Harry G. Procter
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Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, UK
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Abstract
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Kelly’s work was formed and
developed in the context of the American philosophical movement known as
pragmatism. The major figures to which this tradition is attributed are Charles
S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. In Personal Construct Psychology,
Dewey was acknowledged by Kelly and by subsequent writers as perhaps his most
important influence. It has recently become increasingly apparent, however that
Peirce was a much more pervasive and crucial influence on James and Dewey than
has previously been recognized. Kelly did not mention Peirce but a close
reading of the two writers reveals a remarkable correspondence and relationship
between their two bodies of work. To set these two thinkers side by side proves
to be an interesting and productive exercise. In this paper, after introducing
Peirce and examining the relationship between him and Dewey, Kelly’s basic
philosophical assumptions, as outlined at the beginning of Volume 1 of the
Psychology of Personal Constructs, are used as a framework for exploring their
similarities and differences. The result is an enrichment of our understanding
of Kelly’s philosophy which allows us to make links with many different
subsequent thinkers’ ideas and provides a basis for exploring the psychological
aspects of the two men’s work. The latter forms the subject of Part II of this
series which is in preparation.
Keywords: Peirce, Kelly,
Pragmatism, Personal Construct Psychology, Constructivism
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“Of
course, it all goes back to Peirce.” (David Lodge, Small World)
“He was
so great, no university found a place for him” (Roman Jakobson)
“When I
say the stove is black, I am making a little theory to
account for the look of it” (Charles S. Peirce)
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
Charles Sanders Peirce [1]
(1839–1914) is now recognised as a philosophical giant and a key figure in the
development of many later trends in subsequent philosophy and psychology. For a
long time he was known as a rather shadowy figure standing behind the much more
well-known writers William James and John Dewey, but Peirce had first defined and
elaborated the area and given the name to the important philosophical school of
Pragmatism.
Karl-Otto Apel clearly suggests a larger
role for Peirce:
James and Dewey are indebted to
Peirce, often in a nearly word-for-word fashion, for nearly all the new
patterns of thought in their philosophy (Apel, 1995, p. 9).
Whilst
this is probably overstated, it does convey a picture of Peirce as almost singlehandedly
responsible for an enormous paradigm shift: a great original who has
significantly reshaped our philosophical understanding.
The
tragic story that emerges (Brent, 1993) is of a man too clever for his own good
who was largely misunderstood by his contemporaries and for various reasons, to
do with his personality and the moral strictures of the time, was excluded and
unrecognised as the towering figure that he was. His own voluminous writings,
contained in un-sorted boxes of manuscripts, only slowly started to appear
twenty years after his death, in the Collected Papers (CP, 1931 – 1958) [2] in
eight volumes. These are being assembled anew chronologically in the Peirce Edition
Project (1981 – present), which will comprise a projected thirty volumes. The
scope of his work is immense, covering logic, the philosophy of science and
mathematics, epistemology, phenomenology, psychology, semiotics, specialist
scientific papers and metaphysics. His work was an acknowledged influence on,
or presaged, a wide range of thinkers both in the Anglo-American and
Continental traditions including Frege, Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Quine, Putman,
Chomsky, Bateson, Bennett, Husserl, Saussure, Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Jacobson,
Scheler, Habermas, Lacan, Deleuze and Derrida in addition to James, Dewey and
Royce and, as we shall see, many themes in the constructivist and constructionist
family of approaches (see Procter, in press) are to be found in Peirce.
Nurtured
in the developing new culture following the American Revolution, which included
contact with the transcendentalists such as Emerson, Henry James Senior and of
course with his father, the great mathematician Benjamin Peirce, Charles was
early exposed to the philosophy of Kant and the German idealists (Brent, 1993,
Menand, 2001). He writes:
The first strictly philosophical books that I
read were of the classical German schools; and I became so deeply imbued with
many of their ways of thinking that I have never been able to disabuse myself
of them. Yet my attitude was always that of a dweller in a laboratory, eager
only to learn what I did not yet know, and not that of philosophers bred in
theological seminaries, whose ruling impulse is to teach what they hold to be
infallibly true. I devoted two hours a day to the study of Kant's Critic of the Pure Reason
for more than three years, until I almost knew
the whole book by heart, and had critically examined every section of it (CP 1.4).
Kant had confronted the polarisation
in Western Philosophy between the continental rationalism of Descartes and
Spinoza and the British empiricism of Locke and Hume, developing a philosophy
that acknowledged the importance of sensuous experience but also saw the mind
as active in shaping and structuring this experience (see Procter, 1978, 2011)
and in so doing, ushered in an understanding that forms the basis of much subsequent
philosophy, psychology, sociology and other disciplines.
But Peirce criticised the
Aristotelian logic upon which Kant was basing his system, replacing it with a
broader logic of inquiry and semiotic (Apel, 1981). This enabled Peirce to
continue Kant’s project of mediating empiricism and rationalism but in a new
way which addressed the static and dualist picture portrayed by Kant’s
philosophy (Procter, 2011). Both Hegel and Peirce found ways forward from Kant
but with Peirce avoiding Hegel’s idealist solution. The ways Peirce found for
bridging dualisms can be seen to play a role of increasing weight in the
development of John Dewey.
PEIRCE AND DEWEY
Before summarising Peirce’s position
further, let us consider his relationship to Dewey, whom Kelly perhaps
acknowledged more than any other figure when he wrote that, “Dewey’s philosophy
and psychology can be read between many of the lines of the psychology of
personal constructs” (Kelly, 1955, p. 154). Much earlier, Kelly (1932) had said
that “Dewey is probably the greatest of living philosophers...at least
educational philosophers” (cited in Fransella, 1995, p. 58- 9). Novak (1983),
Butt (2005, 2006), and Warren (2003, 2010) discuss the relationship between PCP
and Dewey in some detail.
The relationship between the three
classical pragmatist philosophers, Peirce, James and Dewey is complex and multi-layered.
Peirce influenced both profoundly but only gradually becomes recognised for the
original genius that he was within Dewey’s own writings and in secondary
literature about the history of pragmatism. Through the twenties and thirties, Dewey
writes:
Charles Peirce was probably the
most original philosophic mind this country has produced; certainly one of the
seminal minds of this generation (Dewey 1924).
(Peirce was) one of the most
imaginative thinkers ever in philosophy
Readers who are acquainted with
the logical writings of Peirce will note my great indebtedness to him in the
general position taken.
Prawat (2001), trying to answer the
question of why Peirce’s influence has gone for so long unnoticed looks to the
sheer volume of the two men’s work and the decades involved in bringing them to
publication. But Peirce was clearly also actively side-lined and excluded for
many years as a serious thinker. Dewey (1924) says that “from the ‘sixties to
the ‘nineties these United States were a less congenial nursery, both in
universities and out of them, than they are even today for men who do not
readily ‘fit in’ “. Peirce was blocked from teaching posts for his perceived
unreliability, irascible personality and for having divorced and lived with his
second wife for a period before their marriage (Brent, 1993, Rochberg-Halton,
cited in Wiley, 2006a). But William James said, “I owe him everything” and
actively supported his friend but also said that he found much of his work too
complex for him to understand (Brent, op cit).
Peirce’s rehabilitation, growing
steadily through the mid-twentieth century, suffered another setback at the
hands of Richard Rorty, who although writing sensitively about Peirce and
Wittgenstein in 1961, in the 1980s, on the crest of the postmodern wave, discriminated
between Dewey and Peirce, describing Dewey as one of the two greatest twentieth
century philosophers (with Heidegger) and Peirce as merely having “given
Pragmatism its name and to have stimulated James” (Rorty, 1982). As we shall
see, this is a travesty and is belied by what Dewey himself wrote about Peirce’s
crucial importance to his own development.
The young Dewey (1859 – 1952) had already
fallen under the spell of the English poet Coleridge, who had done more than
anyone to bring Kant, Schelling and the German idealist philosophers to the
attention of the English speaking world. Dewey’s teacher in Vermont, James
Marsh, had brought out an edition of Coleridge’s book, Aids to Reflection (1829) which Dewey later described as “his first
bible” (Menand, 2001). Dewey at the age of 23 enrolled in Johns Hopkins
University in 1882 and chose to work with George S. Morris, a specialist in
Hegel, the great unifier of opposites and critic of Kantian dualism. Dewey’s
aim already at that time, was to reconcile and bring together science,
religion, and the aesthetic as integral to all human experience (Warren, 2003).
His early book Psychology (1887) reflects
a strong Hegelian influence:
Hegel and Morris were idealists who believed that dualisms like subject/object
or mind/world dissolve as individuals move closer and closer to
the truth. Seeing the world as an interdependent whole, Dewey argued, is what is
meant by fully “objectified intelligence” (1887)....Those who reach this level
of understanding are “completely universalized or related” individuals; they
have achieved what Dewey called “absolute self-consciousness.” (Prawat,
2000)
Under the influence of William James,
who was critical of Hegel (and Kant), Dewey gradually moved away from his
Hegelian views but never lost his desire to overcome splits and dualisms. James
emphasised the role of human activity, denying that the world possessed its own
independent rationality (McWilliams, 2009). In 1879, James talked of
conceptions as teleological instruments
and that “classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the
mind” (James, 1880, p.335). Here we find the seeds of Dewey’s instrumentalism but as we shall see that
this emphasis on teleology, final causes or purpose
is to be found earlier to be central in the writings of C. S. Peirce. Dewey found
much to admire in James’ biological psychology, but under the influence of
Peirce, soon began to be critical of James, seeing him as too individualistic
and subjectivist, focusing too much on sensations and particulars (Prawat,
2000).
Dewey first encountered Peirce when
he was a student in Baltimore. Peirce was on the staff at Johns Hopkins in the
only brief university tenure of his career. Dewey decided not to take Peirce’s
logic course but attended his “Metaphysical Club” and saw a lot of him anyway
(Menand, op cit). In 1903, Dewey wrote to James that he was revisiting Peirce’s
writings:
I must say, however, that I can
see how far I have moved along when I find how much I get out of Peirce this
year and how easily I understand him, when a few years ago he was mostly a
sealed book to me aside from occasional inspirations. It is an awful pity that
he cannot be got to go ahead consecutively (Dewey, letter to William James,
1903).
In a useful and informative debate centred
on education, Jim Garrison (1995, 1996) and Richard Prawat (1995, 1996a, 1996b)
discuss Dewey’s work as a type of Social Constructivism. Prawat, in a broad
definition of this term, outlines six types, describing the work of Peirce and
Dewey as Idea based Social
Constructivism, including the centrality of anticipation, abduction (see
later) and the self-propelling nature of ideas. Garrison says that Prawat is right to emphasise the importance of
ideas or habits in Dewey’s work but
they differ about the nature of activity. Prawat underlines again how crucial
it is for Dewey not to separate the subject from the object, or ideas from
reality. Without objects, ideas become mere verbalisms with education based on
this in danger of intellectualism.
Prawat goes on to elaborate his
position in three further papers (1999, 2000, 2001). In the third paper he summarises
Garrison’s view of Dewey’s work, appreciating its holistic treatment in looking
at the major concepts in the context of the whole corpus of Dewey’s work but disagrees
with Garrison’s implication of a continuity
of development in Dewey’s ideas. He argues instead for a fundamental
discontinuity or “Peircean turn” in the course of Dewey’s thinking:
Dewey
eventually joined the group of Peirce’s admirers. In fact, he becomes so enamoured
with Peirce’s application of logic to the process of inquiry that it formed the
basis for his own views after 1915 (Prawat, 2000). Dewey admitted this towards the end of his life [3]... “Any
attempt to develop a comprehensive view of what Dewey was about...must take
into account Peirce and the influence he exerted on Dewey’s thinking after the
First World War” (Prawat, 2001).
In 1916, Dewey published a brief but
rich paper on Peirce which becomes his first major statement and appreciation
of the latter’s work and which contains several central themes of relevance to
Kelly’s philosophy. Possibly with Peirce’s death two years earlier, Dewey
wanted to record his appreciation of his mentor.
Dewey contrasts James and Peirce in
this paper on four major dimensions. Peirce emphasises the social factor more than James. The centrality of inquiry is contrasted with James’
individual will to believe. Both are
seen as realists but Peirce makes it
clearer that it is a conception of the
real that we deal with. And he argues
that what is most new and original in Peirce is the recognition of an inseparable
connection between cognition and human purpose. Whereas James had interpreted
Peirce as saying that the meaning of a proposition lies with its particular practical purpose, Peirce
emphasised the general meaning of a
proposition, making it applicable to human conduct. It becomes for Peirce what
he calls a habit, a pivotal concept
in Peirce’s approach to mental phenomena (Colapietro, 1989, p 108) – a way of thinking or acting used to
address the widest range of particulars or situations, including those not before
encountered. Supporting Prawat’s thesis of a Peircean turn, Edel and Flower
(1985) describe how the central concept of habit underwent a profound change in Dewey’s understanding. From having
been a conservative force, something akin to activities carried out on
“automatic pilot” in William James (1890, chapter iv), the habit for Dewey
became a central feature in his psychology. Now habits are seen to constitute
the self: character is seen as the ‘interpenetration of habits’ (Edel and
Flower, 1985). They quote Dewey: “Concrete habits do all the perceiving,
recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is
done” (Dewey, 1922, p 124). Here we seem to have, very fully elaborated,
something similar in conception to Kelly’s personal
constructs (see Procter (2009) for a description of the construct as broad
and holistic). From “habit” as a rather behavioural conception in James, we
find it now as a habit of thinking, structuring anticipation and imagination,
of making sense of things and of guiding action. Compare this with Kelly’s
construct as a habitual way of construing, perhaps reflected in his use in the
fundamental postulate of the word “channelized”. The construct system can
change but tends to settle into relatively enduring dimensions and
configurations.
More themes in Dewey to be found in
Peirce which appear in Kelly include a stress on intrinsic activity or motion,
common-sensism and fallibilism. Dewey writes in Human Nature and Conduct:
It is absurd to ask what induces
a man to activity...He is an active being, and that is all there is to be said
on that score
(Dewey, 1922, p 84)
This
connects directly with Kelly’s idea of “man as a form of motion”, his rejection
of the energy concept in psychology and his critique of theories which require
people to be “pushed” or “pulled” into action by stimuli, needs, reinforcement,
motivation or drives (Kelly, 1955, pp 36, 48). It is likely that Hegel, for
whom life is imbued with the ever changing and developing dialectic is an
inspiration for Dewey here, but Peirce has his equivalent in his law of mind
and concept of semiosis, where
thoughts, signs and symbols are continuously evolving and growing almost like
living organisms (Fernandez, 2010, Nöth,
2010). This is taken up again later in the discussion on semiosis (pp. 19-22).
Dewey highlighted Peirce’s fallibilism and common-sensism in his reviews of Peirce’s papers (Colapietro, 2004,
Dewey, 1932). In his doctrine of Critical Commonsensism, Peirce attaches great
importance to everyday beliefs that grow out of everyday practice. There is a
massive central core of funded human experiences which have grown up over the
course of our evolution as a species, a process intertwined with the evolution
of other species and with the very nature of the world in which we live (Peirce
CP 5.511, Dewey, LW 11:480, cited in Colapietro 2008 and 2004 respectively). We
tend to take this bedrock of shared certainties for granted: “Five minutes of
our waking life will hardly pass without our making some kind of prediction.
Yet in the majority of cases these predictions are completely fulfilled”
(Peirce, 1903). Dewey notes how Peirce applied common sense to philosophy
itself:
There is one aspect of Peirce's thought
which comes out most clearly, I think, in his conception of philosophy
itself...He holds that philosophy is that kind of common sense which has become
critically aware of itself. It is based upon observations which are within
the range of every man's normal experience; it does not include
matters which are more conveniently studied by students of the special
sciences. To my mind this statement is the more weighty because it comes from a
man who was so devoted to the sciences and so learned in them (Dewey, 1932,
first emphasis mine).
Common sense as a concept has a
radical feel to it, perhaps going right back to Thomas Paine’s challenge to the
British Government in the pamphlet of that name written in 1776. Wiley (2006b,
p. 35) writes that Peirce’s epistemology had objectively liberal implications even
though his personal views were politically conservative. Peirce wrote very
little explicitly about politics (Talisse, 2004), but his position which Apel
(1981, p 193) calls his logical socialism
implies that we surrender ourselves in scientific inquiry to the interests
of an indefinite community (Apel,
1981, p 193, Abrams, 2004). In his 1898 lectures in Cambridge he argued that
the “welfare of the commonwealth” of inquirers should be promoted through
common education in the art of thinking (Peirce, 1992). This was certainly a
core concern of John Dewey whose radical position and progressive education is
discussed by Warren (2010).
Personal construct theory shares the
same vision of respecting the ordinary person’s views and values and treating
the client as the main expert on themselves. Don Bannister had been a member of
the radical Common Wealth Party (McPherson, 1975), founded by J. B. Priestley
and others during the second world war, and these values imbued the British PCP
movement in the 1960’s and 70’s and run through Bannister’s fine novels
(Farrar, 2006).
Peirce emphasised however that
common sense “certainties” are also, like all other beliefs, fallible and must not be allowed to
block the road of inquiry (Peirce, 1892), the greatest sin for Peirce. As we shall see shortly, Peirce was
very critical of Descartes’ attempt to isolate indubitable propositions. All of our thoughts and views are subject
to fallibilism – the principle that we could always be wrong in our beliefs.
This is crucial in the philosophy of science (cf Popper’s emphasising the
importance of falsifiability) and is also central in George Kelly’s
assumption that “all of our interpretations of the universe are subject to
revision or replacement” including those of PCP itself (Kelly, 1955, p 11) and
that “a good psychological theory should be ultimately expendable” (op cit. p
44).
We will now begin to build up a
picture of what the main philosophical contributions that Peirce gave to us
over a long career of struggling to develop his vision, by comparing what he
said with Kelly’s basic philosophical assumptions. We will cover Peirce’s
psychological contributions to constructivism and PCP in Part II of this series
(Procter, in preparation).
What
kind of Universe?
Kelly began the first chapter of The Psychology of Personal Constructs by
outlining his philosophical assumptions in a brief and brilliant summary of his
position entitled “What kind of Universe” (1955, pp. 6–7). I have abstracted
seven statements from his discussion and listed them in Table 1. We will look
at each of these in turn.
Table
1: What kind of universe?
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Kelly
Peirce
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1.
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All thinking is based, in part on prior
convictions.
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We have no power of intuition, but every
cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions (1868: 5.265)
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2.
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The Universe is really existing...it is a real
world that we shall be talking about, not a world composed solely of the
flitting shadows of people’s thoughts.
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Where is the real, the thing independent of how
we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we find our
opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which influences our
thoughts, and is not created by them (1871: 8.12)
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3.
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Man is gradually coming to understand it.
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There is a definite opinion to which the mind of
man is, on the whole and in the long run tending (1871: 8.12).
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4.
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Thoughts also really exist.
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The category of thought, representation, triadic
relation, mediation, genuine thirdness...is an essential ingredient of
reality (1905: 5.436)
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5.
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Correspondence between thoughts and world is a
continually changing one.
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The sign creates its own form of object each time
it is used.
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6.
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Universe is integral...in the long run all events
are interlocked.
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Synechism: The doctrine that all
that exists is continuous (1.172)
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7.
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The Universe is continually changing with respect
to itself...something is always going on.
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Everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing
complexity... it appears to be universal (1892: 6.58, 6.64)
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1. All
thinking is based, in part on prior convictions
This utterance serves to introduce
Kelly’s basic assumptions but is also a profound statement in itself
reminiscent of Peirce’s radical argument that, “We have no power of intuition,
but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions” (Peirce, 1868,
p. 88). This appears early in Peirce’s work, when he challenges Descartes and
his Cogito ergo sum or “I think
therefore I am”. Descartes assumes that we can readily strip away all doubt
until we reach a certainty, or a direct intuition of the self upon which we can
set out building a system of truths. Many years later, Peirce summarises this
and also takes on Locke in his equivalent foundational claim that we can reduce
all experience to pure sensations:
Another
[Locke] proposes that we should begin by observing "the first impressions
of sense", forgetting that our very percepts are the results of cognitive
elaboration. But in truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can
"set out," namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find
yourself at the time you do "set out" – a state in which you are
laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest
yourself if you would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would not have
made all knowledge impossible to yourself?
(Peirce, 1905)
Descartes, commonly dubbed as the ‘founder of
modern philosophy’ (Russell, 1946) started a tradition in which we develop a
system of knowledge by paring down to a firm foundation of indubitable
assumptions or ‘axioms‘ and building up from those. Spinoza, for example,
consciously modelled his Ethics on Euclid’s geometry by assembling a
series of definitions, axioms and propositions, gradually building up his
complete system. Leibniz in his Monadology starts with his axiomatic definition
of the Monad and completes his system in a series of 90 carefully
argued numbered paragraphs. Peirce is critiquing this very foundationalist approach
in what Gallie described as perhaps the most “devastating and complete battery
of criticisms to be found in the whole history of philosophy” (Gallie, 1952, p.
78). In so doing he clears the path for the first statement of our contemporary
recognition that our awareness and experience are thoroughly and inseparably
immersed in and structured by the “immense mass of cognition” or the social and
personal constructions that have developed and been elaborated in the course of
each of our lives in the particular cultural and historical context in which we
grow up. They cannot so easily be thrown off to reveal a purer truth. This
allows us to see Peirce as an ancestor to a wide range of current traditions
from cognitive psychology through constructivist, constructionist to symbolic
interactionism, the sociology of knowledge and hermeneutic approaches.
But is not Peirce (and Kelly) falling into exactly
the same trap of ‘foundationalism’ only to replace old assumptions with a new
set, only with a different content? It is true that Peirce and Kelly share a
profound optimism that in the long run our knowledge and understanding of the
universe is increasing (see below, statement 3). But both are replacing
axiomatic and foundational statements with a view that collectively and
individually, we build up our beliefs and constructions through a process of
inquiry involving making guesses and hypotheses, generated within the framework
of previous constructions, but validated and invalidated in the practice of
daily life and experiment. Both thinkers adhere to the belief in fallibilism
as we noted earlier. Wiley (1994: 30) writes that Peirce replaced
Descartes’ I think therefore I am with “I err therefore I am”:
we discover our individual position on something when we are wrong and an
anticipation is invalidated. We never know whether what we believe has some
kind of ’objective‘ validity. The phlogiston episode in the history of
chemistry is an excellent example of how an apparently unquestionable belief
can suddenly have rug pulled out from under it.
2. The
universe is really existing
This is in itself a clear statement
of realism with which Kelly proposes to distinguish his position from idealism
(“not a world composed solely of the flitting shadows of people’s thoughts”).
But he also says, “I am not a realist...and do not believe a client or
therapist has to lie down and let facts crawl all over him” (1969, p. 225) and,
“Since we insist that man can erect his own alternative approaches to reality,
we are out of line with traditional realism” (1955, p. 17). We are not
passively at the mercy of causes and situations. The real can always be
construed and re-construed in a variety of ways – his basic philosophy that he
calls “constructive alternativism”. Fransella says that Kelly takes “the
unusual and middle position stating both that there is a reality but that we
only have access to the reality we have created” (Fransella, 1995, p. 49). Mackay
(2011) regards this statement as contradictory and incoherent.
Chiari and Nuzzo (2003) classify PCP
as radical as opposed to the trivial constructivism of the cognitive
approach because it does not argue that our knowledge reflects an “objective”
ontological reality but is rather organised by the structure of our experience.
They cite Von Glasersfeld who uses the helpful distinction between a match of reality rather than a fit, in the way that various different
keys may fit a lock, but are in themselves unlike a lock. They see PCP also as epistemological as opposed to the hermeneutic constructivism of Maturana
and Varela and the social constructionists where no reality at all is seen as
existing independently of an observer. I think it is helpful in these debates
to remember that all these words that we use – experience, knowledge, real,
exist, represent, refer, match, copy, mirror, fit and so on, are all philosophical constructs. The idea and
experience of an external, independent,
objective world is still our construct and all these further words
are...constructs. When we bang our knee painfully on the table, it is a real
experience, but it is still construed [4]. Peirce, as we shall see, calls this brute
encounter with the world Secondness, another
construct, one of his three categories.
Peirce may well have criticised the hermeneutic approach, as he did Hegel, as
ignoring the “outward clash”: “This direct consciousness of hitting and of
getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean something
real” (CP 8.41). For social constructionism, this is just another way of
talking. We like to use furniture and death as examples of rhetorically
convincing ourselves and others that the world exists (Edwards et al., 1995).
Dr Johnson (Boswell, 1791), in relation to Berkeley’s idealism, is claimed to
have kicked a large stone and cried, “I refute it thus!”
Peirce’s position on the realism
debate is extremely subtle and complex. Peirce is labelled by writers from one
end of the dimension to the other, from ‘realist’ (e.g. Margolis, 1993, p. 295)
to ‘idealist’ (e.g. Collins, 1998, p. 676). Peirce himself described his
position as scholastic realism but
also as conditional or objective idealism. His position also
changed significantly over time (Hookway, 2004, Short, 2007, Bergman, 2007). The breadth and profundity of his work
belies these words being adequate to do justice to it in any simple sense. Susan
Haack (1993) deconstructs foundationalism
and realism by looking at various
contrast poles to them, isolating six separate dimensions, concluding that one
cannot clearly classify Peirce’s work as being foundationalist or anti-foundationalist,
realist or anti-realist. Nöth (1995: 43) claims that Peirce’s semiotic
philosophy has overcome the realism-idealism dichotomy.
Scholastic realism, derived from an intense study of the medieval philosophers, particularly
Duns Scotus, had Peirce arguing that real
generals such as classes, genera or scientific laws exist and that the
development of scientific knowledge, including pragmatism itself would be
impossible without making this assumption (Moore, 1998: 8, Philström, 2004: 30).
Peirce vigourously opposed nominalism which
states that only particulars exist
and any general categories or laws are just names,
exclusively the product of the human mind, which would place most forms of
constructivism, I think, in the nominalist camp.
Inductions also take place in the process of perception. Hence every
cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose subject and
predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it is not merely the case, as we
saw before, that universals have reality upon this theory, but also that there
are nothing but universals which have an immediate reality (Peirce (1868) W 2:180, cited in
Bergman, 2007, p. 61).
But the word real, Peirce states, was
only brought into common use by Duns Scotus (8.319):
For
realis and realitas are not ancient words.
They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the thirteenth century, and the
meaning they were intended to express is perfectly clear. That is real which has such and such
characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any
rate, that is the sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word (Peirce, 1905, p. 277).
For Peirce then, “that which any
proposition asserts is real, in the sense
of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it” (CP 5.312). But
it is still not somehow independent of the mind: “General conceptions enter
into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions... It is a real which only exists by virtue
of an act of thought knowing it” (8.14, cited in Boler, 2004, p. 83). This view
sees the real as something arrived at in the process of reflective inquiry
rather than being defined prior to inquiry, the attempt to do so which Dewey
(1916) argued was the source of a large part of our epistemological
difficulties. Philström (2004, p. 50) argues that the problem of realism has
been continuously transformed in the pragmatists’ writings but never fully
settled. But, Peirce led us forward to a further position of clarity in all
this by making the question of practice central,
with his definition of meaning as involving the practical bearings or events
that would follow in taking up a conception. This is contained in the pragmatic maxim, (see later, Overview and
Discussion). Peirce also developed the central doctrine of semiotics, a new approach with epistemological
and ontological implications. For Peirce, the Universe is “perfused with signs, if it is not composed entirely
with signs” (5.448n). There is nothing
beyond signs:
Reals
are signs. To try to peel off signs and get down to the real thing is like
trying to peel an onion and get down to [the] onion itself (cited in Collins 1998, p. 677).
We might summarise then, that the
real is a subset of the larger category of “the construed”, where things are
unvarying in relation to what people think about them. Peirce (1903) begun a
lecture at Harvard bringing with him a stone which he amusingly asked people to
bet on whether it would fall to the ground when he released it (perhaps
alluding to Dr Johnson?). With this he argued about the reality of rule
governed behaviour as independent of how anyone thought. It is an example of a
vast amount of shared experience that we take for granted (and of which we are
largely unaware) but because philosophers tend to focus on contentious and
problematic questions, often with a long history of highly elaborated and
polarised debate, this paradoxically collective store of construction, the
subject of common sense, tends to get bypassed in philosophical discussion.
Like all other words, its meaning most importantly resides in its use:
“When
I say I mean my discourse to apply to the real world, the word “real” does not
describe what kind of world it is: it only serves
to bring the mind of the hearer back to that world which he knows so well by
sight, hearing and touch, and of which those sensations are themselves indices
of the same kind. Such a demonstrative sign is a necessary appendage to a
proposition, to show what world of objects...what “universe of discourse” it
has in view” (Peirce, 1895, cited in Hookway, 2004, my emphasis).
3. Man
is gradually coming to understand the Universe
Kelly expresses this optimistic thought in a number
of places, saying:
The truths (that) theories attempt to fix [5] are
successive approximations to the larger scheme of things which slowly they help
to unfold (1955, p. 19)
I
might then be tempted to throw in the sponge and concede that the lines of
human construction and outer reality can never, never touch. But I prefer the more cosmic view which supposes these two
progressions may ultimately join hands, though that auspicious moment may prove
to be an infinity of years away (1977, p. 25).
It
is through the historian’s vista that we see mankind so unmistakably on the
forward march (1955, p. 944).
Peirce controversially proposes very similar points
There
is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long
run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all
it will be reached if time enough is given...there is a general drift in the history of human thought that will lead to agreement,
one catholic consent (1871: 58-9)
The
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed upon to by all who investigate
is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the
real (5.407)
Both Peirce and Kelly lived in the
era of tremendous expansion, Peirce at the height of the industrial revolution
and expanding empires, Kelly in mid-twentieth century with the ever continuing development
of science including his own psychology: “Our public construction systems for
understanding other people’s personal constructs are becoming more precise and
more comprehensive” (1955, p. 9). For me too, it is easy still to be dazzled by
the incredible feats of science which continue to reveal what would in Kant’s
day be deigned as beyond the limits of possible knowledge, and as in the realm
of the noumenal “thing-in-itself”: fundamental particles, black holes, the
double helix or the marvels of electronic and nanotechnology. But of course the
grand theorising and idea of ‘progress’ have taken a heavy knock in the era of
post-modernism. Both Peirce and Kelly were important contributors to the
paradigm shift from modernism to post-modernism. Peirce inspired such thinkers
as Lacan, Derrida and Eco whilst Botella (1995) describes Kelly’s work as at
the vanguard of post-modernism, but both figures retained this optimistic
stance of increasing knowledge in the long run.
The constructivist philosopher,
Joseph Margolis (1993) gives tribute to Peirce for his many rich and insightful
contributions but argues that his scholastic realism, fallibilism and faith in
knowledge in “the long run” need to be dropped in a slimmed down version of his
philosophy in order to avoid contradiction and incoherence. This would leave
Peirce as a recognisable and worthy ancestor to a modern constructivist view. Real
generals and laws would be entirely internal
to the world which is always a symbiosis between subject and object – a resemblance but not a correspondence between what Kelly above
calls the lines of human construction and outer reality. Do we have to abandon
also then, Kelly’s incurable optimism which is so important in the practice of
psychotherapy, the faith that we can revise our constructions and transcend
brute circumstances? How do we reconcile constructive
alternativism with the idea of convergence
even if the latter is said to be infinitely far away in the future?
In a reply to Margolis’ critique, Kelley
Wells (1994) argues that we have good pragmatic justification for the existence
of real generals – it works – we do not need to claim certainty, the belief
remains in the realm of fallible hypothesis. There is no pragmatic way of
finally confirming it, but neither is there a way of disconfirming it. He
believes Margolis himself is entering the realm of transcendent metaphysics by
categorically denying it. Wells quotes Putnam (1991) who believes that we can
give up the objective mood without forsaking all warrant for realism, there is
no necessary inconsistency between conceptual relativism (cf constructive
alternativism) and realism: “One can be both a realist and a conceptual
relativist” (Putnam, 1991:13). It is not impossible to postulate the
independent reality of real generals, even though we know them only through a
“symbiosis” between subject and object (Wells, 1994, p. 849). For example, we
only know other human minds through our construction of them but this does not
mean the existence of other people depends
upon this subjective acknowledgement for their own existence (op cit: 849).
To deny this risks the absurdity of solipsism.
Wells, however agrees with Margolis
about giving up the idea of ultimate knowledge of reality being achieved in the
“long run”. This cannot in any way be pragmatically tested, but we don’t even
need to. Science, Wells says, is already adequately supported by increasing
stability and comprehensiveness of its beliefs – we can say Einstein’s mechanics
are a progressive step forward from Newton’s – more phenomena are explained and
predicted – without saying that Einstein’s theory is closer to some
hypothetical “ultimate opinion” (Wells, 1994, p. 858).
Hookway (2004) casts doubt on the
arguments of critics who say that Peirce’s convergence in the long run commits
him to an absolute conception of reality. He argues that Peirce meant
convergence to apply to specific
questions under investigation, such as the speed of light, where different
observers and different methodologies successively approximate a particular
value, rather than convergence to knowledge of the “nature of reality” in
general. In Kelly’s terms the construct of convergence has a broad but not
unlimited range of convenience. It
will be more valid and useful in some disciplines, such as physics or forensic
science rather than others such as aesthetics and its applicability may be good
for some areas of a discipline but not others. Thus in a clinical situation we
may hope that further inquiry will
reveal the truth about whether a person was actually abused as a child. Further
inquiry may cast light on this though we may never finally know the validity of
our conclusion. The actual events may though prove to be less important than the
client’s attitude and new construing of them.
Hookway underlines the importance of
this important word hope that Peirce
uses. Hope is different to belief. We may hope that our knowledge will converge
on an answer to a question and indeed it is essential that we do so or “we
should not trouble ourselves to make much inquiry” (Peirce, 1896: 3.432). Ironically
Peirce’s critic Rorty takes up hope as a central concept – that we can
“substitute hope for the knowledge philosophers have usually tried to attain”
(1999, p. 24). He says, “Loss of hope is an inability to construe a plausible
narrative of progress – a gesture of despair” and “utopian social hope…is still
the noblest imaginative creation we have on record” (op cit: pp. 232, 277).
4. Thoughts
also really exist
Kelly was writing at a time when
behaviourism had been dominant for over 30 years since Watson’s inauguration of
it in the early 1920’s in psychology and Russell taking it up in philosophy after
that. Consciousness was excluded by Watson in his formulations and Russell
strove to explain word meaning in terms of causal stimulus-response
associations, and to avoid introducing thoughts into the process:
If
a theory of meaning is to be fitted into natural science...it is necessary to define
the meaning of words without introducing anything "mental" in the
sense in which what is "mental" is not subject to the laws of
physics. Therefore, for the same reasons for which I now hold that the meaning of
words should be explained without introducing images...I also hold that meaning
in general should be treated without introducing "thoughts," and
should be regarded as a property of words considered as physical phenomena (Russell, 1926).
I assume Kelly emphasises this
fourth assumption to distinguish his position against this behavioural doctrine.
Kelly doesn’t say much more about thought, but of course the whole of his discourse
about constructs and construing include thought as well as many other
psychological experiences normally treated in a segmented manner in psychology
including action, emotion, attitude and so on (Procter, 2009). He asks, “Are
constructs real?” and answers, “A qualified yes” – “superordinate constructs
are versions of constructs subordinate to them…which are a form of reality
construed through the use of the superordinate…a construct has its own reality”
(Kelly, 1955, vol. 1, p. 136).
For Peirce, thoughts are signs. In everyday understanding, the
word sign usually applies to a material object such as a road sign but in Peirce’s
semiotics, the sign includes a much broader, pervasive range of entities
including just about anything in our physical and cultural worlds including
phenomena, events, objects, gestures and of course words. As signs, thoughts
are seen to operate in exactly the same way – to stand for something else and could therefore be said to “exist”. Peirce
(3.613, 5.503) distinguishes the meaning of the word exist from the word real
as something that we encounter in the here and now and “clash with”, an actuality, just as we discussed with
tables and stones above. We struggle with our own and other’s thoughts for
example in fighting off feelings of jealousy. Or we may struggle with what we
know to be another’s thought, even though we cannot experience it directly. We
can encounter this “otherness” in the world of private experience. We can deny
the signs of an illness even though we can acknowledge that such an illness is
a real phenomenon. For Kelly, such an assumption lies at the basis of his whole
attitude of taking human experience and construing seriously. Wiley (2006b, p.
33) writes: “Once (Peirce) realised that signs constitute the bulk of our
environment, it was easy to see that human concepts are signs and usually vague
ones at that”. Even vague, or what Kelly would call loose, construing exists
for a client and can be a powerful influence on his or her conduct and course
of action.
In his metaphysical speculations
Peirce (1906: 4.551) proposes an even more radical idea:
Thought
is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of
crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that
it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really
there. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there (Peirce, 1906).
These speculations have led to the
discipline of biosemiotics (Uexküll,
1982), that cells and even molecules can be seen as possessing mental
characteristics. The rigid distinction between mental and physical begins to
break down under these considerations. In PCP terms are cells, antibodies
capable of construing? The cone in
the eye responds specifically to red light – is it construing the light as red
as opposed to not-red? Peirce argues that neurones and amoebae are almost
identical in structure and concludes fairly definitely that a mass of
protoplasm feels (1892: 6.133).
Irrespective of all this, the fact
remains that thought is purely private and will never be directly accessible to
another person however sophisticated brain scans may become. Its existence can
therefore never be ratified by someone else. This gives us some kind of
ultimate freedom but also isolation and aloneness.
5.
Correspondence between thoughts and world is a continually changing one.
We have already heard Kelly use the
verbs “touch” and “join hands” of the relationship between our thoughts or
constructions and the world (statement 3). Kelly’s use here of the word correspondence raises questions about
what constitutes the relationship between them. Does our knowledge represent the world? What does this word
mean? Both Kelly and Peirce use it frequently (see Mackay (1996: 342) for a
list of instances in Kelly). Rorty (1990) and Gergen (1994, cited in Leiman,
2001) both severely critique the idea of “representationalism”, that our
knowledge is a “mirror of reality”. Stam (1998) takes cognitive and
constructivist theory, including PCP, to task for falling into the
“correspondence problem” (see also, Ransdell, 2005). If representations are the
source of knowledge, how does the system have access to that which corresponds
to its representation?
As Peirce developed his semiotics,
it becomes clearer that we are not talking about concepts representing in the sense of mirroring or matching reality but referring to or standing for things [6]. Peirce defines the word represent: “To stand for, that is, to be
in such a relation to another that for certain purposes it is treated by some
mind as if it were that other” (Peirce 1902a: 2.273 cited in Bergman, 2009). Olshevsky
(1993, p. 403) argues that this standing for is in no way a copying and quotes
Peirce, “I will now go so far as to say that we have no images [7], even in
actual perception” (CP 5.303). A sign stands for its object – note it stands
for its object (Haack, 1993: 426) –
so we never really know whether the object or element that someone is referring
to is in some way exactly the same as what we take it to be when we refer to it. The sign creates its own
form of object each time it is used. When it is interpreted it becomes a new
sign, the interpretant, which signifies anew, restructured within the new web
of meaning (or construct system), the collateral
knowledge or experience (Peirce,
1909: 8.314, Bergman, 2002) of the interpreting mind.
Michael Leiman (2001, 2011) draws
from Winnicott and the tradition of the Russian semiotics of Vygotsky and
Bakhtin. Like Peirce, he sees the sign as fundamentally triadic. For Leiman
(1992) a sign involves a three-term relation between at least two persons or
realities and an object (which may include gestures, parts of the body, acts,
words). He allows also for a sign to be private as in dreams, fantasies and
wishes just as Peirce saw thinking as a sign addressed to the self in the
future. He uses Vygotsky’s example of tying a knot in a handkerchief in order
to indicate to oneself something to be remembered:
(This)
represents a deliberate action of creating a referential link between the knot
and whatever it is meant to remind one of. The visual appearance of the knot
has nothing in common with the thing to be remembered. It is not a
representation. The act of tying unites the content of the thought with the
knot. The relationship is referential. One of the problems within current
cognitive psychology is the inability to recognize the fundamental difference
between representation and reference
(Leiman, 2011, p. 447).
Floyd Merrell (2000) goes further,
in his “translation of Peirce into our own culture-world”. Drawing on the
French semiology of Saussure and Derrida, he emphasises the interdependence of
all signs, incessantly engaged in interrelated interaction with one another. In
this context, it is “not a matter of signs and things but of thought-signs in the mind and sign-events “out there””. He therefore
wishes to eschew entirely the use of the terms stand for, correspond, refer and represent. All experience is of signs gaining their meaning from
within the web of all signs. Leiman (2001), wanting to preserve the mediating
and referential aspect of signs, argues that such theorising severs language
from social practice, giving a view of language as a self-contained purely
ideal phenomenon.
Whatever stance one may take on
these issues, the move away from a direct knowledge of the world by moving from
representation as a mirror or copy to one of referring to or standing for
leaves plenty of room for Kelly’s principle of constructive alternativism – that there are many alternative ways
of construing the world and that therefore the “correspondence between thoughts
and world is a continually changing one”. Peirce, despite the implication of
convergence in the long run, discussed under statement 3 above, says that even
in cases where we have a settled opinion, or “perfect knowledge” about a
question, it is conceivable that another person “would attain to a like perfect
knowledge which should conflict with ours” (cited in Rosenthal, 2004, p.210).
Norbert Wiley (2006b) argues that Peirce
should be recognised as a founding father of sociology and anthropology because
his new, semiotic epistemology was a significant influence that enabled the
formulation and adoption of the concept of culture
and the consequent refutation of racism.
What
Peirce’s epistemology provided was an explanation of how societies can differ
from each other without any of them necessarily being better or more valid than
the others. The semiotic explanation of cognition leads to the idea that societies
can be different but equal, the inegalitarian hierarchical ladder becoming an
egalitarian horizontal field. This is because there are an indefinite number of
ways of viewing the world, and, given the mediation and indirectness of the semiotic
process, it usually makes little sense to say that some are more valuable than
others (Wiley, 2006b: 31).
6.
Universe is integral...in the long run all events are interlocked.
Kelly argues here in metaphysical
vein, that the universe is integral, that it functions as a single unit with
all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to each other, that it
“all works together like clockwork” (Kelly, 1955: 6–7). It seems unlikely, he
says, that the motion of his fingers as he types these words could be related
to the price of yak milk in Tibet, but that ultimately, given broad enough
frames of time and space, everything is interlocked.
In his arguments against
necessitarianism, Peirce seemingly offers a very similar example in considering
this idea: “Given the state of the universe in the original nebula, and given
the laws of mechanics, a sufficiently powerful mind could deduce from these
data the precise form of every curlicue of every letter I am now writing”
(Peirce, 1892. p. 176). But this is actually part of an argument to refute the
idea of a universe totally based on mechanical laws:
“The
belief...that every act of the will, as well as every idea of the mind, is
under the rigid governance of a necessity coordinated with that of the physical
world...that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws
of mechanics determine anything...is doomed”
(Peirce, 1892, p. 176).
For in his doctrine of tychism, he
gives a central role to chance, uncertainty and spontaneity in accounting for
the processes of development and evolution:
It
is evident...that we can have no reason to think that every phenomenon in all
its minutest details is precisely determined by law. That there is an arbitrary
element in the universe, we see – namely, its variety. This variety must be
attributed to spontaneity in some form
Peirce was remarkably prescient of modern quantum theory and chaos
theory with his understanding of the role of probability in the processes of
physics [8]. Anticipating Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, he said, “you
will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will
be to show irregular departures from the law” (op. cit. 182). He argued that even
the laws of physics evolve (Brent, 1993, p. 174).
This seems a rather more appropriate
cosmological context for PCP, given Kelly’s treatment of free will and
individual creativity, than the rather mechanistic picture implied in Kelly’s
use of the words “exact relationship” and “clockwork”, which may derive from
Herbert Spencer. But to give Kelly his due, he does give the subject
statistical treatment. Discussing the correlation coefficient, he notes that it
is directly proportional to the breadth of perspective that we are taking (cf.
Peirce’s “sufficiently powerful mind”). If we look at things sufficiently
broadly, relationships between them will be observable. In an early paper
(Kelly, 1938) he cautions psychologists against obtaining spurious correlations
by neglecting the effect of selection criteria utilised in sampling. He says
that anything can be made to correlate – the temperature at the North Pole with
the length of rabbit’s ears in Wyoming can be, given sufficient control of the variables.
Kelly traces this back to a basic assumption: The Universe is originally an
“indefinite, incoherent homogeneity” (Kelly, 1938: 207). This enables him to
posit that all phenomena are shaped by our constructions. There is the
opportunity to put the cleavage line of our constructs in any particular place
because of the underlying homogeneity of the world.
The
substance that a person construes is itself a process – just as the living
person is a process. It presents itself from the beginning as an unending and
undifferentiated process. Only when man attunes his ear to recurrent themes in
the monotonous flow does his universe begin to make sense to him (Kelly, 1955: 52).
Without cleaving the world into distinctions we would experience a
“chaotic homogeneity...with the person engulfed in a sea with no landmarks to
relieve the monotony”
(Kelly 1955, p. 51).
This idea of homogeneity has its
parallel in Peirce in his concept of continuity,
or his doctrine of synechism, which
he said was the “keystone of the arch” of his system (Peirce, 1897). Drawing on
his assertion of the reality of real generals and the mathematics of infinity,
he argues for genuine continuity or perfect continua occurring in the
dimensions of time, space and in the general law of mental action (see next
section). A general property “surrenders to the interpreter the right of
completing the determination for himself” (CP 5.505). There are real objects
that have properties that extend over a range of interpretations any one of
which may be selected by an observer (Moore, 1998). Time and space are
continuous because they embody conditions of possibility, and the possible is
general, and continuity and generality are two names for the same absence of
distinction of individuals (CP 4.172).
Parker (1998) asks if Peirce’s
assertions can ever be tested, falsified or confirmed, or do they remain mere
metaphysical speculations. Moore (1998) argues that confirmation comes from the
theory of relativity with its predictions that length, time and mass vary
according to the position and velocity of the observer. For him these imply
general objects, not particular objects. There are physicists, however, who
have argued for the quantisation of time. For example, Henry Margenau
(1950) suggested that an indivisible unit of time, the “chronon” might be
the time for light to travel the length of the classical radius of an
electron. We are clearly at the limits of current technology and possibly
logical possibility to be able to confirm such a hypothesis.
7. The universe is continually changing with respect to itself...something is always
going on.
For Kelly the universe is active,
always changing: “every day it goes about its business of existing...it exists
by happening” (Kelly, 1955: 7). Upon these Heraclitan propositions, Kelly wished
to develop a fresh psychological perspective which avoided the idea that life
and ourselves are static. He wanted to dissociate himself from, for example
dominant behavioural and psychoanalytic paradigms of his day, which seemed to
assume the need for extrinsic factors, such as energy, stimuli, needs, motives
or drives to propel us into action [9]:
Life
itself could be defined as a form of process or movement. Thus in designating
man (sic) as our object of psychological inquiry, we would be taking it for
granted that movement was an essential property of his being, not something
that had to be accounted for separately. We would be talking about a form of
movement – man – not something that had to be motivated (Kelly 1958, p. 80).
With this vision as a basis, Kelly
goes on to develop the picture of construing as always on the move, developing
and elaborating through cycles of experience and creativity, discovery, inquiry
and decision making. The construct system is in a constant state of elaboration (except in cases of human
difficulty where these processes may have become stuck). People make choices
(according to the choice corollary), in which they have an eye to extending (or defining) their range of
construction – understanding better, learning new ways to address issues in
life.
For Peirce (1892), the universe is
characterised by “pure spontaneity – everywhere the main fact is growth and
increasing complexity”:
By
thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always
and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal
departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I
account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in
which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for. The
ordinary view has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the
world, has to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the
least, that variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without
any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves it
back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since (Peirce, 1892: 6.59).
Peirce argued that the concepts of
life and idea should be extended to describe the activity of the fundamental
stuff of the universe, which “in each infinitesimal interval..is present and
living” (Peirce, 1892b, p. 213). The fundamental process involved is what he
called semiosis or “sign activity”. As
we saw earlier, for him, the universe is “perfused with signs” (p 17). Peirce’s concept of sign is triadic as opposed to the dyadic nature of mere mechanical
causation as described by Newton’s laws of motion. It involves three elements
in relation - something (the sign
vehicle) that stands to an interpretant
(a new sign) for something else (the
object). The notion is applied so generally that it is not immediately easy to
grasp. He says, “Anything and everything is a sign to some degree and in some
respect” (cited in Colapietro, 1989: 2). For Kellians, this might fall into the
error of being meaningless through no contrast being made: if everything is a
sign, are we saying anything? But Peirce goes on to say “for anything to be a
sign it must be something other than a sign” (loc cit). Any object, event or
pattern can function as a sign, but only if it is understood as a sign (Peirce,
1909, cited in Bermann & Paavola, 2012).
Signs therefore clearly refer to
items in the human and cultural world – words, gestures, everyday signs of all
kinds. Saussure restricts the word to this use. Peirce however has a much
broader concept in mind including both conventional
and natural signs – the tracks of a
deer are ‘evidence’ or a sign that
such an animal has passed, which even animals are able to interpret. A dog
yelps to request a door be opened and learns to understand words issued in
command (James, 1880: 356). Deception exists in nature, where for example a
moth has evolved camouflage or two eyes on its wings to frighten predators. But
Peirce goes even further. “All forms of life engage in Semiosis, which Sebeok
(1991) refers to as the criterial
attribute of life” (Bopry,
2002: 6), and further even to include the
actions of molecules and atoms arranging themselves into a crystal (as
quoted in section 4 above). In this view, “most semiosis is chemical”
(Sebeok, op cit).
The field of biosemiotics now talks of “protein linguistics” and
“molecular
syntax” (Witzany, 2006).
Peirce reflexively considers an
example of his own elaboration of ideas:
Growth by exercise takes place also in the mind. Indeed, that is what it
is to learn.
But the most perfect illustration is the development of a
philosophical idea by being put into practice. The conception which appeared,
at first, as unitary splits up into special cases; and into each of these new
thought must enter to make a practicable idea. This new thought, however,
follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception; and thus a
homogeneous development takes place.
The parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent.
Patient attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction
called learning
(Peirce, 1893, p. 248).
This conception is very close to
what Kelly had in mind when he talked of construct systems elaborating to form
more and more constructs and subsystems of constructs governed by superordinate
constructs (“the parent conception”) in an ordinal hierarchy.
To compare processes at the highest
levels of mental functioning with those at the level of atoms and molecules goes
far to soften the traditional distinction between matter and mind. It allows us
potentially to understand more profoundly the origin and evolution of mind but
without falling into the trap of the usual reductionism to physical and
chemical processes:
Peirce proposed a thorough-going semiotic perspective in which the
reality of mind is seen as essentially the development of a system of signs.
The mind is a species of semiosis. Accordingly, signs are not to be explained
by reference to some occult and intrinsically private power called ‘mind’, but
the mind itself is to be explained in terms of those manifest and inherently
intersubjective processes called semiosis (Colapietro, 1989, p. xx).
We are aware of the process of
semiosis in the constant stream of thinking that rarely ceases save perhaps in
profound instants of meditation. As a young man, Peirce wrote “life is a train
of thought” with thinking conceived of as infinite chains of developing and
evolving signs (1868: 5.314), an idea later popularized by William James in the
Principles of Psychology (1880) as
the “Stream of Consciousness”. For Peirce this train was dialogical in form:
“All thinking is dialogical in form. Yourself of one instant appeals to your
deeper self (elsewhere “a future self, one just coming into being”) for its
assent. Consequently all thinking is conducted in signs” (CP 6.338). At the age
of 22 Peirce (1861, p. 45) outlined an early version of his categories comprising the I, the Thou and the It, the I being in dialogue with the thou (another person or the self) about
the It. With this Peirce thus also
anticipated the work not only of James and Buber but of the dialogical
approaches of Bakhtin and Vygotsky with the latter’s important idea of the
verbal regulation of behaviour, a function associated with the frontal lobes of
the brain (Luria, 1973).
Archer (2003: 63) critiques James’
concept of the stream of consciousness as being an inner monologue, but never a dialogue (cited in Colapietro, 2006: 46). Valsiner
(2008) subjects James’ concept to contemporary critical inspection, concluding
that the classic river metaphor is an inadequate depiction of the multi-level
psychological processes involved. But in Peirce, this multi-level nature is
already apparent. The stream is not just that of consciousness. All the time
there are many levels of mental activity going on of which we are not aware or
conscious:
The action of thought is all the time going on, not merely in that part
of consciousness which thrusts itself on the attention, and which is the most
under discipline, but also in its deeply shaded parts (7.555, cited in Colapietro, 1989,
p. 40).
Each former thought suggests something to the
thought which follows it, i.e., is the sign of something to this latter. Our
train of thought may, it is true, be interrupted. But we must remember that, in
addition to the principal element of thought at any moment, there are a hundred
things in our mind to which but a small fraction of attention or consciousness
is conceded. It does not, therefore, follow, because a new constituent of
thought gets the uppermost that the train of thought which it displaces is
broken off altogether (1868, p. 99; 5.284).
This
profound observation explains many phenomena including the processes of
creativity, where a new view of a situation or the solution to a problem pops
into our minds after a few days or even after many years: clearly we have gone
on thinking things through at an unconscious level. So often in therapy,
spontaneous change will happen in the following days after a session in which
the client’s experiences have been carefully discussed and explored or when
some aspect has been touched upon. The implications of new ways of construing
the material have been worked through at a low level of cognitive awareness
leading to fresh perspectives and ways forward. For Peirce, the quality of this
kind of thinking may be of much higher quality than ordinary conscious problem
solving:
(1) The obscure part of the mind is the principal
part. (2) It acts with far more unerring accuracy than the rest. (3) It is
almost infinitely more delicate in its sensibilities (CP 6.569).
Peirce seems to be outlining a
concept of the unconscious remarkably similar to that of Milton H. Erickson, as
opposed to the original dynamic conception found in Freud [10]. For Erickson
“The Unconscious Mind” is always in touch with the world, “listening and
understanding much better than is possible for the conscious mind” (Erickson,
1966, p. 277): it is an enormous resource, a “vast storehouse” of learning, experiences
and wisdom (cited in Zeig, 1980, p. 173). In 1985, Joady Brennan and I suggested
that Erickson’s Unconscious can be equated with the personal construct system
as envisaged by Kelly:
Erickson defined the unconscious as the reservoir or storehouse of all
of the individual's life-experiences, ideas and abilities. Erickson's
unconscious becomes essentially all the person's elements and constructs - the
unconscious IS the construct system (Procter & Brennan, 1985).
In Kelly, unconscious processing is
addressed with his concepts of submergence, suspension, level of cognitive
awareness and in the cycles of experience and creativity. However, it is
important to remember that construing in general does not necessarily involve
the person being very aware of their constructs which function as “transparent
templates” (Kelly, 1955, p. 8) or assumptions and values of which they are
often totally unaware and may even meet with denial.
For Peirce, signs and particular
symbols, those signs which are the product of arbitrary human conventions,
function as if alive, growing, elaborating and procreating:
“Symbols
grow ..., come into being by development out of other signs,” that “a symbol, once in being, spreads among
the peoples,” and that “in use and in experience, its meaning grows,” but also
with the insight that only symbols procreate symbols, since “it is only out of
symbols that a new symbol can grow. (Peirce,
1895, 2.302. cited in Nöth, 2010, p. 86)
Peirce argues that signs and symbols
have a potential or “would be” – in PCP terms the interpretant is not fully
determined by the construing of the person. Construing is constrained by the
structure of the sign and the natural or conventional rules associated with its
context. The human sperm or egg have the potential to form a new individual
child. A word in the language cannot be interpreted in an infinitely wide
variety of ways, but narrows possible interpretation to a particular range.
Aristotle covered this with his idea of “final causation”. This has not been
regarded well within modern science which replaced it with mechanistic
explanation (Short, 2007: 91). However Peirce insists:
"It is most narrow not to consider final causes in the study of
nature; but it is nonsense and utter confusion to treat them as forces in the
material sense"
(Peirce, 1.265, cited in Colapietro, 1989, p. 84))
Short has argued how Peirce found a
way of removing the mystery from teleology allowing it to become a rationally
acceptable part of modern science (Short, loc cit). We will return to this for
a more adequate consideration in the second paper of this series.
Arguing that signs have such power
seems to foreshadow post-structuralism, social constructionism and the selfish
genes and memes of Richard Dawkins (1976). Peirce sometimes seems to go so far
as to say that the symbol has purposes of its own and to dispense with the idea
of the autonomy of the individual mind that functions as an interpreter. This
is a partial reading as our discussion of Peirce’s view of the self and person,
which again we will look at in detail in Part II of this series. But the idea
of semiosis does underline an apparent autonomous power of signs and symbols in
nature and culture. This could apparently be seen as falling into the trap of
anthropomorphism or a new version Platonic idealism. Of course, to say that
signs grow is a metaphor and it is well to remember that even when we say organisms
grow, they only do so in a medium, environment or culture with which they
actually co-evolve, as Gregory
Bateson (1972, 1979) was at pains to emphasise. Of course Peirce makes it clear
that signs do require embodiment or materiality to exist (Colapietro, 1989:
84). This point is emphasised also in the work of the Russian semioticians,
Voloshinov and Bakhtin:
The sign is part of reality and in this sense it is as material as any
other natural or man-made object (Leiman, 1992, p. 217).
Signs are particular patterns or
configurations of matter. Years ago the biologist D’Arcy Thompson [11] wrote in
Of growth and form (1917) that “matter
is primal and universal but exists only when it takes on form (cited in
Taborksky, 2008:158). The charge of Platonism in Peirce’s and Dewey’s
discussion of the power of ideas as if they were mind-independent entities is
also met in their emphasis on the importance of the role of learning communities in the development
of ideas (Prawat, 1999, p. 71).
OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION
Although the influence is indirect,
many common and related themes emerge in comparing the work of Peirce and
Kelly. We have seen that Dewey, a major influence on Kelly, was enormously
indebted to Peirce. This is indicated by generous references to Peirce given by
Dewey from the beginning of the twentieth century through to the end of his
life. Prawat argues that Dewey underwent a particular “Peircean Turn” or
revision of his views around the years of Dewey’s first paper on Peirce (1916).
However valid this thesis is, Dewey’s philosophy shows a marked shift from his
early Hegelianism to a replacement of the dialectic with a Peircean emphasis on
the future, on practice, inquiry, common sense and fallibilism which all appear
as central themes in Personal Construct Psychology. But Dewey retained from
Hegel an emphasis on overcoming and rejecting dualisms. Peirce’s philosophy
provided for him a different way of transcending the dichotomies of body/mind,
internal/external, individual/social and realism/idealism. Prawat classifies
both thinkers’ work as “idea-based constructivism”. Because of the pervasive
influence of these ideas on our current views of science and psychology, it is
easy to underestimate what a profound paradigm shift that they entail.
We have seen that in the work of
both Peirce and Kelly (Table 1: Statement 1) that any cognition or construction
occurs within an already existing construct system or “previous cognition”.
Descartes could not achieve a direct intuition of himself and climb out of this
structure simply by a process of armchair doubting. But this raises the
question of how this chain of signs or constructions ever started in the first
place. Clearly, the implication is that we are already structured as babies and
earlier as embryos (ontogenetically) or primitive organisms (phylogenetically).
Even the single cell, a highly complex entity, has the capacity to selectively
exchange molecules with its environment in order to thrive, replicate itself
and develop into multicellular organisms. Even before fertilization, the sperm,
in its specialized environment, has the capacity to gravitate in the right
direction utilizing fructose to power its travel. Kelly did not extend his
range to these concerns, but other constructivists, notably Maturana and Varela
(1987) did, with their concepts of autopoiesis and structural coupling. Peirce
argues that a single teleological principle of semiosis can be used to describe and explain development and
dissemination from right back in the reaches of chemistry and biochemistry
through to the psychological and sociological processes involved in thinking,
interaction and the evolution of language and culture.
Wiley (2006b) claims for Peirce the
status of a founding father of American Sociology and Anthropology with his
concepts of semiosis and the dialogical self preparing the ground for the very
concept of culture itself, the development of which allowed for the overcoming
of racist views of ethnic superiority which pervaded scientific thinking after
Darwin up until only too recently. Peirce’s vision, covering the whole range of
phenomena from natural through to conventional signs, including thought,
language, communicational and cultural materials places him as an ancestor to a
tremendously wide range of subsequent traditions including not just
constructivism but social constructionism, post-structuralism and discourse
analysis for example. This potentially allows us to use his work to overcome
the apparently irresolvable internecine struggles between these contemporary
but more partial approaches.
With the next four statements of
Table 1 (2 – 5), we enter the realm of epistemology and ontology – the
existence of the world and the relationship between it and our knowledge or
constructions of it. We discussed the old thorny philosophical dilemma of realism versus idealism and the many varieties of these and of versions of the
more modern term of constructivism
which reflect this kind of dichotomy. Peirce
has been characterised as occupying various different positions on this
dimension. He attempts to transcend this duality and his position is complex,
nuanced and rich. Whilst insisting that all experience involves cognition and
that thoughts are signs, our opinions
are also constrained by a real which
is what “it is, regardless of what you or I may think about it”. He criticised the
great idealist Hegel, for “ignoring the outward clash” (CP 8.41) of brute
secondness or as Marx (1845) put it, the idealists “do not know real sensuous
activity as such”.
For Kelly, our constructions are
developed and elaborated through a process akin to science where we revise
anticipations in the light of validating and invalidating experience. The
emphasis on anticipating the future and meaning being based on consequences or
“practical bearings” has a clear source in Peirce. In his early paper, How to make your ideas clear, later
endorsed by William James as constituting the origin of pragmatism, Peirce
wrote:
Consider what effects, that might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception
to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception
of the object (Peirce, 1878a)
In 1905
this was restated as the famous Pragmatic Maxim:
A conception…lies exclusively in its
conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life…If one can define accurately all
the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a
concept [12] could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the
concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he (the
writer) invented the name pragmatism (Peirce, 1905).
A year
later, this was restated, somewhat more simply as follows:
The whole meaning of an intellectual
predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in
the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential conditions (Peirce,
1906).
What is
emphasised here in these statements is the centrality of anticipating future
‘practical bearings’, effects or events in the meaning of a concept or
predicate. This emphasis on the future is genuinely new and revolutionary in
philosophy and cardinal for Peirce also in psychology:
I hold that purpose, or rather,
final causation, of which purpose is the conscious modification, is the
essential subject of the psychologists' own studies (Peirce, 1902, CP
7.366).
This
emphasis on the future and anticipation is of course to be found in Kelly’s
Fundamental Postulate and is maintained in a later alternative version which
extends it to a characterisation of life in general:
A person's processes are
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events (Kelly, 1955).
It is the nature of life to be
channelized by the ways events are anticipated (Kelly, 1980 cited
in Fransella, 2003).
With this fundamental postulate with
its key terms the person, channelization,
anticipation and events, Kelly
begins to build his system of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, a very
original, influential and itself still relatively unacknowledged contribution
to the discipline of psychology. In Part II of this series, we will look at an array
of psychological themes where Peirce and Kelly can speak to each other,
including inference, habit, teleology, perception, categories, signs,
construing, person, the dialogical, and the sociological.
The basic
unit of analysis (see Leiman, 2011) for Peirce appears to be the sign, whereas for Kelly it is the construct. These at first glance seem to
be very different entities, but on closer inspection are related. Peirce’s sign
involves triadicity or three parts in
dynamic relation – a sign vehicle stands for something else, its object. This dyad
is similar to Saussure’s signifier
and signified but Peirce insists
there must be a third element. The sign is only a sign if it is recognised or
interpreted as a sign. The person or addressee receiving and interpreting the
sign forms an interpretant, a new
sign. The addressee may be oneself and so thoughts are signs, as are words,
stories, gestures, and indeed almost anything that is construed as referring to
something else.
Kelly’s discussion of the “original
construct” and the “communicated construct” is reminiscent of Peirce’s sign and
the new sign, or its interpretant: p.
We let a communicated construct represent the
personal construct of which it is a construction. The communicated construct is the construing of the person who “receives” it; one of
its elements is the construct of the person who had it beforehand...the
communicated construct is a construction of the original construct and hence
not identical with it (Kelly, 1955, Vol. 1.p. 136).
For Kelly,
as we saw in an earlier paper (Procter, 2011, p. 41), a symbol is attached to the pole of a construct in order that it may
be communicated:
Communication is a matter of reproducing the symbolic
element in hopes of eliciting a parallel construct in another person. The
neatest way is to use a word as a symbol. Of course it may not work, for our
listener may not have incorporated the word into the same kind of content, or
have used it as a symbol for the same construct. Then we may have to trot out
other elements of our personal construct’s context, some of them words, some of
them nonverbal acts
(Kelly, loc. cit. p. 140)
We can symbolize constructs with
words, facial expressions, manners, gestures, acts, objects or persons. When we
are in a country where we do not know the language it is surprising how much we
can communicate simply through gesture and pantomime. But “a large portion of
human behavior follows nameless channels (or ‘unsignified acts’ [13]) which
have no language symbols, nor any kinds of signposts whatsoever” (loc. cit., p.
130).
Communication is the central task of
what for Kelly is his core concern – the practice of psychotherapy (loc. cit,.p.
197). For Peirce collateral knowledge
or experience (see above) is required for an
interpretation to be made. Where communication is difficult, Kelly points to
the possibilities of a “lack of contemporary elements which can be used to
illustrate the context”. Or the therapist might have difficulty because “he
does not appear to understand the subordinate constructs out of which the construct
is formed”. If the client has no symbols to communicate a construct, the
therapist must help him or her create some kind of effective symbolization
(loc. cit.: 198). This may be in words through careful questioning, mutual
exploration and negotiation of meanings or to communicate using other
“semeiotic devices” [14] such as art therapy, clay modeling, diagrams or
enactment. If therapists find difficulty understanding, they “must not be too
ready to impose their own preexisting personal constructs” but will first have
to establish what we might now call a collateral knowledge base by “compiling a
lexicon for dealing with the client” (loc. cit.p. 141).
Kelly’s idea of an element
functioning as a symbol attached to a construct, in order that it may be communicated,
seems to have its almost exact parallel in Peirce’s idea of a sign vehicle or
representamen. For Peirce, a symbol is one amongst three types of sign vehicle,
the others being the icon and an index [15]. But the breadth of examples given
by Kelly would imply that he is using the term symbol in the same way that Peirce uses the term sign in general. For Kelly here, the
equivalent of Peirce’s object is the
construct itself. Kelly’s symbol is used to refer to a construct or construct
pole. It is referring to or indicating therefore a similarity and a difference,
simultaneously in one psychological act (Kelly, 1962, p. 197). Constructs are,
of course, used to construe or subsume elements,
which also seem to have their equivalent in Peirce’s objects. Kelly therefore introduces the crucial issue of dichotomy or bipolarity into his semiotics, something which can be found in
Peirce but not very prominently (see Part II for further discussion on this).
Having enriched our understanding of
the philosophical implications of the work of Charles Peirce and George Kelly,
we are now ready to begin to look at the psychological aspects of their work,
an enterprise that reveals the enormous depth and breadth of their conceptions
(Peirce, 1891, p.172).
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ENDNOTES |
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[1] In a previous
paper (Procter, 2011, available on the web), I give a short overview of
Peirce’s philosophy including a description of the three categories, signs,
abduction, the dialogical nature of thinking and then a discussion of
triadicity in Kelly. I will assume familiarity with this in the current paper.
[2] CP refers to the Collected
Papers of Charles S. Peirce in six volumes. Unfortunately many of the papers in
this series are not dated. This will be remedied in the new Peirce Edition
Project. The author has a pdf of the Collected Papers which can be obtained by
email request: harryprocter20@gmail.com.
[3] Dewey wrote to A.
Balz in 1949: “I did not originate the main figures that play their parts in my
theory of knowing” (LW 16: 280 – 294)
[4] “The inkstand is a
real thing. Of course in being real and external, it does not in the least
cease to be a purely psychical product, a generalised percept” (CP 8.261)
“Everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves
(but) this does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us,
just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain
(CP 5.283) Both these quotations cited in Rosenthal (2004).
[5] NB the word ‘fix’
here – see Peirce’s The Fixation of
Belief (1878b)
[6] Having said that,
of course there is a class of signs, which he calls icons, such as pictures and maps in which there is a similarity between the sign vehicle and
its object.
[7] But it is outside
the scope of this paper to do justice to the complexities of Peirce’s position
here. He went on struggling with the issue to the end of his life. For example
he shifts between taking a “representationist” to a “presentationist” stance in
relation to whether the single event of the percept in the present instant of
the here-and-now is a sign (Ransdell, 2005, Bergman, 2007) and indeed makes the
rather Kellian remark that “These are, however, merely different points of view
in which neither ought to find anything absolutely contrary to his own
doctrine” (Peirce, 1902b). Peirce argues that a percept is not a sign or a
representation, although it becomes the object of a semiotic perceptual judgement resulting in a
“percipuum”, which we experience. See also Hookway, 1985, p. 155 – 166. More on
this in Part II.
[8] Peirce introduced the idea of
blind randomised controlled trials (Hacking 1990: 205) and had an
international reputation in the measurement of error in physics, spending 30
years working for the US Coast Survey and developing the Peirce Pendulum with
its reduced errors of measurement. Doyle claims the label “normal” for the
Gaussian Bell curve is down to Peirce (Doyle, undated).
[9] The 1950s seem to evidence a paradigm shift
in psychology here. Miller, Galanter and Pribram, in their seminal “Plans and
the Structure of Behavior”, inspired by cybernetics, argued for a similar view
with their “renunciation of the dynamic properties of plans” (1960: 64).
Maturana and Varela (1987) later went on to develop their central notion of autopoiesis.
[10] Freud
covered something more like this with his conception of the pre-conscious mind as opposed to the id.
See also, Colapietro (2003) who writes “De Lauretis and I too stress the
personal unconscious as a nexus of constitutive dispositions, a set of habits
by which the unconscious and, more inclusively, subjectivity are constituted as
such”. This will be explored in more detail in part II of this series.
[11] My father, the
painter Anthony Procter told me that as a boy he had spent an afternoon boating
with the scientist D’Arcy Thompson but unfortunately, I don’t know if any
profound teaching occurred on this occasion!
[12] Bipolarity is
also here implied – see Part II.
[13] Kelly (1962: 198)
[14] Kelly (1955, Vol
II, p. 803) - note the Peircean spelling here.
[15] Peirce has many
subdivisions defining types of signs (see Short, 2007) but this set of three is
“the most fundamental division of signs” (CP 2.275). Icons serve to
represent their objects only in so far as they resemble them in themselves (for
example a picture or map). Indices represent their objects independently
of any resemblance to them, only by virtue of real connections with them (e.g.
a finger or signpost pointing at the object). Symbols
represent their
objects, independently of any resemblance or any real connection, because
dispositions or factitious habits of their interpreters (including conventions)
insure their being so understood (from Commens, 2013). In practice, a sign
tends to contain elements of all three of these types of signification.
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AUTHOR'S NOTE
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Thank you to Richard
Casebow, Chiara Centomo, Mikael Leiman, Spence McWilliams, Uta Priss, Jane
Procter and Richard Skinner for their valuable comments on this manuscript.
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ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR
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Harry Procter, PhD has
developed and continues to elaborate Personal and Relational Construct
Psychology which is based in PCP and more generally Systemic Constructivism.
Whilst focussed on families, the approach can be applied to understanding and
working with individuals, groups and organisations. He worked for thirty years
as a clinical psychologist with the NHS in the West of England. He specialised
in the areas of both child and adult mental health, childhood learning
disabilities and autism. He has published over 40 papers and chapters on the
theoretical, methodological and practical aspects of his approach and he has
edited two volumes of the selected papers of Milton H. Erickson for Paidos
Publications, Barcelona.
Email: harryprocter20@gmail.com
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REFERENCE
Procter, H. G. (2014). Peirce's contributions to constructivism and
personal construct psychology: I. Philosophical aspects.
Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 11, Suppl. No 1, 6-33, 2014
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp14/procter14.html)
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Received: 28 April 2013 – Accepted: 15 May 2013 –
Published: 27 March 2014
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