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IMPLICATIVE DILEMMAS AND GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING
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Stefanie
Dorough, James
Grice, Jessica
Parker |
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Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA
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Abstract
This study
examined the relationship between psychological well-being and implicative
dilemmas (Feixas & Saśl, 2004). Participants completed repertory grids
based on a sentence-completion task as well as standardized measures of
anxiety, depression, and self-esteem. Zero-order correlations revealed
statistically significant relationships between the percentage of dilemmas
derived from the repertory grids and the measures of psychological well-being.
Hierarchical regression analyses, however, indicated that dilemmas were not
generally predictive of psychological well-being after controlling for
variability in self-discrepancies. Two archival data sets and two individual cases
were also examined, and it was concluded that person-centered studies are
needed to effectively address the validity of implicative dilemmas.
Keywords:
Implicative dilemmas, psychological well-being, sentence-completion task
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive conflicts have long been recognized as potential
contributors to negative psychological states (Freud, 1923; Festinger, 1957;
Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Heider, 1958), although the relationship between
conflicts and negative emotions, like depression, anxiety and lowered
self-esteem has largely been explored only in theory. This is, perhaps, due to
the perceived difficulty of measuring cognitive conflicts. Using the repertory
grid technique outlined by George A. Kelly (1955), however, Feixas, Saśl and Sanchez
(2000) have recently taken steps towards more reliable measurement of cognitive
conflicts referred to as “implicative dilemmas.”
Implicative dilemmas involve awareness of discrepancies between a
person’s actual and ideal selves, as well as an implicit cost associated with
becoming more like the ideal self. For example, a woman may construe her actual
self as pessimistic, and yet wish to
be optimistic; however, she may
generally construe optimistic people
as uncritical of the world around them
or foolish – both undesirable
qualities. The woman is thus caught in a dilemma because, despite any suffering
her pessimism creates, becoming open to a more optimistic self (a desired
trait) would imply becoming foolish and unable or unwilling to think critically
about the world (undesired traits). Blocked from casting herself in the role of
her ideal self in this aspect due to a cost she considers too high, she is
consequently stuck in an unsatisfied state of self-discrepancy.
In the past personal construct psychologists have attempted to
assess cognitive conflicts using repertory grid measures based on construct
angular distances, construct content, and “imbalance” within triads (Fransella,
1972; Fransella & Crisp, 1979; Ryle, 1979; Slade & Sheehan, 1979; Winter,
1983, 1992; Winter & Trippett, 1979). Feixas and his colleagues (Feixas,
Saśl & Sanchez, 2000; Feixas & Saśl, 2004) define and assess dilemmas
based upon the correlation between congruent and discrepant constructs.
Specifically, dilemmas and dilemmatic constructs (here-to-after referred to
singly as “dilemmas”) are determined in a three-step process. First,
self-discrepant constructs are identified as those constructs on which the
actual and ideal selves are rated at opposite ends of the bipolar scales.
Second, the construct correlations are computed, and those constructs that
correlate with the self-discrepant constructs according to a predetermined
salience criteria (usually absolute r = .20 or absolute r = .35) are
identified. Lastly, the saliently correlated constructs are examined for the
location of the actual and ideal selves. For a positively correlated construct,
if the actual and ideal selves are both located at opposite ends of the rating
scale compared to the ideal self on a given self-discrepant construct, then a
dilemma is determined to be present. For a negatively correlated construct a
dilemma is identified if the actual and ideal selves are located congruently
with the ideal self on the given discrepant construct.
Returning to the individual example above, suppose the woman rated
her actual self ‘5’ and her ideal self ‘1’ on the following scale:
Optimistic 1
2 3 4
5 Pessimistic
Further, suppose the woman rated her actual
self ‘4’ and her ideal self ‘5’ on the following scale:
Foolish 1
2 3 4
5 Wise
Finally, the woman’s ratings of all the
people in the repertory grid yield a positive correlation (r = .70) between the optimistic vs.pessimistic and foolish vs. wise constructs;
in other words, she tended to construe pessimistic people as wise. Following
the three-step process above, the woman is clearly self-discrepant on the optimistic vs. pessimistic construct. Secondly, the correlation of .70 between the
two constructs exceeds either salience criterion (.20 or .35). Lastly, the
woman’s ratings for the actual and ideal selves
on the foolish vs.wise construct are incongruent with her
ideal self on the optimism vs. pessimism construct. In conclusion, she
construes herself as pessimistic and desires to be optimistic; however, she is
caught in a dilemma because movement from the pessimistic to the optimistic
pole includes a risk of becoming foolish, which is the undesirable pole of the foolish vs.wise construct.
Feixas and Saśl (2004) recently summarized
the results of several studies that support the validity of their method of
measuring implicative dilemmas. For instance, in a clinical group and a control
group they found dilemmas occurring in one third of the control group and in
one half of the clinical group, with the total number of dilemmas in the
clinical group double that of the control group. They also found implicative
dilemmas to be relevant in the clinical group’s reporting of social phobia and
irritable bowel syndrome, and their resolution to be associated with a decrease
in symptomology. In a recent study by Fernandes et al. (2005), however, the
number of implicative dilemmas computed from repertory grids was not found to
be significantly associated with general psychological well-being or problem
solving skills among students entering college in Portugal.
The extant literature on implicative
dilemmas has thus yielded inconsistent results, although many of the findings
reported by Feixas and his colleagues have been positive. Given the promising
nature of the technique and the relatively sparse number of empirical studies,
two questions regarding the validity of implicative dilemmas were addressed in
the current paper. First, would implicative dilemmas predict variability in
different indicators of psychological adjustment above and beyond what could be
predicted from self-discrepancies? As outlined above, the presence of
implicative dilemmas in a repertory grid presupposes the presence of
discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves: if no self-discrepancies are
present, then no dilemmas will be detected as well. Given the long history of
successfully predicting various emotional and psychological states from
self-discrepancies (e.g., see Boldero, Moretti, Bell, &
Francis, 2005; Higgins, 1999), it is important to establish that implicative
dilemmas contribute uniquely to the prediction of psychological well-being.
Second, given the logical dependency of implicative dilemmas on discrepancies
between the actual and ideal selves, would an alternative technique for eliciting
personal constructs lead to greater numbers of implicative dilemmas? Prior
research with implicative dilemmas has relied solely upon Kelly’s original
triadic method for eliciting the personal constructs. Criticisms of this
technique suggest that it may yield constructs that are not clearly bi-polar
but instead represent composites of poles from two different constructs (e.g., happy vs.arrogant, selfish vs. female; see York, 1985), and Neimeyer et al. (2005) have
recently recommended the dyadic elicitation procedure as a valid alternative to
Kelly’s original technique. Epting, Probert and Pittman (1993) reviewed a
number of additional elicitation techniques, and Grice et al. (2004) recently
introduced the sentence completion task as an elicitation method that may yield
fewer problematic personal constructs (see Grice, Jackson, & McDaniel,
2006, p. 1210-1211) than the triadic elicitation method. This latter technique
can also be used to elicit constructs that are relevant to particular domains
(e.g., body image, academics, romantic relationships) or experiences (e.g.,
working in a group, solving a problem, going on a blind date), and it can be
used to prompt individuals for personal constructs on which they are likely to
be self-discrepant. The sentence completion task may therefore prove
particularly useful for dilemma research.
These two questions were addressed in the
current paper through the re-analysis of archival data and through a new
empirical study. Based on prior research, it was expected that implicative
dilemmas would be present in the repertory grids of undergraduate, university
students, and that higher numbers of implicative dilemmas would be associated
with higher reported levels of depression and anxiety, and lower levels of
reported self-esteem. Furthermore, these relationships were expected even after
controlling for discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves. In addition
to these general predictions and consistent with the person-centered approach
of personal construct theory, the repertory grids of two participants from the
novel study reported below were examined in depth as another means of
addressing the potential validity of implicative dilemmas.
ANALYSIS OF ARCHIVAL DATA
Participants in the first archival data set
(Grice, et al., 2006) were 138 students (36 males, 102 females), mostly
Caucasian, ranging in age from 18 to 44 (M = 20.01, Mdn = 19.00, SD
= 2.92) years. Participants first completed a repertory grid in which they
rated their actual and ideal selves and 22 other people on 12 5-point scales
constructed from their own personal constructs (e.g., happy vs. sad, stingy vs. generous) that were elicited via a sentence completion task.
Participants then completed a trait grid in which they rated the same people on
30 marker items (e.g., takes charge, starts conversations) for the Big Five
personality traits. At least one implicative dilemma was found in a substantial
proportion of the participants’ trait grids using either the .20 (67.4%) or the
.35 (57.2%) criteria recommended by Feixas and Saśl (2004). Fewer participants,
however, generated dilemmas in their personal construct grids for either the
.20 (31.9%) or .35 (19.6%) criteria. One explanation for the different
proportions may simply be the different numbers traits and personal constructs
(30 and 12, respectively) in the grids. To compensate for such differences,
Feixas and Saśl recommended computing a standardized index, the percentage of implicative dilemmas, that
adjusts for differences in grid size. Specifically, the observed number of
dilemmas is divided by the possible number of dilemmas (kC2, where k equals the number of constructs) in the grid and then multiplied
by 100. The resulting percentages yielded positively skewed distributions, and
the means for the trait (M.20
= 2.04, SD.20 = 2.70; M.35 = 1.03, SD.35 = 1.73) and personal
construct (M.20 = 1.57, SD.20 = 3.07; M.35 = 0.68, SD.35 = 1.72) grids were not
significantly different for both the .20 [t(137)
= 1.51, p < .131] and .35 [t(137) = 1.87, p < .069] salience criteria. The effect sizes were also very
small, η2 = .02 for both comparisons, reflecting the similarity
between the compared means. Interestingly, the Spearman rank-order correlations
between the percent dilemmas for the trait and personal construct grids were
surprisingly low [r.20 =
.179, p < .036; r.35 = .126, p < .140]. These small correlations
indicate that individuals with large percentages of dilemmas in their personal
construct grids did not necessarily have large percentages of dilemmas in their
trait grids.
Participants in the second archival data
set (McDaniel & Grice, 2007) were 133 students (46 males, 87 females),
mostly Caucasian, ranging in age from 18 to 25 (M = 19.17, Mdn =
19.00, SD = 1.38) years. Participants again completed two grids in which
they considered their actual, ideal, and ought selves from their own
perspectives as well as from the perspectives of their parents (e.g., actual
self from mother’s perspective, ideal self from mother’s perspective) and a
significant other. These 12 self elements were then rated on 12 personal constructs
(elicited via a sentence completion task) and on 30 marker items for the Big
Five factors (again, 5-point scales were used). Participants also completed
self-report measures of anxiety, depression, and self-esteem. Results revealed
at least one dilemma in almost all of the participants’ trait grids using
either the .20 (94.7%) or the .35 (94.7%) criteria. Substantial numbers of the
personal construct grids also yielded at least one dilemma for either the .20
(73.5%) or .35 (64.4%) criteria. Each of these four percentages was higher than
the corresponding percentage from the first archival data set.
Statistical analysis of the percent
dilemmas again yielded positively skewed distributions with highly similar
means for the trait (M.20
= 6.98, SD.20 = 5.05; M.35 = 5.42, SD.35 = 4.19) and personal
construct (M.20 = 5.94, SD.20 = 6.36; M.35 = 4.00, SD.35 = 5.12) grids for the
.20 criterion [t.20(130) =
1.66, p < .100, η2 =
.02], although the small difference between the trait and personal construct
grids was statistically significant for the .35 criterion [t.35(130) = 2.67, p
< .008, η2 = .05]. The
Spearman rank-order correlations between the percent dilemmas for the trait and
personal construct grids were also low [r.20
= .242, p < .005; r.35 = .169, p < .054] although statistically
significant or nearly significant at the .05 level. Hence, as with the first
archival data set, the average percent dilemmas were similar across both types
of grids (indicated by the small effect sizes), and participants with high
percentages in their personal construct grids did not necessarily have high
percentages in their trait grids.
Pearson
correlations between the percent dilemmas and the self-report measures of
psychological well-being are reported in Table 1. As can be seen, the
percentages of dilemmas computed from the personal construct grids were not
predictive of the measures of well-being (all r’s < .10 in absolute magnitude). For the trait grids, however,
higher percentages of dilemmas significantly predicted higher levels of
self-reported depression and anxiety and lower levels of self-esteem, although
the size of each effect was not very large (all r’s < .30) in absolute magnitude. Given these latter effects
hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the unique
contribution of implicative dilemmas in the trait grids to the prediction of
depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. A separate analysis was conducted for
each of the three psychological well-being measures, and in the first step of
the model the number of self-discrepant constructs in the trait grids was
entered as the predictor. In the second step the percentage of dilemmas (based
on either the .20 or .35 criterion) was entered. The hierarchical model for
anxiety, for instance, was constructed as follows:
Step 1: Anxiety
= a + b1(Actual-Ideal Discrepancies) + ε
Step 2: Anxiety
= a + b1(Actual-Ideal Discrepancies) + b2(Percent
Dilemmas) + ε
Each model was assessed for outliers,
multicollinearity, and violations of statistical assumptions; and other than
skewed distributions for the standardized residuals, no anomalies were noted. The
results revealed that the observed change in R2 from the first to
second step was slight (all R2 values < .013) and not
statistically significant (all p’s
> .181) for all three models at either the .20 or .35 criteria. These
findings indicated that, beyond the number of self-discrepant constructs,
dilemmas offered little in the way of explaining variance in the self-report
measures of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem.
Table 1: Zero-order Pearson correlations for percent
implicative dilemmas and measures of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem for
the second archival data set
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| | Trait
Dilem.20 | Trait
Dilem.35 | Construct Dilem.20 | Construct Dilem.35 | Self-esteem | Depression | Trait Dilem.20 | 1 | | | | | | Trait Dilem.35 | .94** | 1 | | | | | Construct Dilem.20 | .23** | .17* | 1 | | | | Construct Dilem.35 | .19* | .16 | .93** | 1 | | | Self-esteem | -.28 | -.25** | -.04 | -.01 | 1 | | Depression | .29** | .29** | -.03 | -.06 | -.71** | 1 | Anxiety | .29** | .27** | .10 | .03 | -.43** | .63** |
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Note. Despite the skewed distributions
for the percent dilemma variables, the rank-order correlations were highly
similar to the Pearson correlations. Self-esteem was measured with the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; Depression was measured with the Center for
Epidemiological Study Depression scale; Anxiety was measured with the Hopkin’s
Symptom Checklist. * p < .05, **
p < .01
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NOVEL EMPIRICAL STUDY
Participants
Ninety-one people participated in this
study. All of the participants were undergraduate students at Oklahoma State University,
and the majority earned course credit in exchange for their participation. Thirty-five
of the participants were male, 56 were female. The majority of the participants
(72.5%) reported their ethnicity as Caucasian, 8.8% as Native American, 2.2% as
Hispanic, 5.5% as African American, 4.4% as Asian, and 6.6% as “Other.” Age
ranged from 18 to 40, with the majority of students between the ages of 18 and
22 (M = 20.54, SD = 3.41). It should be noted that degrees of
freedom reported below varied slightly due to missing data on the measures.
Materials
Idiogrid Software (Version 2.4). Idiogrid (Grice, 2007) can be used to administer and analyze various
types of self-report data. Though designed specifically around George Kelly’s
repertory grid technique, it allows the user to administer a variety of
repertory grids, including triadic, dyadic, or monadic construct elicitation
using either rating or ranking scales. For this study, grids were created in
three phases: The first set of instructions directed participants to provide
the names of 16 people who fit eight positive role titles and eight negative
role titles. In the second phase, 14 incomplete sentences were used to elicit
the bipolar constructs. These sentences were written to generate constructs on
which the participants would likely construe themselves as self-discrepant
(e.g., “I am embarrassed when I act like I am ________”). They were then
prompted to provide the opposing pole of the elicited construct. In the third
phase participants rated their actual and ideal selves and the 16 named people
(18 total elements) on 5-point scales anchored by their personal constructs.
For each rating they were also given the opportunity to choose a ‘does not
apply’ option which was recorded as missing data. The role titles and 14
incomplete sentences are included in the Appendix. Previous research using
Idiogrid has yielded data shown to be internally consistent and reliable over
time, and self-ratings using Idiogrid have been shown to correlate highly with
other multidimensional measures of self-concept (Grice, et al., 2004).
Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory. The Rosenberg
Self Esteem Inventory (RSEI; Rosenberg, 1965, p. 17-18) consists of ten
self-report items designed to measure self-esteem. Participants rated each item
on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree
strongly”, and responses were scored from 0 to 6 and totaled to generate scores
that could range from 0 to 60. Data generated by the RSEI is reported to have
both high reliabilibilty as well as construct validity (Goldsmith, 1986). Cronbach’s
alpha for all ten items in the present study was .88.
Center for Epidemiological Study
Depression Scale. The Center for Epidemiological
Study Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) is a self-report instrument for
measuring depressive symptomology in the general population. The CES-D consists
of 20 items assessing both thoughts and affect experienced in the past week. Participants
rate each item on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from “rarely or none of
the time (less than 1 day)” to “most or all of the time (5-7 days)”. Responses
were scored from 0 to 3 and totaled to generate scores that could range between
0 and 60. The CES-D has been found to yield data with both high internal
consistency and adequate test-retest reliability. Substantial evidence of
construct validity has also been reported (Radloff, 1977; Radloff & Teri,
1986). Cronbach’s alpha for all twenty items in the present study was .77.
Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist. The Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist (HSCL; Derogatis, et al., 1974a;
Derogatis et al., 1974b) is a self-report instrument designed to assess five
symptom dimensions: somatization, obsessive-compulsivity, interpersonal
sensitivity, anxiety and depression. Strong internal consistency and
test-retest reliability have been reported on all five dimensions. A freely
available 50-item version of the HSCL used in previous self-discrepancy
research (see Higgins’ review, 1999) was employed in this study. Participants
were asked to indicate, by rating each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale
ranging from “not at all” (scored 0) to “extremely” (scored 4) the extent to
which each symptom bothered them during the past week. They were asked not to
consider the presence of the symptoms on the day of participation, and
responses were averaged such that scale scores could range from 0 to 4. The
present study focused on the 6-item anxiety and 11-item depression sub-scales
which yielded Cronbach’s alphas of .83 and .81, respectively.
Results
Aggregate
statistical analyses
Implicative dilemmas were computed from the
repertory grid ratings following the algorithm described in the Introduction above.
Results indicated that dilemmas were present in 67.0% of the participants’
grids using the .20 salience criterion, and in 49.5% of the grids
using the .35 criterion. Even at the .35 level, this percentage is considerably
higher than the 34% of participants with implicative dilemmas in the
non-clinical group in the 2004 study conducted by Feixas and Saśl. At the .20
level, the percentage of participants presenting with implicative dilemmas
surpassed the 52.4% of participants with implicative dilemmas in the clinical
group of the same study. These percentages compared favorably to the personal
construct grids from the second archival data set above (73.5 for .20, 64.4 for
.35) in which individuals rated their various selves (actual, ideal) from
different perspectives. The new values were much higher than the percentages
from the personal construct grids in the first archival data set (31.9% for
.20, 19.6% for .35).
Analysis of the participants’ grid data
yielded an average of 3.75% implicative dilemmas at the .20 level (SD =
4.13) and 1.82% at the .35 level (SD = 2.78). The distributions at both
salience levels were also highly positively skewed. Independent samples t-tests
indicated that the percent dilemmas for this new study were significantly
higher than the percent dilemmas from the personal construct grids in the first
archival data set for the .20 [t(227)
= 4.58, p < .001, η2 =
.08] and .35 [t(227) = 3.83, p < .001, η2 = .06]
criteria. In contrast, the new values were lower than the corresponding percent
dilemmas from the personal construct grids in the second archival data set at
both the .20 [t(222) = 2.89, p < .004, η2 = .04] and
.35 [t(222) = 3.70, p < .001, η2 = .06]
criteria.
As shown in Table 2, the percentage of
implicative dilemmas at the .20 level was significantly correlated with
self-esteem, depression (as measured by the CES-D) and anxiety. As expected,
greater percentages of implicative dilemmas were associated with lower
self-esteem and higher depression and anxiety. At the .35 level, the percentage
of implicative dilemmas was not significantly correlated with any of the
measures of psychological well-being, although the correlation with anxiety (r
= .205, p < .052) was nearly statistically significant.
Consistent with the analyses above for the
second archival data set, percent dilemmas was regressed, separately, onto the
measures of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem while controlling for the
number of discrepant constructs (viz., the number of constructs on which the
actual and ideal selves were rated on opposite sides of the 5-point scales).
These 2-step hierarchical regression analyses allowed us to ascertain whether
implicative dilemmas predicted psychological well-being above and beyond the
number of discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves. The results of the
analyses in Table 3 show that, while self-discrepancies were predictive of low
self-esteem and high depression at both salience criteria (.20 and .35),
percent dilemmas were uniquely predictive of only anxiety at the .20 level. The
magnitude of this latter effect was also small, as percent dilemmas accounted
for an additional 4.4% of the variance in the anxiety scores beyond the number
of self-discrepant constructs. Finally, it should be noted that examination of
each regression model for outliers, multicollinearity, and violations of
statistical assumptions revealed only skewed distributions for the standardized
residuals. Given the general robustness of statistical tests to violations of
normality, no adjustments were made, and no other significant anomalies were
found for the regression analyses.
Table 2: Zero-order
Pearson correlations and descriptive statistics for percent implicative
dilemmas and measures of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem for the novel
data set
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| | Dilem.20 | Dilem.35 | RSEI | CESD | HSCLDep |
M | SD | Dilem.20 | | | | | | 3.75 | 4.13 | Dilem.35 | .848** | | | | | 1.82 | 2.78 | RSEI | -.213* | -.137 | | | | 44.77 | 9.61 | CESD | .223* | .118 | -.498** | | | 13.85 | 7.78 | HSCLDep | .195 | .124 | -.499** | .710** | | .80 | .57 | HSCLAnx | .243* | .205 | -.376** | .541** | .571** | .55 | .62 |
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Note. Rank-order correlations were highly similar to Pearson
correlations. RSEI = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory; CESD = Center for
Epidemiological Study Depression scale; HSCL = Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist.
Dilemmas were scaled as percentages.
* p < .05, **
p < .01
Table 3: Hierarchical
regression models predicting measures of well-being from self-discrepancies and
percent dilemmas at the .20 and .35 salience levels
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| | Step 1
Actual-Ideal
Discrepancies | Step 2
Percent
Implicative Dilemmas | Dependent
Variable | R2 | F | p≤ | R2 | R2 Δ |
F | p≤ | .20
Criterion | | | | | | | | RSEI | .082 | 7.96 | .006 | .082 | .006 | .578 | .449 | CESD | .020 | 1.75 | .189 | .051 | .031 | 2.79 | .099 | HSCLDep | .048 | 4.46 | .037 | .057 | .009 | .880 | .351 | HSCLAnx | .015 | 1.39 | .250 | .059 | .044 | 4.16 | .045* |
.35 Criterion | | | | | | | | RSEI | .082 | 7.96 | .006 | .082 | .000 | .032 | .857 | CESD | .020 | 1.75 | .189 | .024 | .004 | .358 | .551 | HSCLDep | .048 | 4.46 | .037 | .049 | .001 | .119 | .731 | HSCLAnx | .015 | 1.34 | .250 | .043 | .029 | 2.63 | .108 |
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Note. Degrees of freedom for the different models ranged from 86 to 89,
due to missing data. * p < .05
Unfortunately, the results did not reveal a general relationship
between psychological well-being and implicative dilemmas. In order to
elucidate these generally negative results at the aggregate level of analysis,
we examined two participants’ grids that yielded relatively high percentages of
implicative dilemmas. The first participant examined also reported a relatively
high level of anxiety, while the second participant reported a relatively low
level of anxiety.
Individual grid results: two cases
Case one: Michi
The first case we considered is that of an Asian female, age 20,
with a reported anxiety level of 1.17, substantially higher than the mean (M
= .55, SD = .62), and with 13 identified implicative dilemmas at the .35
salience criterion and 14 at the .20 salience criterion. She reported low
depression (CESD = 13; Hopkin’s Depression Scale = .45), and relatively low
self-esteem (RSEI = 32).
Michi’s grid can be seen in Figure 1. A principal components
analysis conducted on her grid yielded three strong components that explained
78.83% of the variance in her grid ratings. A plot of the first two components
from Michi’s grid (see Figure 2) revealed that she construed herself primarily
as serious, shy, nervous, and unfriendly. Her ideal self was orthogonal to her
actual self in the first two dimensions of her grid; that is, her actual self
loaded highly on the first component while her ideal self loaded highly on the
second component. Her ideal self was construed primarily as highly intelligent.
Michi was self-discrepant on five of the
constructs in her grid (i.e., she rated her self and her ideal self on opposite
sides of the 5-point rating scale) and self-congruent on six constructs. The
self-discrepant constructs are marked with asterisks (e.g., **be shy) in Figure 1, and the
self-congruent constructs are enclosed in brackets (e.g., [look stupid]). Idiogrid reports dilemmas in a user-friendly
sentence format, for example:
- Myself is construed as "act not in
friendly way"
...whereas My Ideal Self is construed
as "act in friendly way"
The dilemma is a(n) "act in friendly
way" person tends to be a(n) "likes to go crazy" person (r
= 0.51)
- Myself is construed as "be shy"
...whereas My Ideal Self is construed
as "be social"
The dilemma is a(n) "be social"
person tends to be a(n) "look stupid" person (r = 0.51)
Examination of
Michi’s 13 dilemmas (.35 criterion) revealed that all involved the
self-congruent constructs of serious,
stable, likes to go crazy, and look
stupid. These constructs can be combined into a superordinate construct
that contrasts serious stable people with foolish (i.e., looks stupid) crazy people. This new construct, or dimension, is
drawn as a dotted line in Figure 2. It can be seen that most of the
self-discrepant constructs involved in Michi’s implicative dilemmas are highly
and positively related to this superordinate dimension; that is, serious stable
people are typically construed as be shy,
nervous, and act not in a friendly. Keeping in mind Michi’s high reported level
of anxiety, it is also telling that the undesired pole of nervous is happy (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Repertory
grid for first case, Michi (click here)
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Figure 2. First two principal components from Michi’s grid (click here)
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While many might construe sad,
a term that decidedly carries a negative connotation, as the opposite of happy, Michi places it in opposition to nervous which is associated with the
desired traits of seriousness and stability. According to this logic, then, the
price of being serious and stable is happiness, and if she were to become happy she would risk casting herself into a world of uncertainty
as a foolish crazy person. Unless she can alter her construct system to break
or weaken the connections between her self-discrepant constructs (be shy, nervous, and act not in a
friendly way) and the superordinate construct (serious stable vs. foolish
crazy), or unless she can subordinate her self-discrepant constructs to the
happy vs. nervous construct, or perhaps reevaluate her contrasting
nervousness with happiness, the delicate balance of her construct system, and,
in fact, her identity, will likely prevent her from construing herself as a
happy, social, friendly person.
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Case two: Daniel
The second case is that of Daniel, a 19-year-old Caucasian male, whose grid revealed 7
implicative dilemmas at both the .20 and .35 salience criteria, and who
reported no symptoms of anxiety. He
reported low depression (CES-D = 13; Hopkin’s Depression Scale = .45), and
moderate self-esteem (RSE I= 37). His grid can be seen in Figure 3, and this
case illustrates the way in which implicative dilemmas may actually function to
protect one from anxiety. Though several dilemmas are identified within his
grid, all of the discrepant constructs share a single theme. As can be seen in
the ratings in Figure 3 and the principal component plot in Figure 4, Daniel
construes himself as somewhat rude and uncaring and construes his ideal self as
kind and helpful. As in Case 1, all of Daniel’s implicative dilemmas balance
upon a single congruent construct (good vs. feeling bad) rather than a single
discrepant construct; for example,
- Myself
is construed as "am rude to others"
...whereas My Ideal Self is construed
as "treating them with respect"
The dilemma is a(n) "treating them with
respect" person tends to be a(n) "feeling bad" person (r = 0.61)
- Myself
is construed as "being rude"
...whereas My Ideal Self is construed as
"polite"
The dilemma is a(n) "polite" person
tends to be a(n) "feeling bad" person (r = 0.52)
The cost of change that is too great for him to
pay to close the discrepant gap is simply construed as feeling bad (the opposite of good).
Kelly (1955, pp. 236-237) suggests that when a single concept, in this case
rudeness, is construed in opposition to several other concepts, in this case,
kind, caring, helpful, etc., that the shared pole likely represents a default (or
predictable) mode of behaving for the person. In other words, when it becomes
inconvenient, difficult, or uncomfortable for Daniel to be kind, caring or
helpful, he likely resorts to rudeness because it is familiar and comfortable
for him. Daniel’s construct system and the implicative dilemmas identified
therein provide what seems to be a straightforward understanding of why he
reports such low anxiety though his grid reveals several dilemmas- they allow
him to remain in a state in which he is not susceptible to negative emotions. His
implicative dilemmas exist because his ideal self is susceptible to feeling bad, where his actual self is
construed as good. The dilemmas
represent a balance of values whereby feeling good is desired over feeling bad
even if it means that he must remain in a state of self-discrepancy. It is
interesting to note that Daniel, while he places himself in the midst of the
people who play negative roles in his life and away from those in positive
roles, he does place himself in close proximity to ‘Dad’, whom he named as “the
most honest person you know personally (other than yourself).” This might be
taken up in several ways. One possible understanding of this is that the
meaning of “honest” intended by the researchers when developing the roles
differs from the meaning Daniel ascribes to the word. Where the researchers
treated honesty as if a virtue, he might associate it with bluntness, or with
“not sugar coating” things. In this case, it is perfectly reasonable, though it
need not be, that a person who repeatedly construes himself as rude might also
construe himself as honest. Another possible interpretation is that he gives
honesty enough value to overcome the negative feelings that might be associated
with construing himself along the same lines as those people in negative roles.
Without knowing more about Daniel’s relationship to his father (who, interestingly,
also appears in the grid as a symbolic construct), and the meaning he ascribes
to honesty, we must recognize that our interpretations are merely speculative.
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Figure 3. Repertory
grid for second case, Daniel (click here)
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Figure 4. First two principal components from Daniel’s grid (click here)
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DISCUSSION
Feixas and Saśl (2004; see also Feixas,
Saśl & Sanchez, 2000) have developed an intriguing method for measuring
implicative dilemmas with the repertory grid. We examined their technique in
two archival data sets and in a novel study and attempted to answer two
questions. First, could implicative dilemmas uniquely predict psychological
well-being? Unfortunately, in the second archival data set and the novel data
set our results were largely non-significant. Although we found discrepancies
between participants’ actual and ideal selves to weakly predict high
depression, high anxiety, and low self-esteem for some analyses, implicative
dilemmas added little to the prediction of individual difference variation on
the three measures of psychological well-being. Only in one analysis for the
novel data set were implicative dilemmas (determined at the .20 criterion)
found to predict higher levels of anxiety above-and-beyond what could be
predicted from self-discrepancies alone. Moreover, this one statistically
significant effect was small in magnitude (increase in R2 = 4.4%).
These null results are consistent with
those reported by Fernandes et al. (2005), who also studied college students.
Given this population of individuals, one explanation for the current results
and those of Fernandes et al. is range restriction, both in terms of age and
presence of psychological distress. Generally, the participants in the second
archival data set and the novel study reported low levels of anxiety and
depression, high levels of self-esteem, and low percentages of implicative
dilemmas. The distributions for the psychological well-being measures and
percent dilemmas were also significantly skewed. Such distributional properties
of the observed data may have attenuated the estimated effect sizes. In other
words, a more heterogeneous sample of individuals with respect to all of the
measures may have yielded larger effects and supported the hypothesized
relationships between implicative dilemmas and different aspects of
psychological well-being. Feixas and Saśl’s (2004) review of differences
between clinical and non-clinical samples with regard to implicative dilemmas supports
this interpretation.
Issues of validity regarding the
self-report measures of anxiety, depression, and self-esteem could also be
raised. While the Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory, Center for Epidemiological Study Depression Scale, and Hopkin’s Symptom
Checklist are widely used in the psychological literature and have
well-established psychometric properties, they were not developed within the
framework of Kelly’s (1955) theory. For instance, symptoms on the anxiety
subscale of the Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist such as ‘trembling’, ‘feeling
fearful’, and ‘heart pounding or racing’, hardly seem to match Kelly’s
definition of anxiety as “the awareness that the events with which one is
confronted lie mostly outside the range of convenience of his construct system”
(p. 565). It is feasible that using an instrument designed on the basis of
Personal Construct Theory, such as the Personal Construct Inventory (Chambers
& O’Day, 1984, Watson, Winter & Rosotti, 1997), could yield more
positive results.
Another explanation for the current null
results that also stems from a consideration of validity can be found in the
two individual grids from the novel study examined above. At least seven
implicative dilemmas were found in both individual’s grids, but one participant
(Daniel) reported no anxiety symptoms while the other participant (Michi)
reported a relatively high degree of anxiety. Careful examination of the
implicative dilemmas in the context of Daniel’s and Michi’s grids revealed
meaningful interpretations of their individual data. In the case of Michi, her
relatively high level of anxiety made sense in light of her dilemmas. She seems
to be caught in a struggle; she would like to revise the roles she allows
herself to play. She sees herself as unsocial and nervous, and would like to be
warm, friendly, and happy. However, Michi seems to feel that sociality is
located at the top of a slippery slope leading to a complete loss of control. She
construes nervous as the opposite of happy and links it with many congruent
constructs, most notably stable. It
seems that Michi, faced with the disconcerting prospect of looking stupid and
losing control, finds the possibility of a warm social self, along with
happiness, to be necessary sacrifices to retain control. With respect to
Daniel, his dilemmas seemed to be shielding him from anxiety. Analysis of his
grid suggests that he believes he would be a better person if he were more
polite, caring and helpful to others. As it is, despite the admittance that his
ideal self would possess these virtues, he reports that he sees himself as
someone who is generally rude and walks past others in need. Daniel’s use of
variations on the construct rude suggest, according to Kelly (1955, pp. 236-237),
that this is his default mode of behavior to which he resorts when he finds
himself unable to cast himself in a role more suitable to the occasion. Though
we might expect to find Daniel experiencing anxiety associated with his many
self-discrepancies, relatively high number of implicative dilemmas and
constriction, he reports no anxiety. When considering the congruent construct
upon which all of his implicative dilemmas are built, however, we find the
desire to be a person who feels good
apparently standing in the way of Daniel moving towards his ideal self. Intuitively,
one is able to make sense of Daniel’s “story.” Where he would like to be
someone who is affected and moved by the feeling and needs of others, he finds
himself at a standstill, because, those who are affected leave themselves open
to experiencing negative feelings as a result of their openness. Rudeness is
his armor, and dilemmatic thinking keeps it in place.
Assuming these interpretations are valid,
they undercut the hypotheses associated with the aggregate analyses…at least
the hypothesized relationship between anxiety and implicative dilemmas.
Repertory grid researchers are themselves often caught in the dilemma of having
to use statistical forms of analysis designed to address hypotheses based on
aggregates, while desiring to place as much focus as possible on the unique
person’s in the study. It may be the case that implicative dilemmas are highly
relevant in a clinical setting, but that the manifestation of any discomfort
associated with the dilemmas is not generally related to a particular symptom
such as depression, anxiety, or self-esteem. Further aggregating symptoms
(e.g., creating a total score from depression and anxiety scores) would only
serve to bury individual differences further in the data. It may be then that
the final testing ground for the validity of implicative dilemmas is the
psychological clinic, where sufficient attention may be paid to the individuals
and the unique dynamics of their construct systems.
Of course it may also be the case that one
or more moderator variables are present and must be measured in order to reveal
the relationship between implicative dilemmas and psychological well-being at
the aggregate level of analysis. Two such variables are suggested through the
comparison of Michi and Daniel. First, it may be that Michi experienced true
actual-ideal self-discrepancies, while Daniel was not considering his ideal
self to be polite, etc., but rather,
was describing his ‘ought self’ (that is, his construal of other people’s
general expectations regarding himself). If this is the case he might
experience momentary anxiety or regret in social events in which he finds
himself unwilling to comply with others’ expectations, but he would be content
with his rudeness in the final analysis. Beginning with the work of Higgins (see
his 1999 review), there is a long history of distinguishing between the ideal
and ought selves in self-discrepancy research, and permitting participants to
distinguish between these two selves may prove fruitful in improving the
predictive validity of implicative dilemmas. Second, participants’ perceived
ability to close the gap between their actual and ideal selves was not measured
in the current novel study. If people feel they cannot change themselves,
implicative dilemmas are likely to have a consolatory effect, and thus, would
not be expected to be associated with anxiety. Future studies might therefore
include a measure of perceived self-efficacy regarding changes in self-concept.
The second question we wished to address
regarded the efficacy of using a sentence-completion task to elicit personal
constructs and to create a propitious context for the generation of implicative
dilemmas. In both archival data sets a sentence- completion task was used to
elicit personal constructs. In the novel study a sentence- completion task was
also used, but it was specifically designed to generate constructs on which the
participants would likely construe themselves as self-discrepant (e.g., “I am
embarrassed when I act like I am ________”). The task was automated on
Idiogrid, and the participants experienced no difficulties in completing their
repertory grids. Analysis revealed that at least one implicative dilemma was
present in as few as 19.6% of the grids in the first archival data set and as
many as 73.5% of the grids in the second archival data set. In the novel data
set, at least one dilemma was found in 67% of the participants’ grids at the
.20 salience criterion (49.5% for the .35 criterion). The percentage of
dilemmas in the novel data set was 3.75 for the .20 criterion, which was
greater than the corresponding percentage in the first archival data set and
lower than the percentage in the second archival data set. These results show
that the sentence-completion task can be used fruitfully to elicit constructs
with the intent of measuring implicative dilemmas in a repertory grid. They
also show that grid size and grid content may play important roles in the
presence and number of dilemmas recorded. The personal construct grids in the
first archival data set were comprised of 24 elements and 12 constructs (24E x
12C), which differed from the dimensions of the personal construct grids in the
second archival data set (12E x 12C) and the grids in the new data study (18E x
14C). With regard to content, the differences between the second archival data
set and the new study were most notable; specifically, in the second archival
data set, the participants rated their actual, ideal, and ought selves from
their own perspectives as well as from the perspectives of their parents (e.g.,
actual self from mother’s perspective, ideal self from mother’s perspective)
and a significant other. The grids were thus comprised entirely of different selves.
In the first archival data set and the novel study, the actual and ideal selves
were rated along with other individuals who were known personally to the
participants. Finally, the importance of grid content on the presence and
proportion of implicative dilemmas was demonstrated by the small correlations
between the Big Five grids and personal construct grids in the two archival
data sets. These small correlations showed that a large percentage of
implicative dilemmas in one type of grid (Big Five or personal construct) does
not strongly imply a large percentage of dilemmas in the other type of grid.
For the archival data sets, the elements were identical across the Big Five and
personal construct grids, thus the grids differed only with respect to their
constructs.
Another aspect of grid design that may play
an important role in measuring implicative dilemmas is the scale employed in
the rating process. In the current novel study and both archival studies, we
employed 5-point rating scales; whereas 7-point rating scales have been used in
previous studies (see Feixas and Saśl’s review, 2004). In the novel study we
also permitted students to choose a ‘does not apply’ option to indicate if the
element under consideration fell outside of the range of convenience of the
personal construct (consistent with Kelly’s range corollary, 1955). It is
simply not known if such scale differences would negatively or positively
impact the validity of the implicative dilemmas measure. Yet another issue to
consider in future research is the method of determining the dilemmas
themselves based on the rating scale employed. For instance, in Feixas and
Saśl’s work constructs were considered self-discrepant if the actual and ideal
selves were rated more than two units apart on the 7-point rating scale. For
example, suppose the actual self was rated ‘4’ and the ideal self was rated ‘7’
on the following scale:
Foolish 1
2 3 4
5 6 7
Wise
According to Feixas and Saśl the ratings
would be self-discrepant. In the novel and archival studies above, however,
such ratings would be considered ‘undifferentiated’ since the actual self is
rated at the midpoint of the scale and cannot be said to be either foolish or wise. Consistent with Kelly’s dichotomy corollary, we considered
constructs to be self-discrepant in all three data sets only if the actual and
ideal selves were clearly located on opposite sides of the rating scale. Given
the high variability in the numbers of implicative dilemmas yielded from the
novel and archival results above, however, it appears that grid content played
the most important role in influencing the number of dilemmas. Still, different
methods of determining self-discrepant constructs should be theoretically and
empirically examined in future studies. The 0.20 and 0.35 salience criteria
employed in determining the presence of an implicative dilemma also appear to
be arbitrary and certainly warrant further investigation.
In conclusion, results from our studies
failed to support general relationships between implicative dilemmas and
depression, anxiety, or self-esteem when considered in the aggregate. All of
our samples, however, suffered from range restriction, and questions regarding
the appropriateness of the traditional self-report measures of psychological
well-being were raised. By examining two individual cases from the new data
set, we also noted several potential limitations of approaching these
hypothesized relationships through standard aggregate analysis. Future research
on implicative dilemmas might do well to utilize different measures of
psychological well-being that are more consistent with Personal Construct
Theory. Studying a smaller number of individuals longitudinally in a clinical
setting or in a period of transition (e.g., studying individuals going through
a divorce) might also prove more fruitful for demonstrating the validity of
implicative dilemmas. Lastly, as described by McAdams (1996) the “self” of any
human being is reflective of the context. That is to say, the self is not an
enduring set of traits, but rather, the intersection of various events,
expectations, people, circumstances, etc. Our analyses of different types of
grids suggest that grid content plays an important role in the presence and
number of implicative dilemmas. The context of the grid can be manipulated
using the sentence-completion task to elicit constructs that are relevant to a
given domain of experience (e.g., dating, academics, religious worship; Grice
et al., 2004). Person-centered studies of implicative dilemmas could thus be
designed in a manner that is consistent with McAdams’, and indeed Kelly’s
(1955), dynamic view of the person.
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APPENDIX
Eight negative and eight positive role
descriptions
1. A former boyfriend/girlfriend whom you
now dislike
2. A person whom you consider to be
unethical or immoral
3. A person in high school or middle school
whom you did not like
4. The teacher or coach whom you did not
like or who was a poor role model
5. The most dishonest person you know personally
6. A person whom you once thought was a
friend but in whom you were badly disappointed.
7. A person with whom you have worked and
did not get along with
8. A person in your family whom you
consider to be a poor role model
9. A current or past romantic partner whom
you still love
10. A person who upholds high ethical and
moral standards (other than yourself)
11. A person in high school or middle
school whom you liked
12. The teacher or coach whom you liked or
thought was a good role model
13. The most honest person you know
personally (other than yourself)
14. A current close friend (other than your
romantic partner)
15. A person with whom you have worked and
got along with well
16. A person in your family whom you
consider to be a good role model
Incomplete Sentences
1. It is
common to want to change things about your physical appearance. For me, it
would be nice if I were ______.
2. I am
embarrassed when I act like I am ________.
3. Often
people behave in ways they don’t particularly like. Sometimes I am disappointed
to find myself acting like ________.
4. When I
get emotional, I wish I wouldn’t __________.
5. It is
normal to sometimes envy other people. The people I sometimes envy are
typically ________.
6. It is
true that no one is perfect, and sometimes I really wish I wouldn’t ________.
7. Generally
speaking, other people think that I ought to be more ____________.
8. If I had
to describe myself in one word, I would say that I am _________.
9. One of the
things I admire about Romantic Partner is that he or she is ________.
10. In order
to make mature decisions in life, a person really needs to _________.
11. To qualify as a person I
dislike, you must be the type of person who is _______________.
12. The typical student at OSU
is the type of person who enjoys _________.
13. Most people in America
tend to _________.
14. When I go to parties, I
generally feel _________.
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AUTHORS' NOTE
The authors would like to thank Zack Colorio and Bryan Maeen for
their help collecting the data for this study. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Stefanie Dorough, Department of Psychology, 215 North Murray, Oklahoma State
University, Stillwater, OK 74078. Electronic mail may be sent to stefanie.dorough@okstate.edu.
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ABOUT THE
AUTHORS
Stefanie Dorough is a second-year student in the Lifespan
Developmental Program at Oklahoma State University. Prior to coming to
OSU, she attended an existential-phenomenologically focused psychology program
at the University of Dallas. She is currently studying person-centered
methods of assessment in the Personality Research Laboratory at OSU. E-mail: stefanie.dorough@okstate.edu.
James Grice, Ph.D., is an associate professor of psychology
in the department of psychology at Oklahoma State University where he teaches
courses on statistical methodology and personality. He is most interested in
multivariate statistics and their application to problems in mainstream
personality psychology and repertory grid research. He has been a student of
Personal Construct Theory since the 1980s and has authored a number of papers
and computer programs relevant to repertory grid methodology.
E-mail: jgrice@okstate.edu
Jessica Parker is a second-year student in the Lifespan
Developmental Program at Oklahoma State University. She is currently studying prejudice and gender
and racial stereotypes in the Social Cognition Laboratory at OSU. Her
primary research, however, focuses on interpersonal relationships, specifically
examining gender differences in cheating behaviors and relationship commitment.
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REFERENCE
Dorough, S.,
Grice, J. W., Parker, J.
(2007). Implicative dilemmas
and general psychological well-being. Personal
Construct Theory & Practice,
4, 83-101.
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp07/dorough07.html)
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Received: 15 August 2007 – Accepted: 15 October 2007 -
Published: 12 December 2007
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